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2A b st r a c t
This thesis aims to develop system that can be utilised to validate psychotherapy. The 
thesis rejects the approach of studying different psychotherapeutic modalities to see if 
they meet scientific criteria. Instead, the attempt is made to develop a model of the 
mind against which psychotherapeutic theories and practices can be measured. It is 
stipulated that a biological framework was to be used as a foundation for this exercise.
The standard model used in studying mental illness, the medical model, assumes that 
mental illnesses are similar to physical illnesses. When the problems inherent in 
defining illness and health in this medical model are examined it is seen that some of 
these are problems for physical medicine too. The issues particular to mental illness 
are made distinct by using a computer analogy. While studying the medical model and 
while using the computer analogy it is seen that the notion of function is central to 
both. From this examination it is concluded that knowing the function o f any entity is 
the only criterion for saying whether c r  not it ir  functioning properly.
The next step taken is to develop an understanding of the mind suitable for further 
examination within a biological context. This is done by following a standard 
philosophical route which shows the relationship between mind, representation, and 
the use of everyday psychological terms by which we identify the mind. This route 
also leads to a notion of function that can be applied to biological entities in general 
and the mind in particular. Having found a useable idea of function, this thesis then 
proceeds to search for the function of the mind ontogenetically and phylogenetically.
3The first o f these is done using studies which show how children acquire and make 
use of mental concepts. The second source is ethological, in which the behaviour of 
animals, especially primates, is looked at in relation to their environment and 
evolutionary background. The emphasis will be to show that the mind and its 
precursors are biological in nature, either by showing that the building blocks of 
mental structures are simple entities or by showing that there are plausible 
evolutionary reasons for the structure’s existence.
From these two sources o f evidence it is claimed that the mind in human beings is a 
biological adaptation that arose because of the social complexity of life among the 
primates. It is further claimed that the function of the mind is to allow human beings 
to categorise the environment — especially the environment consisting of other 
members o f that species —  in biologically useful ways and use that categorisation to 
aid survival. The success of using this mental ability to organise one part of the 
environment led to its being used in others. It is argued that such a model could be 
used as a basis for evaluating psychotherapeutic practices.
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7Chapter 1
Philosophical Problems of Psychopathology
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY seems to have touched quite a few areas of philosophy in the 
last few decades. Some connections are obvious: mental disorder gives a unique 
insight into the mind-body problem. But it is not just those studying the mind that 
have used the casebooks of psychiatrists, other philosophical topics have also 
benefited from the study of mental disorders. Aesthetics needs to know how the 
creative mind works and its relationship with society. The fact that there were many 
artists who were social misfits or had mental disorders but produced great art has 
often been explored. Moral philosophers, with their concern with responsibility, 
agency and the possibility of self-deception, find cases o f thought insertion and verbal 
delusions worth examining.
Close by, political philosophers and those studying the social sciences have found 
fertile ground looking at the social factors which define or even cause mental illness, 
asking questions about what constitutes a good or even tolerable human life. The 
question, “What is mental health?” produces more questions: “What is a normal 
person, how do you choose a normal “specimen”?” Perhaps a healthy human 
specimen is someone who is not depressed, not anxious, without perversions, in touch 
with reality, not alienated from other people, adapted to his or her work, not 
excessively emotional, and productive. This seems to be at some level a political 
statement about the dominant system and fitting-in rather than seemingly objective 
criteria. Does how we treat people who do not fit the standard socially acceptable
model of behaviour say anything about civilisation? When is a person mentally ill 
rather than merely eccentric? Perhaps, in an extreme case, a well-off person who can 
indulge his obsessions will be left alone while some one who is not so well off would 
be incarcerated. At one time, psychiatry used to be called “moral treatment” (See 
Susser, 1991, p. 99.)
In a broader area, Anthony Storr (1996) in his study of religious cult leaders and their 
mental make-up (in a chapter entitled Sanity and Insanity, p. 151-171) points out that a 
person cannot be judged insane merely on the truth or falsity o f his or her beliefs. He 
does this by showing how thin the line between the two really is when applied to 
certain cult leaders: the context or environment of a person's beliefs is important in 
judging if they suffer from disorders which would warrant them being 
institutionalised.
Epistemology has long been concerned with the concept of rationality, and cases of 
irrationality are often used explicatively. Normative notions in epistemology and logic 
sometimes involve evaluating human inference and decision making processes, which 
can go wrong in people with psychological disorders. The relationship between 
knowledge and belief can be explored, for example, by studying patients with 
prosopagnosia who cannot recognise familiar faces by sight, even though their 
eyesight may be fine. Prosopagnosic patients can identify people by other sensory 
modalities like hearing or touch. So if they are shown photographs of friends or 
famous faces they will not be able to identify them; but at some subconscious level 
they do seem to know, as can be shown by asking them to guess.
9Philip Pettit’s (1979) Rationalization and the Art o f  Explaining Action examines how 
the assumption o f rationality is of primary concern in any epistemology. He points out 
that we are dependent on rationality being an epistemological priority (conceptually a 
priori) if  we are to hold the values of simplicity, generality, and economy. He also 
notes that a theory o f persons is dependent on this rationality assumption.
On top o f this, philosophers studying the mind, language and meaning are the most 
obvious students o f psychopathology. Philosophers have long depended on thought 
experiments populated with bizarre people, but psychopathology provides a wealth of 
real life cases for them to use.1 Those studying phenomenal awareness and 
consciousness have been giving attention to attention itself, as well as aphasia, 
agnosia, and blindsight, hoping that these will shed light on some basic problems of 
consciousness, like the relationship between consciousness and personhood.
The knowledge that even the most bizarre mental disorders are intricately connected 
with relatively prosaic perceptual and cognitive deficits (See Shallice, 1988) has given 
a firmer ground for some materialists. We know that the mind influences the body, 
and vice versa, but just how close this connection is can be seen by the fact that the 
use of neurobiology and physiology for the study of mental disorder is not questioned 
any more. For example, Capgras Syndrome —  in which the sufferer comes to believe 
that familiar persons like close relatives have been replaced by impostors who have 
assumed the exact appearances o f those whom they have replaced —  seems like a 
pure mental illness, something going wrong in the belief system of the patient. But it 
is actually caused by a malfunction in a particular part o f the right brain. Illnesses like
10
seasonal affective disorder and depression which affect a person's world view show 
the links between perception, emotions, the brain and the mind.
But in cases like this, unless psychiatry takes over totally in treating a particular 
mental disorder, there seems to be a problem of overdetermination. For instance, in a 
major depression the patient has a set of emotional symptoms and observed 
behaviours that most clinicians would put in the same categories. But the real “cause” 
may be any number o f mechanisms, physical or psychological or a combination of the 
two. And then we are confronted by the question, how can communicative therapy 
and drugs both address the same problem? Another side to this coin is the often noted 
fact that there are mental illnesses which are two distinct phenomenological disorders 
but can be treated by the same chemical. Does this say anything about the disorders 
themselves? Anxiety and depression both respond well to anti-depressants; does this 
imply that they are both the same type of disorder?
Mental disorders clarify problems certainly, but often give rise to even more 
problems; the questions that psychopathology gives rise to seem as endless as the 
illnesses. What do thought insertions tell us about the subjective experience? In this 
disorder the sufferers believe that the thoughts they are “having” are not their own, 
but have been inserted into their minds by someone else. What is the connection 
between personal identity and self-awareness? Problems with memory show how 
mental continuity is necessary for personhood, yet Multiple Personality Disorder 
(MPD) suggests that distinct “persons” can share the same body and that 
psychological continuity is perhaps not necessary. And these are distinct “individuals”
1 For example, see the books of Oliver Sacks or Antonio Damasio’s Descartes ’ Error (1994).
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since MPD sufferers may have different personalities, each of whom may have 
different allergies and immunological reactions (Flanagan, 1994, p. 136). Quite often 
writers have been able to attack theories of consciousness because various 
psychopathologies show that the position may not be coherent. Since the ontology of 
ordinary psychology contains a wide range of emotions used as explanations of one’s 
own as well as other people’s behaviour, anyone studying folk psychology needs to 
look at cases where people have “inappropriate” emotions. Emotion specific disorders 
have also helped to show the differences between cognition and emotions.1
The philosophy of science has often worked on defining what constitutes a 
psychological or psychotherapeutic theory. (For example, Popper's attack on 
psychoanalysis.) The question here is whether the natural sciences provide a model 
that psychotherapy should emulate. I will be looking at this more closely later on, but 
right now I would like to point out that psychiatry and psychotherapy, as they are 
practised, have their own philosophy of science oriented problems. For example, how 
is a diagnosis done; is it scientific enough, in some sense of the word “science”? 
Would all diagnosticians come to the same conclusions when they examine the same 
patient? Since —  unless they are in the same school of psychological thought —  they 
often do not, it is questionable what veracity diagnosis generally have.
Leading from this, questions asked in the philosophy of social sciences about 
methodology, explanation and the fact/value distinction can be used directly in 
studying the treatment of mental disorder. The idea of normativeness, for example: is 
the concept of cure a normative notion? This can be seen in any diagnosis of mental
1 See Damasio, op cit., for examples.
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illness, but the significance of this normativeness is not clear. An example is the case 
o f a person who has delusions, which obviously require some kind of epistemic 
evaluation. Is this in any way part of the so-called scientific method?
At this level there is a very fundamental question of whether human behaviour and 
experience can actually ever be a subject for Science. All the social and psychological 
“sciences” crave some sort of scientific “respectability”. Can a way be found of 
integrating the subjective, phenomenological descriptions of mental illnesses with a 
neurophysiological basis, thereby giving a more “scientific” footing to the study of 
mental illness? Answering this question amounts to an attempt at a scientific analysis 
o f the mind or consciousness, the possibility of which is denied by many 
philosophers. Some practitioners now go in the opposite direction, and deny that a 
therapeutic practice like psychoanalysis can ever be, or need to be, scientific.1
1.1) These Problems in the Context of the Practice of Psychotherapy
Though psychopathology gives rise to many problems, the concerns of this thesis will 
be those of the last paragraph: the methodology and practice of psychotherapy. Since 
there are a large number of such practices, I will first take a general look at some 
concepts fundamental to any study of psychotherapy, the interconnected notions of 
health, disease and illness as applied to physical as well as mental health, to see if 
they can provide a model or a firm base for a close examination of the problems of 
mental health.
1 For example, see Anthony Storr's (1988) Churchill's Black Dog, Chapter 10.
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The dominant model of health and disease today is the medical one, the model 
developed by western allopathic medical science —  though it should actually be 
called a biomedical model since it is based on biological science. This science, since 
that is generally the way it is studied, is reductive, which unfortunately, gives rise to a 
reductive attitude in medicine. The biomedical model leaves very little room for the 
social, psychological and behavioural dimension of illness and because of this, many 
writers feel that a change to a biopsychosocial model is needed.1 Even if the 
biomedical model is the dominant one and encroaches on the others, it is interesting to 
note that all societies have developed the healing arts of some sort or the other and the 
need to acknowledge and control sickness seems to be a universal human need.
1.2) Health, Illness and Disease: An Introduction
In its constitution of 1958, the World Health Organisation defines health as “...a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.” (Quoted on p. 32 in Caplan, Engelhardt, Jr., and McCartney, 
(1981) and elsewhere in the book.) As many writers have pointed out, this is rather 
vacuous, since without further definitions it does not really explain what health is, and 
these further definitions could be more troublesome than a definition of health. For 
example, what is social well-being? Can it be separated from the political situation in 
the community to which the individual belongs? The WHO definition could include 
wealth, legal or political power or prestige as a part of health since these could be
14
seen to constitute social well-being. In this section I will briefly examine some of 
these points. We will see that rather than answering any questions, an examination 
will give rise to even more.2
Health and illness do not necessarily have to be polar opposites, as Harre (1991) 
points out. Health, because o f its social or cultural elements, is not just an empirical 
claim about the biological functioning of the bodily system. Generally, not having 
good health is bad luck, not bad morals, and it calls forth sympathy rather than 
opprobrium. Further, though not necessarily so, health is generally assumed unless 
illness is declared. This declaration does not always have to be by the affected person, 
but can be by society, as in the case of infectious diseases: victims can be defined as 
ill and then required to step outside society.
In a clinical sense a definition could be possible: health is the absence of disease and 
disease the absence of health. Disease generally is used to explain physical or 
behavioural disorders, disorders generally being what we find undesirable or 
disturbing as individuals or as social groups. But does an objective notion underlie the 
idea of disease? Some writers feel that there is no concept of disease in biology 
separate from the human study of biology. Diseases are only seen when there is some 
relationship with or to human beings. When we study a diseased animal or plant, it is 
because we value the life o f that specimen or species. If we study it from the point of 
the infection or parasite, for example, then the diseased organism is merely the
1 Non-allopathic forms of medicine, like homeopathy, seem to be more holistic and pay attention to the 
whole person
2 The book Concepts o f  Health and Disease, edited by Caplan, Engelhardt, Jr., and McCartney (1981) 
and the writers contributing to it, served as a useful reference point in this section and some o f the 
discussion here has been prompted, (though not exclusively) by it.
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substrate for the normal functioning of the infecting organism. Diseases thus seem to 
have a questionable ontological status. (See Sedgewick, 1981.)
It is generally accepted that physical health is normative at least in the evaluative 
sense, an evaluation against a norm. What is the norm in this case? Perhaps we could 
say that it is statistical normalcy; that this is what the majority of human beings are 
like physically. This is obviously not true, since the human constitution is different in 
different communities. The standard example is sickle cell anaemia which is present 
in the majority of the population in some areas, and is classified as a disease. 
However, having this disease gives the “sufferer” a defence against malaria and may 
actually be useful. The problem lies in “health” being an evaluative —  in the sense of 
judgmental — concept, as opposed to a causal or otherwise explanatory concept. So 
now the question arises, is it a descriptive or a prescriptive concept? Without doubt, it 
involves comparative judgements, but with what are these comparisons made?
There is also the point about illness: there is a difference between illness and disease. 
Illness, which seem? to have a connotation of “being felt”, does not always need 
disease, and you can have disease without feeling ill. In fact, most diseases become 
apparent to the person only in their later stages. Sometimes illness is used in a 
practical sense, while disease is a more theoretical notion, a pattern of factors and 
occurrences. To use the word “disease” is also an attempt to explain, perhaps show, 
some kind of causality. But then does a disease exist as a natural kind? Are there 
diseases, or are there only diseased persons (or organisms)? As Engelhardt, Jr. (1975) 
argues, to understand health we have to understand disease, but to understand disease, 
we have to understand health, (p. 31-45) Which is primary, health or disease? As
16
mentioned earlier, both can be simply and circularly defined in terms of the other: 
disease is the absence of health, or health is the absence of disease.
One writer who goes against this normal negative notion of health as the absence of 
disease, injury or impairment is Caroline Whitbeck (1981) in A Theory o f  Health, (p. 
611-626). Her arguments emphasise that there is no sharp line between health and 
illness, and a high degree of health can go hand in hand with impairment. Health and 
disease are not complementary concepts. For instance, restoring a patient to health 
may not mean perfect health, but the condition prior to whatever affliction is being 
treated. Also, individual components of health need not be “healthy” in themselves, 
physical fitness for example. And though the notion of functions is related to the idea 
o f health, things can lose their function and not be diseased or faulty: not all 
dysfunction is disease. For instance, evolutionary vestigial organs are not diseases. 
The discomfort felt by a teething infant nor that felt by a pregnant woman are 
indications of the presence of a disease. A special case is ageing: something that 
results in death need not be a disease. Though it must be said that this last case may 
be changing as a result of modem mores: it seems as if ageing is being considered as 
something the effects of which can be rectified by medicine.
Some diseases, like sickle cell anaemia mentioned earlier, may actually be useful. 
Another example is cowpox (before the smallpox vaccine was developed) a disease 
which gives immunity to other, more serious diseases. People actively try to get these 
diseases. If you examine the early stages of a disease in two persons: one who wants it 
as an inoculation, the second who actually has the disease, there will be no 
physiological difference between the two. (Another example o f a disorder which is
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actively cultivated is sterility.) Further to this, Whitbeck points out that there is 
nothing wrong with being subjective in terms of value, since it is the collective 
decision of a human community, and likely to be requisite for survival of that 
community, (p. 625) So to say that something is a disease is to say that it is a token of 
a type that one wishes to control, eradicate or treat. Sometimes the question, “Is it a 
disease?” is really a covert answer to another question, “Should this person be under 
medical care?”
Whitbeck sees health as the capacity to act or respond appropriately; it is an indication 
of what a person is capable of. Health is a psychophysiological state which provides 
the person with a large repertoire of responses. Whitbeck goes on to say the idea of 
disease is value-laden in the sense that any definition of that term implies the 
conclusion that people have an interest in being able to influence that kind of thing, 
(p. 614) There is another sense of being value laden, the strong sense, where the term 
is designated as being good or bad or desirable/undesirable in its context. This is the 
sense in which it is usually taken. Health is value-laden in this very strong sense, it is 
good but disease is only value-laden in the interested sense. Therefore, disease and 
health are different order concepts.
One writer who tries to give a tighter definition of disease is Faberga, (1981) in The 
Scientific Usefulness o f  the Idea o f Disease. His definition is: “‘Disease’ refers to 
negative (i.e. unwanted) discontinuity or deviation in the condition of the person.” (p. 
131). Faberga’s is still a social definition, since these changes in behaviour and 
functioning are noticed by comparing them to group norms, and illness is a social 
norm violation. (Here “illness” is used rather than “disease” since it is the behaviour
that is being discussed.) This illness behaviour leads to appropriate responses from the 
other members of the group: illness applies to behavioural changes, changes which 
are judged as undesirable or unwanted in a particular culture, which are considered as 
having medical relevance. In the biological sense, the concept generally involves 
factors which are harmful to the population. Or, as Faberga says:
[TJthe behaviours which realise a state of illness are different in kind from 
those ordinarily descriptive of an organism’s identity. In other words, 
organisms are individuated, among other things, on the basis of their 
social rank, age, sex, and ... style of behaviour. It is to this “whole” that 
comembers are “locked in” during group activities. In order for an 
individual to show illness and have it be “recognised” by others, his 
behaviour must deviate from the accustomed norm or behaviour set by 
him in the past. Speaking anthropomorphically, the organism has to signal 
that he has changed, (p. 137-138)
In another naper, (1981b) Faberga clarifies his position. He argues that disease is a 
bodily thing; it is located in a body and there is an abnormality in function and/or 
structure of any part, process, or system of the body. In this respect diseases depend 
on biological processes; but their recognition or assessment is dependent on 
behavioural cues. And there is a phenomenological discontinuity between the two; it 
seems to be possible to have a health framework which is actually made up of two 
separate sub-frameworks, the physiological and behavioural: he clearly differentiates 
between the two. So if  we are not pure behaviourists, the behavioural framework is 
going to involve some psychological terms; there is going to be a difference between
psychological and physical predicates and phenomena. We seem, therefore, to have 
come back to the mind, even in physical or as it is sometimes called, somatic 
medicine. Levi Strauss’s uninvited guest, the human mind (quoted in Brown, 1991 p. 
142) is present everywhere.
1.3) Health, Illnesses and Diseases of the Mind
A useful article for comparison in this respect is Lazare’s (1973) Hidden Conceptual 
Models in Clinical Psychiatry, which examines how a psychiatrist decides what 
counts as data. He uses the fictional case o f a patient who goes to four different 
psychiatrists. For example, take the older person, whose children have left home and 
is now living on their own in some huge housing project. When the children do come 
to visit, they end up fighting and the person gets depressed to the point o f suicide 
when they've left. The same person, with the same history and problems sees four 
different therapists, who have four different conceptual models: the medical model, 
the psychological model, the behavioural model and the social model. All four 
workers will give different diagnoses, a different prognoses and will prescribe 
different solutions. And all four methods will help. Sometimes more than one method 
will be suggested: the same practitioner will prescribe medication and/or a change in 
the social situation as well as behaviour patterns. “Take these antidepressants, try and 
see your children more often, and when you do, try not to talk about subjects that you 
know they’ll react badly to, and see if there’s anything particular that triggers off 
these feelings when you see them. We’ll talk about it next time we meet. Meanwhile, 
I'll try and see if the social services can move you to a nicer house.”
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A decision to use one or a combination is dependent on the interaction between the 
patient, physician and clinical situation as well as the ideology of the therapist. In the 
example above it intuitively sounds right that a mixture of modalities is prescribed, 
and it is perhaps what we would expect. Maybe it can be seen that the medication is 
prescribed to alleviate immediate symptoms and the rest is to prevent recurrence of 
the problem. This is analogous to the somatic situation where some one who gets an 
infection is both given antibiotics and told not to spend +ime in an area where the 
infection took place. Quite often, physical medicine still needs emotional or social 
education (or at least these factors need to be taken into account) to correct a malady 
or affliction: for instance, diabetes or heart surgery, where eating habits need to be 
changed.
But in the psychological case there is a problem of overdetermination. Would one of 
the methods have made a difference without the others? If, for some personal reason 
the patient said that they preferred not to move or discuss their children; would the 
medication alone have been enough? That the multiple social/environmental solution 
seems intuitively better may just be an indication of our philosophical and political 
prejudices.... Furthermore, if the political views of the therapist were taken into 
account there would be different behavioural changes recommended. Different 
scenarios can be easily pictured: if  their therapy was based on Marxism for example, 
or the patient was a woman and the therapist using a feminist therapy. And if the 
doctor came from a different medical school of thought the prescribed medication 
might be different or might even be ECT. Lazare points out that a disagreement about 
treatment between physicians is not unusual in any form of medicine and sees this as 
a positive sign, since it seems to “attest to the vitality of psychiatry.” (p. 427) But I
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cannot agree with him. In somatic medicine this has changed as subfields of medicine 
have improved over time and more has been understood about how the body works. 
And quite often a plethora of views in any medical field indicates a lack of any real 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms.
Bayles (1978) in Physicians as Body Mechanics, compares a doctor to a car mechanic 
fixing a car and considers this a useful analogy. But generally, if  there is something 
wrong with a car, we know what is wrong or we know how to go about searching for 
what is wrong. The ideology of the mechanic is not very important. This does not 
seem to be the case in psychotherapy. The issue here is that there is a qualitative 
difference between the class of organically healthy patients and the class of 
organically diseased persons. Is there such a qualitative difference between 
psychologically normal and abnormal people?
In any framework, mental diseases have a peculiar and unclear standing when 
considered in a hard biomedical paradigm. They are usually defined in ways that 
always involve mental terms like feelings, particular types of beliefs, emotions and 
desires as well as terms of social relationships. The inferences formed from such 
terms are based on standard techniques and methodology for a particular modality, 
such as gestalt therapy or psychoanalysis. Generally no facts about the patient’s body 
are allowed, once medical conditions are ruled out by prior tests. These inferences are 
based on “felt” statements like, “My heart starts beating faster”, or “I feel faint”. 
Judgements about mental diseases are then reached in terms of formulations about 
behaviour and about the way the mind functions. Inasmuch as it is behaviour, they are
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related to a biological substrate, but the assumption is that they are at a different level, 
at least in the sense of structure.
One way to see this is from the point of view of actual practice, where verbal reports 
are needed in both physical or mental disease at the level of symptoms as indicators of 
impairment. But a physician need not always trust verbal descriptions the way a 
psychiatrist has to. Verbal reports do not logically imply a particular understanding of 
bodily functions; and though physical medicalisation sounds necessary it is possible 
that a meaningful discourse can be undertaken without understanding any related 
bodily events. This is often seen in societies, generally preliterate ones, where illness 
is often explained in supernatural and social ways.
Medicalisation is also a statement about universals, it assumes that diseases, whether 
physical or mental, are transcultural. Doctors who move from where they have trained 
to another culture would still be able to perform their work. This is not necessarily so 
for a psychotherapist. One might answer that this is because what a psychiatrist deals 
with is the mental world, which is culturally created. There may be a few human 
universals but the mind is a cultural artefact.
Many people are now emphasising that the social sciences are just as fundamental as 
the biological and pharmaceutical sciences when it comes to medicine in general. This 
is because symptoms are usually, if not always, expressed in behavioural terms. 
Behaviour is understood according to cultural norms and the way in which patients 
see themselves and their impairment, and expresses that impairment, is determined by 
social, psychological and cultural factors as well as biological ones. This also extends
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to the decision process of recognising and specifying unhealthy behaviour, and then 
planning to have it corrected or controlled.
With the biomedical model in physical medicine so confused, one might question 
whether the medicalisation of mental illness is a worthwhile project? I will take it as 
granted that even though there are problems, the biomedical model has been the most 
productive so far. No one can doubt the advances physical medicine has made. So I 
would answer that it is definitely worthwhile. But this raises a further question: is the 
analogy between physical or organic problems and mental problems just an analogy 
that should be discarded when it is not needed any more? Or should it be kept on as a 
metaphor — as long as it is seen as a metaphor — if it facilitates the treatment of 
mental illnesses? Or perhaps it is not an analogy or a metaphor, but actually the case 
that all mental problems and physical problems are similar and should be seen as 
such. If this is indeed true, then the aetiology, diagnosis and treatment of mental 
illnesses could follow the lines of treatment for organic ailments. The claim in this 
thesis is that this is indeed the case.
1.4) The Aim and Methodology of This Thesis
In the preceding sections many questions have been raised to show the range and 
depth of problems associated with this field. I am not going to try and answer all the 
questions individually; instead, I will be circumventing the problems by building up a 
conception of mental health and disease from more basic notions. By this I do not 
mean some a priori understanding is going to be used to analyse the concepts 
underlying mental health, but rather that our exercise is going to be theory driven. The
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theory we will be using will be evolutionary theory and it will provide us with a 
context or working paradigm. This paradigm, in the form of basic assumptions used in 
this thesis, will be put into place in the next chapter.
After these assumptions are in place we will go back, in Chapter Three, to try and 
establish what the medicalisation of mental illness means, and what we stand to gain 
if mental illness is fitted into the medical model. For this we will have to see what the 
medical model entails. There are a lot o f prejudices associated with the medical model 
as it is applied to mental illness, and we need to see if those prejudices are valid. We 
will do this in Chapter Four by using another analogy that is used in studying the 
mental — the analogy of the computer. This analogy will be used to strip away any 
factors that are not really pertinent to the thesis. While studying the medical model, 
and while using the analogy of the computer it will become apparent that what is 
central to both is the notion of function. Therefore we will be asking if the mind has a 
function.
We will have seen that what is problematic about any attempt to physicalise the mind, 
and hence fit it into the medical model is a version of the mind/body problem. So 
before trying to answer the question of what the mind is for, we have to be sure what 
we mean by the mind. In Chapter Five we shall see that this problem centres around 
what are known as propositional attitudes. Do propositional attitudes have a function 
in the biological sense? We will see in Chapter Six that the idea of function is basic to 
biology and that you cannot have modem biology without the idea of function. Then a 
connection will be made between propositional attitudes and function. Having shown
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that propositional attitudes can be functionally understood, we will go on to see if 
there is any evidence that they actually have a function.
In Chapter Five and Six we will have adopted certain positions or systems because 
they are useful. There will be justifications for these adoptions, but the main point is 
that they have been adopted because they work. But after that we must travel down a 
different road, one that is built on empirical evidence, and not paved with the 
philosophical certainty of sufficiency or necessity. The empirical evidence points to 
what is possibly the case; that this is how things are; not that, given this particular 
analysis, this is the only way to view the mind.
This second road is multidisciplinary and dependent on three sources for evidence: the 
first o f these is child development studies where we will look at experiments which 
show how children acquire and make use of mental concepts. We will also look at 
studies of children who cannot make use of these concepts, because sometimes when 
things are broken or fall apart, we can more easily see how they were constructed. 
The second source will be ethologic?! studies. Here, we will examine the behaviour of 
animals, especially primates, in relation to their environment and evolutionary 
background. Finally, we will take a brief look at the paleontological studies of the 
recent evolution of human beings. Looking at these fields will give us an indication of 
what the mind is designed for, that is, what function the mind evolved to fulfil. Let us 
keep in mind that this is what empirical evidence suggests, it is not a philosophically 
logical argument, but it may help to tell us something about mental illness.
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However, before we start examining arguments and evidence, we should agree on 
what counts as evidence or from what field evidence is permissible. This will again be 
dependent on the paradigm we use and the assumptions that underlie that paradigm. 
The next chapter will explain these assumptions.
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Chapter 2 
The Paradigm To Be Adopted
THERE WILL be some assumptions underlying the whole of this thesis. For instance, 
the medical model which will be discussed is dependent on seeing humans as 
biological entities; all living organisms will be assumed to be complex adaptive 
systems. The fact that evolution is responsible for the complexity of present day living 
organisms is taken for granted. Along with this is the assumption that anything that is 
biological has to be seen in the light of evolutionary theory. Just as every part of the 
body is there for some evolutionary reason, the mind too must have some 
evolutionary reason for its existence. (It will be apparent that there is also the 
assumption that there is some connection between the brain and the mind!) We may 
also need to get rid of some assumptions like the commonly held nature/nurture 
separation since the inside and outside distinction as applied to bodies is not very 
meaningful when it is seen in evolutionary terms. As Elliott Sober (1984) points out: 
“Biologists are regularly reminded that fnness is not a unitary property of the 
organism itself, but involves the system of relations by which organism and 
environment are bound together.” (p. 51)1 Further, we know from evolution that 
species may not be a natural kind. So a human being may not be a particular “kind”, 
an entity temporally and physically static; it may be the human being with its 
evolutionary history that has to be seen as a kind instead. A point that will be 
emphasised throughout is that there are no sharp lines in biology. Even such
1 Also see Goldsmith, 1991, p. 70 and passim  on the falsity of the nature/nurture distinction and the 
accompanying debate on biological determinism.
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seemingly basic categories such as living or non-living are fuzzy when it comes to 
acellular organisms like viruses.
Using the theory of evolution as a way to support or disprove psychotherapeutic 
therapies is not new. Many people who have developed such theories have used 
biology to try and have a firmer foundation. An example is the work of Bowlby who 
based his theories on research on primates and the imprintmg experiments o f Konrad 
Lorenz. Bowlby, a child psychologist and psychiatrist was also familiar with the work 
o f Harlow who showed that young monkeys had a biological need to cling to their 
mothers, and that these young monkeys chose cloth wrapped monkey mannequins in 
preference to wire ones which had feeding bottles. On the basis of his studies of 
young children, Bowlby suggested that there is a need for an attachment figure in 
humans and this is not dependent on whether the attachment figure is a good feeder or 
care giver. He based his theory on the view that natural selection would have favoured 
the survival of children who had a sense of attachment to a protective figure who 
would look after them. As a result of our evolutionary history, biological physical 
attachment leads to psychological attachment.
Bowlby’s work seems widely accepted, but there are theories which seem more far 
fetched. For example, Julian Jaynes (1993) in his book The Origin o f  Consciousness 
in the Breakdown o f  the Bicameral Mind says that early humans were not conscious in 
the sense that we are (or even in the way that some primates are). Instead they had 
bicameral minds where the left hemisphere of the brain controlled the body without 
recourse to any “mind”. The right brain calculated possibilities, plotted action and 
planned and informed and advised the left brain, which then based its actions on these
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suggestions. This right brain “talking” to the left was what the ancient Greeks called 
gods, who constantly interfered, gave suggestions and were concerned in the minutiae 
of everyday life in way that later gods were not. It is fairly recently that this internal 
speech ceased and became integrated into one personality, with the internal 
monologue becoming what we call consciousness. In modem times, those who again 
have this dichotomy between the two halves of the brain we call schizophrenic: 
hearing voices is one o f the defining characteristics of this illness.1
2.1) Models and Modalities
What this thesis is about, in a broad sense, is an evaluation of psychotherapeutic 
practices. One possible way to do this would be study each modality or 
psychotherapeutic practice and examine it to see if it meets present day scientific 
criteria. Although such an examination is a possibility, what I want to do is somewhat 
different. The aim is not to support any one theory, but to see if there is a framework 
or model which can be used to generally support or disprove therapeutic modalities. 
So I am working at a more fundamental level. It is not a question of whether, for 
example, Freudian complexes actually exist or not, or if  schizophrenia is a result of 
something going wrong in the hemispheric connections o f the brain. I am attempting 
to see if  there is model of the mind, of mental phenomena, which can serve as a 
platform to support other theories, or be used to weed out other theories.
1 A review of the history of evolution based theories o f mind can be found in Robert Richards’ (1987) 
Darwin and the Emergence o f  Evolutionary Theories o f Mind and Behaviour. It also has a section 
showing where sociobiology fits into the historical scheme as well as early work on evolutionary
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The word “model” has been used without comment throughout the earlier sections 
and will be used throughout this thesis, so it would be appropriate to explain what is 
meant by it and why it is being used. A model serves the purpose of being something 
to which other systems can be compared or can be fitted into, to see their usefulness. 
It also serves the further function of being able to be studied without dismantling the 
whole edifice which it models. There is a distinction to be made between models and 
theories and that distinction should be kept in mind. Of prime importance is the notion 
that models are intended as heuristic aids rather than as complete descriptions, so they 
are useful rather than true. Further, models are less “data sensitive”, discontinuing 
evidence is damaging to a theory but not necessarily to a model. When I say that “I 
am attempting to build a model” it sounds as if  a particularly weak demand is being 
made. But it should be noted that it is not; all that is being said by the use of this word 
is that now we are not dependent on the truth or falsity of any particular theory, but 
able to accept or discard them or as scientific consensus changes.1
It should pointed out that the idea of models used here actually contains two notions 
incorporated into one; conceptual models are systems c f  interrelated concepts used to 
characterise and categorise the nature of certain phenomena; while explanatory 
models are used to actually explain phenomena by, for example, attributing cause to 
them. A conceptual model could theoretically be compatible with an infinite number 
of explanatory models. In this thesis, Chapters Two to Six will form conceptual 
models while Seven and Eight will be explanatory.
models o f the development of science. A very interesting discussion on why the commonly held notion 
of the naturalistic fallacy is no fallacy at all can be found on p. 612-620.
1 See footnote, p. 75-76 in Hundert (1989) for similar use of these terms.
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Also, a note on usage: occasionally in the later stages it may seem as if the words 
“models”, “theories” and “hypothesis” are used interchangeably, this is because the 
various authors referred to in this thesis label their work in this manner. To examine 
whether the writer is presenting a theory or hypothesis would take us far beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
2.2) Evolutionary Epistemology
Since part of this thesis is about how human beings come to acquire knowledge about 
the world, my discussion fits into a field known as evolutionary epistemology. 
Unfortunately, this phrase has come to acquire two senses. One refers to the way that 
theories replace each other: the way science has “progressed” through the years is said 
to be comparable or analogous to the way evolution works, with theories that are 
“better adapted” or “fitter” surviving and displacing those that are not. The way I am 
using it, however, is in the second sense: that knowledge human beings have and use 
is intimately connected with the way human beings are, that it is therefore biological, 
and cannot be separated from this fact. Our thinking, our reasoning, is based on 
cognitive capacities which have evolved as have all our other capacities. Evolution 
becomes a dock for Neurath’s ship.
An example of this way of thinking is the work of Crook (1980) who bases his 
philosophy on the hunting behaviour theory. According to this theory, early man’s 
hunting behaviour, dependent on social transactions and reciprocal altruism, gave rise 
to the cognitive activity which then gave rise to the large brained modem man. This 
cognitive activity is our way of viewing the world and acquiring knowledge. His aim
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is to show how evolutionary theory can give support to a therapeutic theory and, in 
that respect, it is similar to some parts of the present work. However, more recent 
research shows that this hunting hypothesis is possibly wrong and the selective 
pressures could have come from another dimension; there are more useful and better 
empirically supported theories.
What all such writers are saying however, is that evolutionary epistemology shows us 
that we can know reality because there is a certain correspondence between our 
cognitive structures and the structures of the real world. These cognitive structures 
form our understanding of the a priori, and explain why we have certain ways of 
reasoning.1
I will be looking at these cognitive structures, but it is worth remembering that this 
methodology is dependent on empirical evidence, not logical certainty. In this thesis 
what I want is a plausible account. Plausibility demands simplicity, internal 
consistency and coherence. Apart from the obvious requirement of internal 
consistency, the demands of simplicity and coherence mean that this theory is going 
to have to cohere or at least be compatible with whatever other theories in science —  
neurobiology, for example —  may already be in place. This will chiefly involve 
coherence and dependence on the modem synthetic theory of evolution based, as it is, 
on natural selection. Developing a naturalistic approach means having some kind of 
ontological restraint, invoking only entities whose causal powers can be understood in 
naturalistic terms. Sperber (1996, p. 99) in his attempt to formulate a naturalistic basis
1 For example, Sattler’s (1986) Biophilosophy, especially p. 198-202, or Riedl’s (1984) Biology o f  
Knowledge. (Though their work is not in agreement and Sattler criticises Riedl!)
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for anthropology suggests that we start off recognising only human organisms in their 
material environment, natural and artificial, and focus on the organism’s mental states 
and processes and on the physical-environmental causes and effects of these mental 
things. This will be my view too; but I would add that we also need to look at other 
species, since the restriction to humans seems limiting. Finally we should not assign 
specific problems to the study of the mind if they are problems for any other 
discipline too, for instance problems of logical causality which seem to exist in all 
fields. Georges Rey (1997) calls this the “Fairness Principle” (p. 27) and it is 
worthwhile to adopt this when thinking about problems like supervenience.
2.3) Evolutionary Theory
One aspect of the naturalisation programme is the dependence on evolutionary theory. 
Since this will be foundation of this work, it is necessary to spend some time on it 
here. The modem version of it is known as the synthetic theory of evolution, since it 
joins the standard Darwinian theory of evolution with Mendelian genetics. It is a 
continuously evolving theory, dependent on ongoing research, and hence evolution 
cannot be tightly defined. However, its importance to the present study is illustrated 
by the title of an article by evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973): 
Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light o f Evolution. As he explains in 
the article, the facts which constitute biology can only be connected to make a science 
by using the theory of evolution. This means that anything in biology has to be 
explained historically.1
1 Reprinted in Ridley 1997, also quoted in Sober (1994) p. 5.
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Living organisms possess an inherent capacity to reproduce and because o f this we 
might expect the population of a species to increase. However, animal populations on 
the whole tend to be stable. This stability is achieved because of the competition of 
individuals for limited resources like food, space and mates. All individuals are 
different from each other to some degree and this gives rise to some being more 
successful than others. Individual differences are selected for: passed on and inherited 
through reproduction and generally, those that are passed on are those of successful 
individuals. Though, as a means of shorthand, we speak of character differences being 
passed on, what is selected is the genotype, the actual genetic material. This results in 
the phenotype, which is the expression of the genes, the individual who is their bearer. 
Because o f all this, the genetic make up of any species tends to change over time. 
Those individuals who are successful tend to have more of their offspring survive 
because they pass on successful traits. This reproductive success is called “fitness” 
and it is not a general or abstract concept, but fitness for a certain environmental 
situation. A trait that confers fitness in one environment may actually lower it in 
another.
It should also be noted that a genotype without environmental building blocks would 
remain a genotype and nothing more. Environmentally supplied materials, in the 
absence of genetic information to organise their use in development would remain an 
unorganised collection of molecules. The development of every aspect of an organism 
—  its appearance, its physiological mechanisms, its behaviour, its everything —  is the 
product of an interaction between hereditary information and the environment that 
provides the substances for development.
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This is a very simplified precis of the theory. But is it “correct” or “true”? As Rom 
Harre (1992) says:
The reality o f the mechanisms of evolution as proposed by Darwin is a 
separate question from the reality of evolutionary process, that is the 
gradual change of species. Nowadays it is hardly conceived by most 
biologists that Darwin’s theory began as a model o f the real process in 
nature, so much is it taken for granted that Darwin’s model is real. I 
suppose that it is still just possible, though extremely unlikely, that it may 
eventually turn out that quite different mechanisms are responsible for the 
evolution of species, (p. 177)
This mirrors Quine’s distinction between ontology and ideology: ontology is the set of 
things or processes that need to exist for the theory to be true, the set of worldly 
things; while ideology is the set of the theory’s predicates or the set of words. Two 
theories may share an ontology without sharing an ideology. It is the ontology that I 
will be using, without being necessarily committed to an ideology. All that is required 
for evolution to take place is that something is capable of replication, that is, it is 
capable o f making copies of itself. In this process of copying, some mistakes will be 
made (mutations). These mistakes will also produce copies of themselves. These 
copies may survive or fail in a particular environment and hence may or may not 
produce any more copies.
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There are problems with the theory of evolution. Some of these are merely historically 
important and have been resolved. Others have not, and defy attempts at resolution in 
spite of the work of scientists as well as philosophers of biology. For example, as is 
usually said, evolution naturalises teleology and hence makes it legitimate as a form 
of historical explanation. But what is the nature of this explanation, that is, what is it 
that evolution explains; and is this the same sort of explanation that is found in the 
other sciences? Is it causal or descriptive or something else altogether?
Or again, when evolution “acts”, what does it act on? What are the units of selection? 
This leads on to the question, mentioned earlier, of what the definition of species is 
and how species should be classified, since they are supposed to change over time.1 
Such questions seem philosophical in nature; there are other questions which look as 
if they can be answered only by empirical research. For example, what is the origin of 
life itself; how did evolution start? Some of these are outside the purview of this 
discussion. Some, like those concerning the nature of explanation, are important to 
this thesis, but only inasmuch as they underlie the whole discussion: they will be 
visible o n l v  rarely.
There are other problems in using evolution as a basis for studying behaviour and 
minds. One of the most important for this thesis is the clash between two opposing 
views: the punctuated equilibrium theory versus the adaptationists. This thesis is on 
the side of the second, which says that natural selection is the most important 
mechanism in evolution: all the characteristics of living organisms are adaptations to a
1 See Hull's classic paper, A Matter o f Individuality (1978) for a discussion on the historical explanation 
of biological concepts like species; and why they work better than static explanations.
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particular environment. What this means is that traits cannot have arisen by except by 
being acquired gradually through time. According to this view, there really is no other 
way to explain the presence of complex structures.
The punctuated equilibrium theorists say that though this is partly true, there could 
also have been cataclysmic events which gave rise to the characteristics we see today. 
A corollary to this view is that there could be “spandrels” which arose accidentally 
because o f the way other traits are designed by evolution, and do not themselves have 
an adaptive purpose. “Panglossian” is the name given to adaptationism by its 
detractors (notably Lewontin and Gould) on the grounds that it claims near universal 
explanatory power for natural selection and seems to say that there is a reason for 
everything. In this debate it seems as if the adaptationists are winning, though this 
may be only because of their larger numbers!1
But what exactly is an adaptation? A workable definition can be found in Barkow, 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992, p. 62-63): something is an adaptation if it is 1) a system 
o r inherited and reliably developing properties that recurs among members of species 
that 2) becomes incorporated into a species’ standard design, because during the 
period of their incorporation, 3) they were co-ordinated with a set o f statistically 
recurrent structural properties outside the adaptation (either in the environment or in 
other parts of the organism), 4) in such a way that the causal interaction between 
outside and inside (in the context of the properties o f the organism) produced
1 For a short description of the debate, see Sober, 1993, p. 119-142. A defence of the adaptationist 
programme can be found in Williams (1996) and Dennett (1995) among others. A review o f the debate 
from the other side can be found in Eldredge (1995); who does emphasise the closeness o f the two 
views. Also, see Ruse’s (1995) Evolutionary Naturalism, which puts the debate in its palaeontological 
context, p.70-105.
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functional outcomes that were ultimately tributary, with sufficient frequency to the 
species propagation.
Though the arguments are more complex than have been described here, and may be 
unnecessarily obscure for the needs of this thesis, there are some factors in the debate 
which are important to the present thesis. I have accepted the adaptationist view for 
my work for two reasons. The first is that it seems to me to provide a good research 
programme or strategy.1 Even if in fact not every trait has an adaptive significance — 
it could be a by-product —  this hypothesis does not seem very useful. (The word 
adaptive is to describe something that has a use now and is being maintained for that 
reason.) If we claim that the traits exist for a historical reason then we can start 
looking for that reason. Let us also keep in mind that to use the word adaptation is not 
to say something about the present usefulness of a trait but about its history, that 
having it gave the organism some selective advantage at some stage of its 
evolutionary history. Some traits may, in fact, lack current usefulness. Sometimes 
traits get co-opted for something else. Maintenance is also an important concept here: 
the nrevention of evolution, as Williams calls it (1996, p.32). But all of these are to be 
understood by looking at their history. So what I am saying here is that all organs, all 
limbs and appendages, all functional body parts as well as behavioral patterns are to 
be seen as being present now because of the process of evolution; there are no 
functional forms which do not have a history. For the purposes of the present thesis, 
there are no “spandrels” nor novel functional forms. This can be seen as the primary 
assumption or axiom of this thesis.
39
Schilcher and Tennant (1984, p. 63) make the distinction between universal 
explanatory power and universal applicability: this seems to be close to my suggestion 
o f research strategy. Evolution has universal applicability, but may not be able to 
explain everything. And as they point out (p. 100), the theory of evolution not only 
explains design, but the absence o f design; for example, when we see that something 
could have been done more efficiently in another way, or old structures are used for 
new purposes.
One of the points made against the “just so” post hoc stories that adaptationists are 
accused of relying on is that they have no predictive powers. This is not so, quite 
often evolutionary psychologists, for example, can actually predict what the empirical 
findings will be. We will see some of these cases later. In short, even if we allow the 
possibility that the anti-adaptationists have a point and that not every trait has an 
adaptive value we will still have to agree that most traits do. And if you do not search 
for a function you will not find one. As a working hypothesis, not much else is 
possible.
Another use of the idea of adaptation is linked with usefulness and function. I do not 
have to explain mental phenomena by recourse to “emergent properties”, for example. 
This is important if  I am going to say that the mind has a function. To encapsulate a 
major portion of this thesis in a few words, we have minds because we evolved them 
and we evolved them because they were useful. Finding out why they were useful will 
help us understand what the mind is and hence its proper functioning.
1 Sober (1998) has a trenchant discussion on adaptationism as a research strategy.
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Finally, the concept of adaptationism is connected with what is known as optimality 
theory. This allows adaptationism, the idea that most, if  not all, phenotype features are 
in some sense contributory to fitness, to be applied to behaviour: generally, through 
natural selection the behaviours of organisms tend to the most cost-effective use of 
time and available resources in a particular environmental situation. This will be a 
useful tool to have when we study mind and human behaviour.1
In the study of mind it has often seemed as if  philosophers need to keep the human 
species separate from other animals, and lines have been drawn which make humans 
seem unique. But these lines have often been moved and now it seems as if they have 
faded to non-existence. A part of implying that there is an evolutionary solution to 
any problem is to acknowledge that there is a possible or theoretical (if not actual) 
continuity between other species and us. This continuity is taken for granted in 
various fields of medicine, and occasionally in research on mental health where 
animals are used to test medication or symptoms induced which are claimed to be 
similar to those in humans. For example, see the volume (Keehan, 1979), 
Psychopathology in Animals, especially in the work done on depression, 
schizophrenia and addictions.2 This is an attitude I will adopt
1 For a deeper look at optimality theory see, for example, Dupre (1987) or Williams, (1996).
2 However, the contributors to this volume do not pay much attention to philosophy except the ethics of 
experimenting on animals.
41
2.4) Ethology
Ethology is the study of the natural history of animal behaviour and of prime interest 
are the selective pressures which have acted in limiting and controlling its evolution. 
Do ethological studies have anything to tell us about the mind? Though ethology was 
in some ways a response to behaviourism, until recently ethologists only used words 
like “instincts” and “innate behaviour” to avoid charges o f anthropomorphism. 
Furthermore, incidents like the Clever Hans type phenomenon frightened them into 
not making any statements attributing mental faculties to animals and —  except for a 
few workers like Konrad Lorenz who stuck their necks out — most used terminology 
that was compatible with behaviourism. The major difference was that ethology 
acknowledged that behaviour was far more complicated then was seen in laboratories, 
and the natural environment of the animal had to be taken into account.1 As far as 
animal minds are concerned Lloyd Morgan’s canon has been the tool of choice: “In 
no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher 
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which 
stands low^r in the psychological scale.” (Quoted in Thorpe 1979 p- 28.)
One problem for us in using ethological studies is the terms used. When they did use 
them, ethologists in the past do not seem to have been aware of the problems 
philosophers have with the meaning o f words like “mind”, “awareness”, 
“intelligence” or “consciousness”. Quite often they used them interchangeably and
1 A classic example of this can be found in Gould and Gould, p. 58 on guiding biases which lead 
researchers to realise animal behaviour cannot be understood in the lab without knowing the species 
ecological niches and evolutionary history. There is also the point that animals which do well in 
laboratory experiments are generally scavengers species like pigeons, rats and mice which are 
relatively flexible species to whom, in the wild, learning would be important.
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without qualification. At this stage I will not attempt to analyse the differences 
between these terms, but I will eventually have to take a closer look.
However, the connection between animal minds and our own minds and the meaning 
of some of these words, seems to be getting clearer with the newish discipline of 
cognitive ethology, which was kick started by a remarkable book by Donald Griffen 
(1976): The Question o f Animal Awareness. He considered it a prejudice, not a sign of 
scientific rigor, that animals were denied mental faculties: even the simplest of 
animals have a large repertoire of behaviour which philosophers seem to have 
ignored. Quite a few animals show flexibility and creativity which supposedly only 
humans possessed. Griffen suggests that it is time that the violence done by Morgan’s 
canon and Occam’s razor be repaired. He pointed out that Morgan's cannon is based 
on an intuitive classification of behaviour into higher and lower categories in order to 
ensure that we do not ascribe human mental activities to animals, we then insist that 
the lower is always to be preferred unless evidence forces us to choose the higher. But 
as Griffen points out, the distinction between lower and higher is based on no 
objective scale, (p. 47)
His studies show that there is no real behavioural discontinuity separating us from 
other species. (He also reminds us that early behaviourism was agnostic, not a denial 
of minds, p. 57.) If there is a line drawn, it is by philosophers who have needed to 
emphasise the superiority or at least the difference between humans and other 
animals. They subscribe to the idea that all animal behaviour is either innate or 
formed by stimulus-response learning, that nothing was novel or arbitrary, and the 
assumption that behaviour could only be of two exclusive types, instinct as opposed to
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conscious choice. Griffen’s book contains a wealth of examples which show that this 
conception is wrong, and how difficult it is becoming to deny animals some ability to 
think. Language is often mentioned as the factor that separates humans from other 
animals and one of his examples is the sixteen criteria which one writer (Thorpe 1972 
quoted on p. 34-37 of Griffen) claims can differentiate human language from animal 
communications. Griffen shows that some forms of animal communications fit these 
criteria. Especially in the case of bees, many recent experiments make it impossible to 
doubt that bees are actually communicating with one another in some rudimentary 
language. He also shows that certain animals can be shown to have a “culture” and 
“cultural learning”
It might be pertinent to note that W.H. Thorpe in The Origins and Rise o f  Ethology, 
(Thorpe, 1979, p. 160-162) makes some points specifically directed at philosophers 
who questioned the use of symbols in bee dances, not understanding how complex, 
adaptable, how flexible and purpose based these dances are, how they can be used by 
the bees for a variety of purposes and sometimes even refer to things in the past. For 
instance, to signal nectar in yesterday's position when signalling in the middle of the 
night when there is no sunlight: when the signalled bee flies out in the morning, it 
takes a very different position relative to the sun.
Other researchers have followed Griffen’s work; we shall be looking at some of this 
in later chapters, especially work done with primates, but I should mention here 
Gould and Gould's book (1994), The Animal Mind in which the two authors show 
how flexibility and creativity can be found in the repertoire of animal behaviour. They 
also give examples o f cultural transmission of knowledge in animals, especially in
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birds, who are taught by older birds to distinguish predator species. I would like to go 
in some detail into this area, for instance, the goal-setting by beavers, conceptual 
categorisation by parrots, etc. but space does not permit it. However an important 
point needs to be made here: one prejudice that Griffen was against is the notion that 
large brains are needed for any sort o f cognitive processes, and that simpler neural 
mechanisms are only capable of stimulus-response type o f operations. He argues that 
cognitive processes like thinking and awareness may be adaptive because they made 
up for the lack o f hard wired brain tissue (Ristau, 1991, p. 55). That is, the larger the 
brain, the more pre-programmed instructions it can contain and less the need to think, 
while a small brain needs flexibility to interact with a dynamic environment. Let us 
not forget that the brain, of any sort, is an expensive organ to maintain in terms of the 
energy from food it needs to keep going, so it must be there for a reason. Evolution is 
not going to maintain an organ that an animal can do without.
It is interesting that this is one area where philosophers have actually worked with 
animal researchers, the most notable being Bennett who, with cognitive ethologists, 
formulated more useful versions of Morgan's canon, and Dennett who worked with 
Seyfarth and Cheney on intentionality in vervet monkey warning cries. Ristau (1991) 
shows how important philosophy is to cognitive ethology. This is partly due to the 
happy coincidence that there are animals which are living embodiments of 
philosophical thought experiments on intentionality and language. For example, this 
statement: “When asked to compare two vocalizations, vervet monkeys make 
judgements about them according to their meaning rather than simply according to 
their acoustic properties.” (Cheney and Seyfarth p. 145, in Ristau, 1991). Is this a 
philosophically accurate statement? Are vervet monkeys actually able respond to
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“meanings” and not some very complex signalling system? Another example of 
philosophical interest is deception; animals that play dead when attacked, or lead 
predators away from nests. Or, cognition; Burghardt's work on a two-headed snake is 
as strange as any thought experiment. (Ristau (1991) p. 53-90)
O f course, inasmuch as this is a scientific endeavour all the ethological theories are 
open to revision. For example, bee dances —  mentioned above —  are a standard 
example used when discussing language and communication in the natural world. 
(And one I will again be using.) It is taken for granted that bees communicate the 
location of nectar to each other by dancing, changes in the dance correspondend to 
changes in the position of the flowers aimed at. There are, in fact, alternate theories to 
the bee dance language theory: For example, the work of Wenner and Wells (1990). 
They suggest that the bee may find the location of the nectar by what they call an 
“odour search” and not an intentional communication between two bees. But these are 
dissident voices and it seems difficult to discount the work and opinions of other 
cognitive ethologists.
2.5) Sociobiology
There have been applications of ethology and optimality theory to human behaviour, 
and these are generally lumped under the title of sociobiology. Sociobiology tried to 
show that some forms of social behaviour, animal and human, are adaptations and 
may have been selected for as a solution to a particular adaptive problem. Konrad 
Lorenz’s ethological forays into human society seem like a precursor, but it was the 
famous Chapter 20 in E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology —  where, among other things he
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tries to biologically explain schizophrenia, criminality and religion —  which kicked 
off a furious debate. This debate has largely died down, with most scientists firmly on 
the side of the sociobiological methodology, though not necessarily supportive of the 
same conclusions as Wilson.1
The initial angry reaction was to the idea that human beings could be studied in the 
same way as animals, and were supposed to follow some of the same behavioural 
rules. This sounded like it was taking away human free will. But after all, since Freud 
(or, even earlier) it has been realised that the reasons for our behaviour need not 
necessarily be known to us; and eventually it was generally acknowledged there was 
something to be learned from sociobiology. Researchers continued with their work, 
with its major — if sometimes understated — premise that biological knowledge 
based on evolution is needed to inform any study of human beings, whether that study 
be physical, behavioural and even cultural.
2.6) Evolutionary Psychology
Earlier workers in sociobiology ran into trouble because they tried to go directly from 
evolutionary principles to explanations of culture or social life without including 
psychology. Evolutionary psychology is what fills the gap between the two. This has 
been pointed out forcefully by Cosmides and Tooby (1987 and in other articles 
elsewhere, especially in The Adapted Mind by Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992). 
According to most modem researchers the human mind/brain was “designed” during
1 For a discussion on the debate see Michael Ruse's (1984) Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense or a
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the Pleistocene period. The job of evolutionary psychology is to ask, “ ...[W]hat are 
the design features of this architecture— if any—that regulate the relevant behaviour 
in such a way that it would have constituted functional solutions to the adaptive 
problems that regularly occurred in the Pleistocene?” (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 
(1992) p. 55)
Evolutionary psychology is based on the difference between proximate and ultimate 
explanations in biology as applied to psychology: proximate explanations are the 
physiological and behavioural functions triggered by present environmental signals. 
Proximate causes are dependent on physiology on biochemical responses to stimulus. 
In contrast, ultimate (or distal) causes depend on evolutionary explanations and are 
the adaptations set in place through evolutionary history. They are genetically 
mediated tendencies to behave in a particular fashion. Natural selection has provided 
an organism with proximate mechanisms to produce the selected behaviour, for 
instance, to make it feel better about certain behaviour patterns rather than others by 
the release of natural opiates. All behavioural activity, including those important to 
social situations are biologically maintained by the release, control or withdrawal of 
chemicals like endorphins and other endogenous opiates. Natural selection does not 
select directly for behaviour, it selects for psychological processes and their physical 
substrates which underlie behaviour.
The ethologist studies behaviour patterns o f organism in their natural environment, 
paying attention to the evolutionary history of the species under study. But what 
environment? In terms of evolution we have seen that the past is as important as the
briefer discussion in Sober, 1993.
present: to see the development of any organ or behaviour, we have to search for the 
environment in which it developed or the environmental period which posed an 
adaptive problem which it solved. This is known as the environment of evolutionary 
adaptiveness. For man it was the Pleistocene period, extending from between 1.6 
million to 10,000 years ago. This was when whatever hominid precursors we had 
finally evolved into Homo sapiens. If  we can understand some of the pressures of that 
time, we can understand some of the solutions nature came up with to ensure our 
survival, solutions such as intelligence.
What was man like during the Pleistocene period? There have been various attempts 
to piece together a picture from palaeontological evidence, and the consensus is that 
early man lived in groups and was basically a hunter-gatherer, dependent on some sort 
of social organisation for survival, much like our nearest living evolutionary 
neighbours, the primates of today. It was during this time that the hominid brain size 
increased to what modem humans possess, giving rise to a higher intelligence or at 
least a higher information processing ability. It seems as if there were some selection 
pressures which gave a runaway or snowball effect: some theories say h was 
language, others that the information acquiring and processing needed to be a hunter 
gave the impetus that caused the brain to grow. Still others say that it was tool 
making. The runaway effect is central to all these theories: if  some thing, language for 
example, gave a selective advantage to those who had it, the advantage would be so 
great that through generations the capacity would itself increase the capacity to have 
that capacity, much like a snowball rolling downhill.
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As well as theories based on language or tool-making, there are others, one of which, 
the socialisation theory, will be of particular interest in the present thesis. This theory 
is partly based on ethological work on primates and it is worthwhile keeping in mind 
that in terms of time, there are only approximately 350,000 generations back to where 
our evolutionary branch divided from the apes (Dunbar, 1996, p. 10), so studying them 
is likely to tell us something about ourselves.
Most of this work is based on the idea that there are some human behavioural 
universals, and that understanding these universals would give us some indications of 
how evolution has designed the human mind. But are there such universals? Everyone 
agrees that the need for shelter, food and mates is universal among human beings and 
biological in basis. But there seems to be some prejudice against saying mechanisms 
by which we try to achieve these needs, especially psychological mechanisms, are 
also biological and hence universal. For a long while anthropologists claimed that 
there are no real human universals: culture and language alone form the human mind. 
The idea was that the brain/mind is a blank slate, or a general problem solving 
mechanism responsive to any situation it firds itself in, although I do not think that 
even these cultural relativists would have said it is an absolutely blank slate. This idea 
has been shown to be wrong and much research has been done on the ubiquity of 
universals. (See, for example Brown, 1991 and Sperber, 1996.) There may seem to be 
a great diversity in human behaviour across cultures, but this diversity is misleading. 
A classic illustration is the way we divide the colour spectrum: since the spectrum is 
uniform across the visible wavelength, there should be no reason why it should be 
divided in any particular way. However, it seems that all cultures divide the spectrum 
in a similar fashion. Another example is the facial expressions that denote basic
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expressions of fear, hate, anger and surprise; they are fairly standard between 
cultures.1
In Genes, Minds, and Culture, Wilson and Lumsden (1981) explore the connection
between genetic evolution and cultural history. As they point out, human genes affect
the way that the brain and hence human cognitive structures are formed; which
stimuli are perceived as such and which ignored, how information is processed, stored
as memories, recalled and so on. The processes that create such effects they call 
• • 2epigenetic rules. What is postulated is that epigenetic rules give rise to evolutionary- 
developmental modules which have particular areas of relevancy o f information and 
information processing. The goal is to insure the minimal cost, in terms of time and 
energy. (Remember the big brains-small brains point made above.) Relevancy here 
means what is important to that particular organism or species. In humans there will 
be a relevancy towards language, logic and arithmetic, for example.
This point is clarified by Tooby and Cosmides, (1989) in The Innate Versus the 
Manifest: How Uraver sal Does Universal Have to B°., (p. 36, In response to a target 
article by Buss on sex differences in mate selection.) They say that a person’s innate 
psychology and his or her manifest behaviour is related in the following way:
1 See Sperber, p. 114 for more on this topic and Wilson and Lumsden (1981) on the way the colour 
spectrum is divided (p. 44-45) and also for a discussion on why a general problem solving strategy 
would not work as well as a specific built-in strategy to cope with the world (p. 53-85) and hence the 
necessity of a modular brain. Brown, p. 85, gives a brief explanation of why there cannot be general 
purpose minds. But this topic will feature in Chapter Seven.
2 Epigenesis is a term used in embryology to describe how organisms and organs develop from 
precursor cells because of their position relative to other cells as well as their developmental history; 
development is the sum total o f all the interactions between genes and the environment, including the 
chemical environment such as hormones, that gives rise to the phenotype.
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The mapping between the innate and manifest operates according to 
principles of expression that are specified in innate psychological 
mechanisms; these expressions can differ between individuals when 
different environmental inputs are operated on by the same procedures to 
produce different manifest outputs, (p. 36)
They point out that this is similar to Mayr’s suggested difference between closed and 
open behavioural programs: programs that are open to environmental inputs and 
hence variable in expression, as against those that are closed to environmental input 
and therefore uniform in expression.
2.7) Other Attempts to Apply Evolutionary Theory to Human Beings
It might be thought that at least in recent times the study of the human body would be 
firmly based on evolutionary theory. But even this has been slow to change, as has 
been shown by Nesse and Williams (1995) who point out how modem medicine 
could benefit if evolutionary principles were included in its study. Though the human 
body is a wonderful object well suited to survival, essentially it is a collection of 
evolutionary compromises collected into a patchwork: solutions to different adaptive 
problems cannot always be coupled together perfectly. The most common example is 
the fact that back problems effect nearly everyone, because the back was not designed 
for our upright posture, an evolutionary recent adaptation. And in the case of mental 
health, Nesse and Williams point out that if  emotions are adaptations shaped by 
natural selection, they can be understood just like any other biological trait. For 
example, anxiety may have had the function of preventing future dangers; while an
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emotion like sadness or grief may have evolved to prevent additional losses after a 
death in the social group (p. 209). But the environment to which man was first 
psychologically adapted is very different from, and clashes with, the modem 
environment, and this could be the reason for some modem mental problems. Somatic 
problems that might cause mental disorders in modem life are not flaws but design 
compromises.
Depression is a case in point. Experiments with animals have shown that depression 
seems to have the function of regulating and maintaining hierarchies. It is an 
involuntary sign of submission which saves the individual from attack by dominants. 
Once an individual is quietened and out of harm’s way because of the depression, it 
can plan how to best accept its social position, or decide to change this position after 
evaluating the situation.1 However when hierarchies become confused, or when we 
lose sight of hierarchical stmctures, for instance, when we do not know who our peers 
and superiors are, or have the wrong set of peers, depression becomes a common 
response. (For example, television, may give an unnaturally high materialistic idea of 
hierarchies, to which most of us can never attain.) Nesse and Williams make an 
interesting point that knowledge of the normal functions of the emotions would 
provide for psychotherapy something like what physiology provides for the rest of 
medicine. But, they add, many psychiatric symptoms might then turn out not to be 
problems in themselves, that is, not diseases, but defences, like fever and cough in the 
physical sphere.
1 Mood and dominance are co-dependent in social species, (Nesse and Williams, op cit., p. 219)
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In other fields Sperber (1996) attempts to naturalise anthropology, that is, to give it a 
more biological base, and show how the earlier relativism was mistaken. There is also 
the work of Steven Pinker (1994) who argues that man has a biological instinct for 
language and shows how language could have evolved.1 Again, Wright (1995) in The 
Moral Animal, shows that most human morals, if  seen in the light of evolution, are 
related to standard frameworks like game theory and genetic altruism. He also makes 
an interesting point about self-deception. It can be shown that it is advantageous to 
animals to deceive other animals when they are competing for mates, space and food 
or even to escape a predator, and the animal being deceived is going to be looking for 
signs that it is being deceived. Having the ability to maintain a “poker face” will be an 
evolutionary advantage; and the best way for an animal to show no behavioural signs 
of its next move would be to hide its next move from itself, perhaps by keeping 
“thoughts” of “plans” inaccessible to emotion or other centres in the brain.
An eye-opening work is that of Daly and Wilson (1988) who have examined cross- 
cultural records of violent crimes like murder and rape and show that they are just 
what evolutionary theory would predict. (They also point out why Freud’s Oedipus 
theory is wrong according to evolutionary theory. It is not sexual competition but 
competition for attention in terms of time that the child is fighting for.) Even 
aesthetics is coming under the magnifying lens of evolutionary psychology: an 
interesting work is Dissanayake’s (1998) who asks why most cultures have some form 
of art and what art does for human beings. What Dissanayake does is shift the focus 
away from the question, “What is art” to “What does art do for people?”
1 He also gives an incisive criticism of Gould’s punctuated equilibrium position and a defence of 
adaptationism.
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2.8) Reverse Engineering
After establishing what a workable sense of the word “mind” could be in the coming 
chapters, we are going to make a similar shift, from asking “What is mind?” to “What 
does having a mind do for human beings?” A useful idea here is that of reverse 
engineering. In the engineering process, we know what we want to do and we design 
a product to do just that. But what if we already have the finished product? If we have 
an object, say a man-made artefact or tool, and we want to know what it is, how do 
we go about finding out? You will get some basic information from just examining 
what it is capable of doing. But there is a big difference between what something can 
do and what it is supposed to do. Cosmides and Tooby (1994, p. 95) give the example 
of a toaster. If you were told that this thing will warm your hands, stop paper from 
blowing around if  put under it, and can be used to kill someone by dropping it into a 
bath, would you be able to guess its structure beyond knowing that it gave off heat, 
was electrical and heavy? On the other hand, if  you knew that it was designed to toast 
bread, the way you went about trying to see how it worked would be different and 
procably more usefu l1
In a discussion of mental health, one problem is going to be to understand what we 
mean by mind. We all know we have one but when we try to define it or identify or 
locate it in ourselves, we come upon a host of problems which can be found in any 
basic philosophy of mind text. A separate but related problem is that o f other minds. It 
may be that we have some ineffable experience which lets us know that we have a 
mind, but why do we attribute a mind to other people? The question “What does
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having a mind do for humans?” may provide a clue to all this. In terms of reverse 
engineering, this question could be rephrased as: “The design solution is the mind. So 
what was the problemT’ But first I would like to retrace my steps and see if  I can 
clarify some issues in mental health, with a view to showing why we need to take this 
route.
1 See also Dennett (1995) on the idea of reverse engineering.
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Chapter 3 
Are There Mental Illnesses?
THE DISCUSSION in the following section hinges on a fundamental question: If a 
patient has no organic disease, trauma, or lesion, and no anatomical, physiological or 
neurochemical abnormality, can he or she still be considered ill if they show mental 
disorders? This is akin to asking, can there be an objective or third-person diagnosis 
of a mental illness, followed by treatment which is not dependent on the personal 
views of the practitioner but on scientific knowledge?
The answer, according to most psychotherapists would be an unequivocal “yes”. 
Unfortunately, answering this question in the affirmative leads to further questions: 
What do we mean by illness? In the case of the mind, how do we define normality and 
abnormality and hence disorder? Perhaps we can say that it is the same distinction as 
is between somatic health and disease. In which case, what is the suitability of the 
medical model for mental illness?
Most people who have attempted to answer these questions have ended up 
disparaging psychotherapy. Two historically important and influential critiques of 
psychotherapy were Eysenck (1952) and Szasz (1961). Both caused problems for 
psychotherapists irrespective of the school to which they belonged. The earlier crisis 
was precipitated by H. J. Eysenck who questioned the worth o f psychotherapy in its 
attempts to alleviate neurosis, and claimed to show that most patients with neurotic
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disorders resolve their problems spontaneously, without the need for any form of 
systematic psychotherapy.
Thomas Szasz in the Myth o f Mental Illness (1961), and his other books, questioned 
the concepts used in categorising and hence diagnosing mental disorders. He pointed 
out that these concepts have a normative and holistic character that is dependent on 
culture and/or society, which is supposedly uncharacteristic of scientific medicine in 
general. He suggests that perhaps psychiatry is better seen as an ethical and practical 
enterprise that deals with “problems in living”, more connected with the social fabric 
than a medical subclass concerned with the treatment of disease. A succinct summary 
o f Szasz’s view as well as its continuation can be found in The Meaning o f  Mind by 
Szasz (1996)). What is especially interesting is his implication that any philosopher 
who uses a naturalistic or materialist theory to show that mental illnesses do exist is 
obviously supporting the present reactionary political system.
I do not want to dwell too long on these critiques, since they are not pertinent to the 
present discussion except in passing. As noted earlier, the aim of this thesis is develop 
a model using contemporary theories rather than answer criticism about modalities. I 
will be returning to Szasz's views briefly while arguing for the medical model, but an 
actual appraisal of Szasz is not necessary. However, it needs to be pointed out that 
these criticisms have not gone away. Eysenck’s results as well as his basic premises 
have been challenged, but some essential problems do remain. For example, he 
suggested placebo controls, whose use in verifying medical practices is standard 
procedure, but how can this be done with psychotherapeutic methods? It seems 
doubtful that psychotherapies will be able to reach the clinical standards which the
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rest of medicine aspires to. In this case maybe we should question whether the 
medical model is the right one for mental illnesses.
Arguments have continually raged over the exact limits of mental illness. Some, 
following Szasz —  and R.D. Laing who popularised this idea —  regard the whole 
concept o f mental illness as a myth. Others consider that the majority of seemingly 
normal people suffer from some mental abnormality or the other and could benefit 
from some form of therapy; there are as many sorts of mental problems as there are 
individuals who suffer from them. There is no doubt that a social factor is usually 
involved in diagnosing mental illness: it is what society sees as being right, wrong or 
inappropriate behaviour.
The problems have in fact worsened: there are now more than 400 different types of 
psychotherapy (Erwin, 1994, p. 262) but there is no way of evaluating or comparing 
them to see which ones might be more effective or suitable for a particular type of 
disorder.
In the case of psychotherapy for neurosis, there always seem to be other reasons why 
the patient could have improved. There are some obvious benefits which a patient gets 
anyway even before therapy commences. For example, there is an increase in morale 
because the person is attempting to do something about his or her problem. Anyone 
who is seeking psychotherapeutic help has already accepted that there is a problem: 
this acceptance may itself lead to a solution or be a part of the resolution. Frequent 
and regular contact with other human beings, what Erwin (op cit.) calls “process
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effects” may also be important in effecting a cure. (See also the Dorothy Rowe article 
mentioned below.)
3.1) Definitions
A note of warning is necessary here: the words, “psychiatry” and “psychotherapy” 
seem to have varied usage in the literature and even more meanings in ordinary usage, 
but for the purposes of this chapter I shall be using the words in the following sense:
P sy ch ia try  is the branch of medicine which is concerned with mental disorders and 
seeks to find organic — for instance, genetic — causes for their presence. 
Practitioners generally depend on the use of pharmacology and/or physiological 
methods, such as electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) and surgery, to affect a cure. It is 
sometimes specifically called scientific or biological psychiatry. Methods of 
assessments of this form of therapy, such as placebo testing, are the same as those 
used to assess any other medical process.
P sy c h o th e rap y  refers to any of the variety of psychological methods, for instance 
psychoanalysis, used to modify mental, emotional and behavioural disorders. It is 
what Stevenson (see below) calls communicative therapy. As compared to psychiatry, 
the relationship between the patient and the therapist as well as the methodology is as 
important as the therapy itself. This is in contrast to psychiatry where, supposedly, 
any doctor could administer a particular drug.
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The separation between the two seems a remnant of Cartesian dualism which still 
pervades any philosophical or medical study of the brain/mind connection. However, 
it should be emphasised that in actual practice the two are not exclusive: most 
therapies are a mixture of both. The most ardent of medical psychiatrists would admit 
the role of environmental and social factors in the causing and curing of mental 
disorders, and their tools for facilitating recovery would be more than just a 
prescription pad. Even in a philosophical sense it is difficult to separate what is 
physical and what is purely communicative.
But on the whole, psychiatry has achieved a more legitimate status. One of the 
reasons for this is that the other sciences seem to have long looked down on 
psychology and psychotherapy because o f their lack of rigor in terms of assessment 
and theoretical status. They do not seem to meet the standards of the “hard” sciences 
in their empiricism, and they balk at the unquestioned validity of the experimental 
method as the one road to scientific truth and knowledge. This is, of course, a problem 
for all the social sciences, but psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapy seem to be 
more troubled because the fundamental problems of mind always seem to be based 
around subjective experience.
There are perhaps other reasons, reasons that cannot be scientifically analysed and 
need to be seen in a social framework. Sometimes mental illnesses are seen as a 
failure of the will and therefore with disdain. Susan Sontag’s book, Illness as 
Metaphor (1978) shows how blame becomes central to the self image of those 
suffering from some illnesses. Elaine Showaiter's (1997) Hystories, examines why 
there is a resistance to problems which are felt to be medical being classified as
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psychological. Generally, people much prefer their illnesses to be medical, that is 
organic or biological, since they are then given social permission to act in a particular 
way and be absolved of responsibilities towards society. Society only sympathises 
with those who did not bring about their own illness through their behaviour. Many 
mental disorders are seen as not fitting into this criterion, and therefore the sympathy 
accorded to the sick does not follow a diagnosis of mental illness in those cases. 
Something that is labelled as psychosomatic (whatever this word is taken to mean) is 
treated as if  were not really serious, it is “all in your head”. Until quite recently, 
people with anorexia were told, “Don’t be a fool, just pull yourself together.” What is 
happening is that it is sometimes felt that organic damage or malfunction somehow 
limits the blame and/or the stigma associated with mental problems and asocial 
behaviour. A “materialistic” diagnosis perhaps results in the absolving of blame and 
relieving of the feeling of shame, so may be reassuring to the patient. The supposed 
certainty of medical diagnosis and cure is reassuring to both patient and society.
Is this certainty lacking in psychotherapeutic diagnosis? How is a mental illnesses 
identified? Only after a mental illness is diagnosed and identified as such can we talk 
about what kind of therapy is useful. The standard text in this respect for both 
psychiatry and psychotherapy is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, currently in its fourth edition (DSM IV). There is also the ninth edition of 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD 9). The ICD divides mental disorders 
into three classes, neurosis, psychosis and mental retardation; the first two are divided 
into further sub-classes while mental retardation is subdivided into degrees. The ICD 
classification is not considered as advanced as the DSM.
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The DSM starts from a definition of mental disorders which centres on “a clinically 
significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern” “in an individual” and 
“not only in the relationship between the individual and society”, which is “associated 
with either a painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more important areas 
of functioning.” In the DSM, mental disorders exist as separate entities, not as 
gradations. An important point in comparison to other branches o f medicine is the 
DSM claim that disorder classification is “generally atheoretical with regard to 
aetiology”. So there is no real correlation between the forms taken by the disorders 
and their causes, which means that medication may be used to treat the diagnostic 
symptoms, not the actual illness. (The quotes are from Gregory, (1987) p. 466.)
This seems to reflect the problem pointed out by N.G. Blurton Jones (1976, p. 428- 
429): studies of human behaviour depend on two forms o f research: “emic” 
statements which depend on “contrasts and discriminations, significant, meaningful, 
real, accurate, or in some other fashion regarded as appropriate by the actors 
themselves” and “etic” statements which “depend on phenomenal distinctions judged 
appropriate by the community of scientific observers.” Psychotherapy seems to waver 
between the two, since there does not seem to be a way of choosing between one or 
the other. If  psychotherapists are out to alleviate individual suffering, it is obviously 
the actor whose opinion is most important; if on the other hand the treatment is to be 
medical, it needs to be integrated into the rest of science. This is further confused by 
the fact that, normally, a scientist tries to make sure that his or her emotions do not in 
any way influence the experiment. In psychotherapy, quite often therapists must 
recognise and use their own reactions to the patient, and analyse what these reactions 
are telling him or her about the patient/client.
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Does psychiatry, with medication or other invasive methods, actually cure the illness 
or merely alleviate the symptoms? This is not an attempt to denigrate psychiatry, 
which the word “merely” may imply: there are many therapies in the standard practice 
of medicine which help the patient to not suffer, so the body can be allowed to heal 
itself. The difference between illness and symptoms can be seen in a physical illness, 
the common cold. There is as yet no cure for the cold, but a large variety of 
medication is often prescribed as a treatment. Cough syrups or drops are given to 
anaesthetise the throat, to stop the coughing usually accompanying the later stages of 
a cold. Decongestants are given to clear the nasal passages o f mucus to make 
breathing easier, painkillers are prescribed to ease the body ache. But none of these 
medications actually cure the cold; only the body’s natural resources and the passage 
of time can do that. A further problem with this where mental illnesses are concerned, 
some medications prescribed for mental disorders do not treat specific functional 
“abnormalities” but the whole brain, and since they are usually administered orally or 
into the blood stream, the whole body.
In general medicine diagnosis means finding the cause and the aetiology of the 
disorder, which entails an analysis of the disease process. In contrast, in the mental 
health field it seems as if nosologies are derived from descriptive categories which 
were developed by consensus among teams of psychiatrists. This amounts to nothing 
more than a labelling of the phenomena that mental health specialists think they 
observe, combined with first person accounts of the patient's experiences, which is 
exactly what the DSM approach attempts to do.
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3.2) The Medicalisation of Mental Health
An examination of these issues can be begun by having a look at three articles which 
address some of these problems and provide a starting point for further discussion. 
Leslie Stevenson (1977) discusses, in Mind, Brain and Mental Illness, the distinction 
between mental illness and bodily illness and the psychiatry-psychotherapy divide. He 
starts off by examining what a strong materialist theory of the mind would imply. 
Intentionality is the major stumbling block for such theories and he points out that —  
commenting specifically on the Smart-Armstrong identity theory —  using 
intentionality as a criterion does not necessarily imply that there is no such thing as 
mental illness, just that all mental illness has a physical basis. (We will be taking a 
look at intentionality shortly.) He finally comes to the conclusion that a version of 
non-reductive materialism, namely Davidson’s anomalous monism, would “make 
room for both the physiological and the psychotherapeutic aspects of psychiatry” (p. 
39). However, there are some more recent approaches to the mind which may give a 
more satisfactory solution to Stevenson's problem than anomalous monism.
There is a pertinent response to Stevenson’s article by Dorothy Rowe (1980) in which 
she makes two interesting points: first, that most models of illnesses, mental as well as 
physical, have been built on the assumption of a single, physical cause. This 
assumption may not be valid. Using the example of tuberculosis, she points out that 
modem epidemiological studies have shown that cases of tuberculosis cannot be 
blamed just on the tuberculosis bacillus and must take into account social and genetic 
factors. So it seems that it may not be possible to isolate a single cause for some
65
illnesses: there may not be a single causal chain, but “a network of genetic, 
physiological and social factors” (p. 110). This might also be true of mental illnesses.
Second and possibly more important, she points out that Stevenson’s distinction 
between “methods of treatment which essentially involve communicating with the 
patient, and those that do not” (Stevenson 1987, p.32) may not be a valid one either. 
In any form of medical treatment the communicative aspect is as important as the 
physical, if  only because they cannot be teased apart. She makes the point with two 
illustrations of mental illness and its treatment, drugs and electro-convulsive therapy. 
Lithium, unlike other medication prescribed for some forms of depression, involves 
regular meetings with a doctor or nurse, that is, frequent contact with caring and 
concerned people. This may be a major factor in its success as a treatment.
She also makes the case that when ECTs are prescribed, the beliefs o f the doctor and 
the patient, and the communication between, them cannot be separated from the ECT 
itself. The attitude o f the doctor towards the form of treatment may be as important as 
the treatment. Some doctors prescnbe ECT only as a last report and the patient who 
knows this can come to the conclusion that this is the last chance to get better. As she 
puts it,
[Psychology and psychiatry have been slow to learn what the physicists 
have known for years — that the observer is always a part of the 
experiment.... [T]he patient is always engaged in trying to make sense of 
his individual world. Everything that comes into his world carries some 
communication, (p. 112).
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This seems to be an extremely important point, and difficult to ignore.
However, there is an even stronger point to be made here. Since it has been shown 
that certain acts and forms of communication, verbal as well as physical, actually 
cause physical changes in the nervous system, and are necessary for its development, 
any distinction between the two is going to be even more difficult to make. Physical 
communications like stroking and hugging are important if  the nervous system in 
young primates is to develop into that of an adult. For example, Kraemer, in A 
Psychobiolgical Theory o f  Attachment (Kraemer, 1992), shows that monkeys reared 
without maternal care or peers have damaged physical structures in the brain. It is also 
well known that learning is not a process by which the brain just absorbs information, 
but involves actual physical changes in the brain. So this difference between 
communicative and non communicative methods of therapy is quite hazy if not totally 
arbitrary. Some cognitive therapies use the learning of coping methods to cure 
phobias, which seems a communicative method; but if the physical basis of the mind 
is actually changing through these methods, changing as much as it would because of 
something like ECT, is it really just communicative therapy?
In a later issue of the same journal T.S. Champlin (1981) discusses the same issue but 
from a different viewpoint. He is mostly concerned with the writers who attack Szasz 
who justify the reality of mental illness by using an analogy with physical illness.1
1 Anthony Flew and Ruth Macklin are among the writers he lists.
He presents the sceptic’s case against mental illness and then attempts to refute it. His 
argument is that problems have arisen because of the concepts of mental disease and 
mental illness. He argues that these are two distinct expressions, which should not be 
conflated. The first is a metaphor and should be seen as such, while the second may or 
may not be a real description. Those who have tried to show that there is such a thing 
as mental illness using the analogy of physical illness have floundered on this 
distinction, they have been using the words “disease” and “illness” as if  they were 
synonymous. According to Champlin, “Disease is logically parasitic on organic 
growth.” A corpse cannot have a disease, neither can the wooden leg of a piece of 
furniture, even if the tree that it came from was diseased. Further, you can have a 
disease and yet feel perfectly healthy.
This “feeling” is important. He compares the difference between wounds received in 
battle and wounds caused by surgery. Only the former are real wounds since they 
were the results of woundings. You can speak about surgical wounds but they are not 
real wounds, since the surgeon does not actually wound his or her patients. Intention 
and pain seem to be important here. And in the same way you can only have a mental 
illness if  you feel ill in some way or the other. So when mental disease is spoken off, 
it is in the sense of “corruption is a disease in modem society”, which does not add to 
the ontology of diseases. Champlin goes on to say that mental illness necessarily 
involves impairment of one’s mental health, just as physical illness necessarily 
impairs one’s physical health (p. 477). That is, feeling ill and having a physical illness 
are logically related: if  there were no such thing as feeling ill, there would be no such 
thing as suffering from a physical illness. So plants can have diseases but not 
illnesses.
68
Though this is a very brief summary, I cannot agree with some of his arguments. Why 
cannot a corpse have a disease? I can certainly imagine a doctor discovering that a 
person who has died in a car accident has cirrhosis. Why does the cirrhosis stop 
because the person “stops”? When Champlin says, “...[I]t is you, not your body that 
has the disease,” (p. 479) I am not sure what he means.
He lists what he sees as some of the differences between mental illness and physical 
illnesses, (p. 474-475). First, some physical illnesses are infectious while no mental 
illnesses are; Second, the victim of a physical illness, if  conscious, has some 
discomfort, while in the case of mental illness quite often it is other people who 
complain first. Third, you cannot speak of a fatal or mortal mental illness, that is, you 
cannot die of a mental illness. Fourth, many illnesses are trivial while there are no 
mental illnesses that could be considered minor: a mental illness cannot last just a 
week as some physical illnesses do. You would not expect some one who had taken a 
few days off work to return and say, “Oh, I was mentally ill for a few days”. (His 
example) Finally, a person may have an illness, for example jaundice, all his life, 
from birth to death. But he points out you could not say of newborn baby that it has a 
mental illness.
His list is questionable. Some of the arguments make it seem as if  the problem lies 
with present day usage: the topics under discussion are not problematic, just the way 
we talk about them. Why can there not be minor mental illnesses? If, for instance in 
the future, depression is recognised as an illness, a person could certainly say “I didn’t 
come to work last week because I was depressed.” Again it may be found that
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something like depression is “catching” and we may have to change our views of 
what “infection” really means. Perhaps it could involve something like Dawkins’ idea 
of a “Meme”. There are certainly epidemiological studies o f the spread of certain 
types of mental illness which may imply some sort of “infection”. (In this regard, see 
Showalter, op cit.) Also, anorexia can be fatal and can certainly be seen as a mental 
illness. He also uses a very restrictive sense of the word “illness”, for example when 
he says that tonsillitis is an illness while conjunctivitis is not, mainly, because a 
person suffering from conjunctivitis does not feel ill. This does not seem correct.
An interesting point that Champlin makes concerns the nonnative element. He says 
that insanity/sanity are important in the analysis of mental health. In my 
understanding from the examples he gives, what is important in any mental illness is 
the fact that something is being “overdone” so to speak not just an obsession but an 
insane obsession. A mentally ill person is not just happy (if that is a symptom), he or 
she is insanely happy. The same is true for most other emotions. Along with this, 
insanity must have some element of irrationality: there should be no good rational 
explanation for those emotions or behaviour patterns. (Champlin does note that in 
spite of his view about the need for insanity as a criterion for mental illness, a person 
can be mentally ill without being insane; and it is possible to be insane without being 
mentally ill.)
What is of importance in Champlin’s article is his point that not just illness, but the 
concept of health, both physical and mental, is problematic. For him the crucial words 
are “good health” and “ill health”, not “healthiness” and “unhealthiness”. Mental 
illness should be compared to physical illnesses in that there is an impairment of
70
health. We might need to understand health before we can understand what it means 
to have a disease or be ill.
I would suggest that he does not go far enough in exploring what the connection is 
between health, ill health and illness, physical or mental. It can be shown that it is 
more than an analogy or a metaphor. But the point to be taken from Champlin’s 
article is that the normative element has to be seen as being fundamental. By this I 
mean that we need to establish a system which will give us the means o f knowing 
when something is functioning properly. How would this sort of system work?
Let us take a step back here and ask, what is meant by saying that someone is 
mentally ill? Can a rigid definition be attempted? Probably not, since there are many 
criteria to be taken into account and included in the definition. For instance as Szasz 
and others point out, disorders like schizophrenia are culturally defined. (Compare 
R.D. Laing’s “Sane reaction to an insane society”.) Supposedly, shamans, respected 
as valuable members of society in certain tribal cultures, had the signs (or symptoms) 
of what would be diagnosed as schizophrenia in another culture. So we would need to 
have some standard culture as a fixed point. O f course this need not be universal: we 
could use a culture in which the individual was located. But identifying such a static 
culture to use as a standard would lead to another problem of delineating cultures. 
Can we just get rid of the cultural factors? A definition could be based on what is 
harmful or incapacitating to the person themselves. But what is harmful? A rich 
person who collects tin cans and refuses to part with them is seen as a harmless 
eccentric while a more impoverished one who walks the streets collecting the same 
objects and also refuses to part with them would be seen as someone who needs help.
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3.3) Mental Illness Defined
Perhaps a way out of the regress and recursiveness is to stipulate a working definition; 
a definition that can provide a starting point; and one that seems to avoid any social 
value judgement by not saying that any one with any sort of mental illness necessarily 
needs therapy or "curing". For example, it is generally said that someone is ill, 
mentally or otherwise, if they are in a condition that is harmful to them or have a 
condition which they regard as unpleasant or unwanted. But keeping in mind 
Champlin’s comments I feel a better definition would be given in terms parallel to 
physical health and physical illness, this can be done with reference to normal 
functioning since we can (to some degree) know what any bodily organ is supposed to 
do to be called properly functioning. When that functioning is impaired we can 
recognise the malfunction by reference to its proper function. A person is mentally ill 
when he or she has some functional disorder o f  the mind which limits in some way the 
natural functioning o f that person as a human being.
If abnormal behaviour is caused by an organic condition, this does not mean that the 
disorder is not psychiatric. A condition is a psychiatric one if it disrupts mental 
functioning irrespective of cause. And since some organic conditions disrupt mental 
functioning they are by definition psychiatric. It is an open-ended definition which 
can be made more rigorous by defining natural function. It may or may not have its 
basis in an organic disorder of the body or brain. This definition depends on the 
meaning of other words like the “mind” and “natural functioning”. We will see that in 
the physical case, the connection between order and disorder rests on a notion o f what
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it means for something to be a biologically working entity, that is, how it is 
differentiated as a biological kind.
3.4) The Medical Model
When we say that mental illness and mental disease are comparable to physical illness 
and physical disease, we are using the medical model approach to mental illness. We 
will eventually attempt to find a function of the mind, but first we need to know if  this 
model of health, illness and disease o f body organs can be carried over to the mind. If 
it is valid move, we need to be sure what the benefits o f using such a model are, as 
compared to other models.
Lawrie Reznek, (1991) in The Philosophical Defence o f  Psychiatry, is a defender of 
the medical model, and his starting assumption is that psychiatry is a subfield of 
medicine and that detractors of psychiatry are arguing against the medical model. 
What are the other standard models used to study mental illness? Following Kuhn's 
work on conflicting paradigms, Reznek calls them paradigms rather than models and 
argues against four of them. (p. 131-156) His paradigms are:
The P sychodynam ic  P a rad ig m : for instance, Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
implies that the conflict between different parts of the psyche, usually unconscious, 
results in mental disorder, even if  the individual parts themselves may be working 
perfectly well.
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The B eh av io u ra l P a rad ig m : which tries to explain mental disorders as learning or 
conditioning of inappropriate behaviour and faulty cognitive inferences. In this 
paradigm the symptoms are the illness since, there are no underlying mental diseases 
or unconscious forces.
The In te n tio n a l P a rad ig m : there are no real mental illnesses as such but purposeful 
reactions to society. For instance, followers o f Laing and Szasz claim that mental 
illness is in some ways a volitional state: the patient has some reason for behaving the 
way he or she does, usually because of social situations.
The Sociological P a rad ig m : where behaviour is seen as following from social 
factors, and abnormal behaviour can be seen as a symptom of the society as a whole.
The M edical P a rad ig m , which he is defending.
Reznek’s defence consists of showing that all the paradigms mentioned above can be 
subsumed under the medical paradigm. Because o f the way these paradigms look at 
disease they still have to acknowledge its existence. He shows that whatever ontology 
is adopted, they have an inability to get rid of the category o f mental illness. His 
argument is the multiple realizabilty argument applied to disease: the non-medical 
paradigms need to insist that a mental illness is of a particular type of illness, but there 
is no necessity of specifying disease entities; a disease can be any type of abnormal 
process. (I do not need to defend the medical model against other models just yet.) 
The medical model is dependent on some assumptions, or more strongly, these 
assumptions are axioms on which the medical model is based. Reznek shows that
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when these axioms are carried over to the mental health field they have obvious 
benefits. He calls them theses and lists eleven that demonstrate the usefulness of the 
medical model. This list will provide a point of reference for the evaluation of the 
medical model, which will be done below.
T l) T h e  C au sa l T hesis: A sub class of abnormal behaviour is caused by disease.
T2) T h e  C o n c e p tu a l Thesis: A disease is a process causing a biological malfunction. 
T3) T he D em a rc a tio n  Thesis: A mental illness is a process causing a malfunction 
predominantly o f some higher mental function.
T4) T he U n iv ersa lity  Thesis: Diseases are not culture- or time-bound.
T5) T he Id en tifica tio n  T hesis: Scientific methodology enables us to identify 
diseases.
T6) T h e  E p is tem olog ica l Thesis: Scientific methodology enables us to discover the 
causes and cures for these diseases.
T7) T h e  T eleo logical Thesis: Psychiatry's goal is the prevention and treatment of 
mental disease.
T8) T h e  E n title m e n t Thesis: Having a disease entitles a patient 10 enter the sick > ole. 
T9) T h e  N e u tra lity  Thesis: Besides the values implicit in the goal of preventing and 
treating disease, psychiatry is neutral regarding any ethical or political position.
T10) T h e  R esponsib ility  Thesis: Having one's behaviour caused by a mental illness 
in a certain way excuses one from responsibility.
T i l )  T h e  G u a rd ia n sh ip  Thesis: Having a serious mental illness entitles the 
psychiatrist to act against the patient's will. (Reznek, 1991, p. 12)
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At this stage we should keep in mind the necessity of models. As we have seen in 
section 2.1, conceptual models are systems of interrelated concepts used to 
characterise and categorise phenomena, while explanatory models are used to actually 
explain phenomena. A conceptual model could theoretically be compatible with any 
number o f explanatory models.
Perhaps there is a conceptual medical model which could be stripped o f its social 
values so as to be used as a basis for the study of mental illness. Tommy Svensson 
(1995), in On the Notion o f  Mental Illness, is critical of the medical model as a basis 
for the conception of abnormal behaviour and recommends the search for a new 
model. However, since he is talking specifically about mental illness, it will be useful 
to examine his ideas and see what it is that he is rejecting. His criticism is directed 
against the theoretical frameworks and the notions of health, disease and illness 
adopted by those who rejected the views of Szasz.
To attempt a precis of Szasz’s work, covering his many books is difficult, but briefly, 
Szasz’s arguments attempt to show that the practice of psychiauy has a social control 
function, a function which was not based on any real understanding of what mental 
illness was. Szasz said that, historically, there was a stretching of the concept of 
illness from the physical to the mental; and that this extension was misguided. Szasz 
was not implying that there are really no mental illnesses: his view was that people 
may have mental problems, but that it is incorrect to interpret these in terms of 
diseases. Furthermore there is a difference between problems that are diseases and 
problems that look like diseases. In the case o f physical afflictions there is a deviation 
from some clearly defined norm, and in the case o f physical illness this norm is the
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structural or functional integrity of the human body. The notion is that organic 
abnormality is stressed as a necessary condition of disease and medicine is seen as the 
art and science o f dealing with the body’s faults.
Svensson breaks down Szasz’s position into four theses:
1) The coming into being of the concept of mental illness is associated with the 
mistaken extension of the concept of illness.
2) The basic meaning of the word “illness” is or ought to be a physico-chemical 
disturbance of the human body, which is why you can speak of “mental illness” 
only in a metaphorical sense.
3) Ascription of illness in cases of physical and “mental” illness respectively are 
made on the basis of deliberations that are of very different natures and serve very 
different functions.
4) Human suffering and troubles can be divided into two clearly separate classes: 
diseases or illnesses and “ problems” and the problems that are denoted “mental 
illness” belong in the latter category, not the former, (p. 20)
This means that the explanatory notions of medicine, health or disease need to be 
changed. Or perhaps our view o f what psychiatry is should be changed so as to 
include it totally within the field medicine. Svensson makes a useful and interesting 
distinction (p. 64). He says that there seem to be two ways of looking at the term 
“mental illness”, the fundamentalist way and the metaphorist way. The fundamentalist 
claims that mental illnesses are based on the medical model, because they are illnesses 
in exactly the same sense that physical illnesses are illnesses. This implies that there is 
a general concept of illness of which the defining characteristics are shared by mental
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and physical illness. The metaphorist claims that mental illnesses are not “mental 
illnesses” in any real sense, which implies that such illnesses lack the defining 
characteristics and so differ in crucial ways from physical illnesses. But the 
metaphorist claim that there are still some good reasons for calling them mental 
illnesses, because they can be looked at as i f  they really were illnesses.
In the context of these positions Svensson examines two “two ideal type medical 
models”, what he calls the Traditional Medical Model (the TMM) and the 
Modernized Medical Model (the MMM) (p. 66). The TMM is concerned with the 
causes and aetiology of disease: when a disease or illness is identified a certain causal 
chain is presumed to be present. In comparison, in the MMM, what is of concern is 
the effect or the consequences of the disease. If the result of an illness is different 
from another then they can be said to be two different diseases. The TMM is 
reductionistic in that it explains higher level phenomena by lower level ones, while 
the MMM is holistic: it is more concerned with the higher level expression of lower 
level situations. Put simply the TMM focuses on the cause while the MMM focuses 
on the effect.
In both models, “disease” and “illness” are not interchangeable words: illness could 
be the experiential aspect of the disease and/or the clinical manifestation of the 
disease. In the TMM there could be mental disease without mental illness while the 
MMM suggests that there could be mental illness without mental disease.
The TMM implies that disease is a value free concept while the MMM implies that 
the disease concept is value loaded. One proponent of the TMM is Boorse (1977).
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Boorse’s theory is based on the concepts of “biological function” and “statistical 
normality”: because these two are value free, the concept o f disease is also value 
neutral.
Boorse’s argument runs along the following lines:
1) Species of living organisms are the products of evolution.
2) The result of this evolution is, for every species, a natural design, a species typical 
design, which comprises the hierarchy of interlocking functional systems that 
supports the life of that type of organism.
3) These biological designs have a strong consistency over time and it is on this 
consistency that medical theory and practice rely.
4) A species-design is therefore a uniformity of biological functional organisation, 
typical of members of that species.
5) A function in this context is contribution to a goal: organisms are goal directed
6) The function of any part or process of an organism is its ultimate contribution to 
the organism as a whole.
7) In the hsalth/disease discussion, the ultimate goal of the organism is survival and 
reproduction.
\ccording to Boorse once we know what a typical species design is and what the 
ypical characteristics of the species are, we have criteria for health and disease for 
hat species. He suggests that species design and characteristics are whatever is 
statistically normal for that species and this can be identified empirically. Using this 
framework Boorse is then able to give a tighter meaning to the concepts of health and 
disease: health is the same as the normal functional ability of the whole, or of a part,
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or process of, the whole organism. Disease is a internal state which impairs this 
health. (An aside here: Boorse suggests that the Freudian structures of the mind, the 
id, ego and superego, could be construed as biological functions.)
There is a theoretical side as well as a practical side to his discussion. In terms of a 
theoretical understanding all we need is the concept o f disease as pointed out above, 
but in a practical sense, in terms of what medicine actually does, the concept of illness 
is also needed. So he gives this definition: “A disease is an illness only if  it is serious 
enough to be incapacitating and therefore is 1) undesirable for its bearer; 2) a title to 
special treatment, and 3) a valid excuse for normally criticisable behaviour.” (p. 61) 
So illnesses are a subset o f diseases. There could be diseases which are not illnesses, 
but no illnesses without disease being present. It can be seen that this is already 
inclusive of some of Reznek’s thesis.
As applied to mental illness the TMM implies that there are two subcategories of 
diseases: organic (or physical) ones and mental ones. The mental ones are similar 
enough to tit the same paradigm yet dissimilar enough to justify that they do not fall 
into the same category, as physical ones. This means that the pathology is of the same 
type as in the case of organic diseases, that mental diseases consist of structural or 
functional abnormalities of the human species. Now the problem here is to explain 
this without implying that they are all organic; for if an illness has a pure organic 
pathology, or derives from an organic pathology, then by definition it is not mental.1
1 This is basically Szasz’s position.
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Svensson then goes on to talk about the MMM based theories of health and disease, 
those of Pom, Whitbeck (We have looked at her work in Section 1.2.) and Nordenfelt. 
These are more holistic and based on the idea of a person’s needs and goals. So 
diseases are defined as processes that have a tendency to limit the organism’s ability 
to meet its sum total goals. Disease in this view is not just the opposite o f health. 
Goals are construed in a social environment, and the concept o f health is a more basic 
one than that of disease; in fact, some diseases, if  they do not cause any incapacity 
may actually contribute to a person's health. Another characteristic of this view is that 
it is a person who is in a state of health or disease, not an organ.
The shadow of dualism seems to fall on both these models. Whether metaphorical or 
not, there seems to be some need to defend mental disease purely as mental disease. If 
an organic fault is found, do these diseases stop being “mental” diseases? What kind 
of causal criteria would a disease need to have to satisfy the claim that it is purely 
mental? Let us keep it in mind that many physiological diseases result in 
psychological effects and many mental pathologies have physiological effects. The 
TMM especially seems to run the risk of getting rid of the category of mental diseases 
totally by reducing mental diseases to physical ones, since mental illnesses would just 
be a manifestation of physical diseases. Since there has to be some kind o f physical 
abnormality associated with its mental manifestation, it looks as if  the class o f purely 
mental diseases would shrink to nothing as medical scientific knowledge increased.
A way out of such reductionism might be some variety of functionalism, in which 
case the pathology could be said to be located in the mental structures o f a person, 
rather than the physical. So what needs to be shown is that mental diseases need to fit
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the criteria of disease in the same way that physical ones do. Svensson asks, (p. 85-86, 
using Boorse), if  we could make a list o f bodily organs and functions which are 
susceptible to diseases, how would it go? Could we add “the mind” to the list? Boorse 
is using the standard multiple realizabilty argument, leading to a functionalist 
position. Imagine different people with the same mental problems who were found to 
have different physiological states. Or the other way round: similar physiochemical 
abnormalities might give rise to differing mental problems in different people. Both 
cases could in fact obtain, mental diseases may therefore fail to be physical diseases 
because they cannot be defined in physiological terms.
Svensson finds a problem with this position. First, he feels that in the case of any 
eventual correlation between the mental and physical causes of mental disease, the 
“mental” causes would disappear, since there would otherwise be the problem of 
overdeterminism. He also feels that this leads to a dis-anaolgy between mental and 
bodily diseases inasmuch as there are no structural disturbances in mental diseases as 
there always are in physical ones. I cannot agree with Svensson here since in any 
functional description of mental diseases there have to be some structural 
relationships between different mental states. This is what functionalism means: each 
mental state is defined by the functional role it plays in the overall structure of the 
mental system.
There is another version o f the functionalist position that can be taken in the TMM 
framework. One could say that the mental apparatus is showing a pathology. This 
pathology could be explained with the same sort o f causal relationships that apply to 
physiological ones; and so it could be called a disease. Svensson uses the machine
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analogy here: If there is a “machine fault”, it is the psychic machinery, not the 
organic, that has broken down (p. 84). This sounds like promising analogy since the 
metaphor is a productive one. In fact if machines are just things designed to do 
something and if  the body and mind could be seen in this light, it becomes more than 
a metaphor. However, Svensson uses this analogy disparagingly since he has a 
problem with the fact that this is based on some sort of functionalist theory (though he 
does not call it that). There may be a problem if  functionalism is shown to be wrong 
in the future. Indeed if  some kind of identity theory is found to be true, there would be 
no mental diseases in the Boorsean framework. He says:
Not until the coming into being of such a theory of the mind, which would 
also have to be generally accepted, much like physiological and 
biochemical theories o f the workings of the body are accepted by a 
scientific consensus, would we able to speak of objectively statable, non- 
evaluatively normal (in the sense of natural) functions of the mind. (p. 95)
I can see no problem with this. If in the future the mind is reduced to physiology, if 
the whole mind-body problem disappears, then we will indeed not have a subclass of 
disorders, namely, mental illnesses.
One o f the problems Svensson sees in the medical model is that false beliefs are what 
usually distinguishes people who are considered to be mentally ill or diseased. He 
points out that not all kinds of abnormal beliefs are signs that the person holding them 
is mentally diseased: consider for instance the members o f religious minorities or
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cults.1 Since there is no way to inspect a mental function, we depend on personal 
reports or behavioural evidence, and decisions about abnormality o f behaviour are 
based on social norms. Svensson seems to think that what makes these people 
“normal” is that many other people also hold such beliefs. That is, normativity 
becomes a social rather than biological norm. The implicit assumption here is that the 
social is not biological. A sociobiologist would obviously not agree with this: the 
social relationships of ants, dogs, primates are explained as being genetic or innate 
and biological, and the sociobiologist would contend that the line drawn between our 
social behaviour and that of other species is arbitrary.). So “Can it be shown that 
assessments of mental diseases are matters of decisions of the natural-function 
(biological, statistical, non-evaluative) kind and not of the social (normative, 
evaluative) kind of normality?” This question seems to me to be a succinct 
restatement of the whole problem. Svensson goes on to ask: “What is a “mental 
function” that could be viewed as analogous to a bodily function, for instance that of 
an organ?” (p. 89)
To summarise the discussion of the last few pages: we have been examining the 
notion of mental illness, and attempting to see if there is indeed such a category into 
which some type of human disorders can be included. We have seen that there is such 
a category, and that fitting mental illness into it would involve its being in some sense 
similar to physical illness. However, the concept of physical illness and disease is 
dependent on the notion of malfunction; and the notion of malfunction seems purely
1 Svensson’s example is based on De Sousa, (The Politics o f  Mental Illness, in Inquiry. 15, 1-2, 1977, 
p. 187-202) and not from Storr mentioned in Chapter One
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metaphorical when used in the case of the mental. To go on from here I will bring in 
another metaphorical notion, that of the mind as computer software.
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Chapter 4
An Attempt to Simplify Matters: The Computer Analogy
THE standard analogy made while examining the relationship of the mental and its 
physical substrate is that of a computer and its program. This analogy will be useful in 
approaching the study of mental illnesses, since it can be used to separate out the non- 
essential factors influencing any discussion of the topic and to provide a hypothetical 
and ideal framework free of any attached social conditions. While talking about real 
mental illnesses and the value of psychotherapy, some of the problems mentioned 
earlier do need to be answered. But it may be worthwhile to see if  some of the 
problems are really not problems concerning psychotherapy. There are moral, ethical 
and financial problems about any form of medicine: maybe it can be shown that there 
are none specifically associated with psychotherapy. So the medical model can be 
studied with the use of the computer model, this time in the conceptual, not 
explanatory sense.
The analogy will also be useful at a later stage of the discussion, so the analogy or 
metaphor needs to be stated in some detail.1 When speaking of the computer in 
everyday use, such as “I am working on my computer to finish the report,” we do not 
separate the two; but we know that a computer actually works because of two distinct 
components hardware and software. To do anything useful on a computer you need 
both. So first, there is the machine, the actual physical computer with its CPU, various 
other processing units and various electronic components for power, communications,
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etc., coupled with the keyboard or some other input mechanism and the output 
devices such as a monitor and/or printer. This is the architecture, the hardware, it is 
made of metal, plastic and silicon, but can theoretically be made up of anything 
including wood or beer cans.
Then there is the software, the program which is needed to make the computer work 
or make the hardware perform some task, such as word processing, games, or 
graphics The number of tasks is unlimited. A program is a sequence o f stages, steps or 
phases which, when performed in order, allows some action or task to be 
accomplished by the hardware. The stages or steps in a program are usually a set of 
orders or instructions or recipes performed algorithmically. (Sometimes programs 
may be referred to as algorithms.) Programs are dynamic: they are only significant 
when they are operating. The various steps in a program can be defined symbolically 
or physically and the same program can be instantiated in any medium, pegs in a flat 
surface, punch cards, magnetic tape, floppy disks. Programs of several different types 
can run on the same hardware, sometimes simultaneously. Programs can initiate other 
programs; modify themselves or other programs; and can be themselves upgraded or 
modified as needs and uses change.
Complex programs are made in a patchwork basis. They are built o f smaller programs 
which in turn are built up of subroutines. There may be levels of programming 
languages, each of which is meaningless to one at a higher level. There may be one 
master program whose function is just to hold together all the other programs and 
make them run in order. When designing a program each subroutine is tested
11 will not be differentiating between analogy and metaphor.
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separately, and can be improved or rejected independently from the whole program. If 
one of them stops working, the whole program, if  it is well built, may not collapse. 
But some subroutines may be important enough to destroy the functioning of the 
whole program if they stop working.
Programs can implement other programs and programs can simulate hardware, in that 
a computer program may actually simulate on its own machine a machine that doesn't 
actually exist physically, a virtual machine. So we actually have three types of 
multiple realizabilty: that of the hardware, the hardware can be made up of any 
material; and that of software, which can be recorded on any medium. And software 
can simulate other software or hardware.
4.1) Is the Analogy Useable?
As mentioned earlier, this is a standard metaphor, but it is actually the paradigm- 
defining metaphor in present day philosophy of mind, as is shown by Sloman (1978) 
in The Computer Revolution in Philosophy. One of the reasons for this is because it 
does not place any ontological limitations on the study of the mind: the metaphor 
doesn’t necessarily say what the mind is.
As Sloman says
.... [T]he computational metaphor, paradoxically, provides support for a 
claim that human decisions are not physically or physiologically 
determined, since if the mind is a computational process using the brain as
a computer then it follows that the brain does not constrain the range of 
mental processes, any more than a computer constrains the set of 
algorithms that can run on it. (p. 11)
Or as he says even more strongly, “Thus reduction is refuted.” (p. 9) He makes an 
another interesting statement in his book, pertinent to the present discussion (p. 140 - 
141). While talking about psychopathology as applied computers or intelligent 
mechanisms and the problems of interpreting and diagnosing pathological behaviour 
he says: “It cannot be done without a good theory of the normal structure and 
functions of the system. This is why I have little faith in current methods of 
psychotherapy.”
It is occasionally felt that computers have become the prevalent models for the mind 
only because they are relatively new and complicated. Once they become commonly 
used they will fall by the wayside as did hydraulic or mechanical metaphors. This is 
not true. It is not their “mysteriousness” that makes them suitable models, but the fact 
that computers, in contrast to any other manmade artefact, were built and designed to 
work the way the mind works (or was thought to work). This is why the metaphor is 
so common.1 But is this metaphor/analogy going to be o f any use? Margaret Boden 
(1979) explores this and shows how useful it can be, and that the usual objections to 
using metaphor are wrong in this case. Her discussion (Similar to, but going a bit 
further than Sloman’s.) is aimed at showing that the positivist/behaviouristic position 
is not what computer metaphors necessarily imply, since intentional language is an 
integral part of any computer process description. She writes:
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From the philosophical point of view, computational insights enable us to 
understand how it is possible for the immaterial mind and the material 
body to be closely related, and in particular how it is possible for the mind 
to act on the body during purposive action and voluntary choice, (p. 111- 
112)
Similarly Cummins (1977), also sees the need for the use of programs to explain 
behaviour. It is especially useful in delimiting the ways in which when information 
processing terms may explain a particular behaviour, independent of physiological or 
mechanical factors.
There is no question that if  there is in any sense a mind/body problem, there is a 
hardware/software problem. At first it may not seem that way since to use the 
software/hardware distinction in some ways presupposes a resolvable dualist position 
leading to materialism. Anyone who uses this as a metaphor therefore seems to be 
saying that there is no mind/body problem. Software is obviously created by human 
beings in non-mysterious ways, and it interacts with the hardware in ways that are not 
at all worrying. The problem is generally sidestepped by invoking the fact that 
computers are designed by humans and hence their “minds” are “derived” from 
humans and they have no “original” minds, hence no minds.2 But Hilary Putnam, in 
The Mental Life o f  Some Machines, (1976) and Mind and Machines (1960) examines 
this metaphor and shows that any problem that the mind/body is supposed to have, a
1 This point is also made by Nelkin, (1993) p. 237.
2 I have substituted the word “mind” for the word normally used, “intentionality”, because I will be 
discussing it later.
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sophisticated machine will also have. As mentioned above, it seems that when anyone 
uses the computer analogy he or she is already taking some kind of materialist 
position. But as Putnam points out, this is not necessarily true. Mind/body problems 
arise when considering the hardware software/distinction in hypothetical Turing 
machines, particularly when examining concepts such as “preference” as applied to 
the machines.
Just as in the case of the mind and body, the three positions of dualism, materialism 
and behaviourism all have their own problems in the case of machines. Regarding 
materialism, Putnam uses the multiple realizabilty argument to show that you could 
not logically infer what “psychological” state the machine is in from studying the 
machinery. Obviously, in very simple machines you could know, but it would be a 
contingent fact and not a logical one. And as he says, “But we are concerned here 
with the question of logically valid inferences, not empirically successful ones.” 
(Putnam, 1976, p.91) Or again,
What is suggested is this: It seems that io know for certain that a human 
has a certain belief, or preference, or whatever, involves knowing 
something about the functional organization of the human being. As 
applied to Turing machines, the functional organization is given by the 
machine table. A description of the functional organization of a human 
being might well be something quite different and more complicated. But 
the important thing is that descriptions of the functional organization of a 
system are logically different in kind either from descriptions of its
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physico-chemical compositions or from descriptions of its actual and 
potential behaviour, (p. 100)
However, it must be noted that while we are examining and discussing the program, 
the hardware or the architecture cannot be discounted. All programs are designed for 
some particular hardware; the program is dependent on the architecture, even if it is 
many “layers” above the actual machinery. If a program is being written for a 
particular machine, and the programmer knows that certain pathways are faster than 
others in this particular hardware, the programmer would make sure that most of the 
heavy duty processing took place in that area.
But let us not forget that beyond the metaphor, there are processes which work in a 
way which could be best “described” as a program and that description has an 
explanatory power. Ethologists often speak o f “genetically preprogrammed motor 
patterns” when referring to a fixed action pattern activated by a innate releasing 
mechanism. Here one act follows another with “switches” coming on or off according 
to some pre-programmed set of “instructions'’ triggered of by an external stimulus. 
Whether the instructions are due to learning, habituation or evolution, they can still be 
called programs because that is indeed what they are. (The work of Nesse and 
Williams mentioned earlier shows what could be considered as “bugs” in this case.) 
For instance, noted zoologist J. Z. Young, has written two books (1987), Philosophy 
and the Brain, (1978), Programs o f the Brain, which suggest that that is indeed how 
the body and the brain work. There are also more popular books like Simons’ (1986) 
Is Man a Robot? where humans are portrayed as naturally programmed machines. 
Some philosophers of mind would object to this view claiming that use o f words like
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“instructions” presupposes mind and intentionality in that they imply beliefs and goals 
to physical objects. (See the note above on “original” and “derived” minds.) However 
I need not go into that and will let the argument develop when intentionality is 
discussed.
In the work mentioned in the last chapter, Reznek uses what he thinks of as the fallacy 
o f the computer metaphor against Szasz. He does point out that one of the reasons 
Szasz is wrong is because of the dualism implicit in his position based on an organic- 
mental distinction. (Szasz actually talks about televisions and the programmes shown 
on it, not computers.) According to Szasz the only time one can say that the machine 
is malfunctioning is when there is a hardware error. I feel Szasz can be criticised for 
the physicalising of the disease concept, but not, as Reznek does, for the analogy, (p. 
87) “The problem in the case of organisms is that there is no way for us to make the 
distinction between the hard- and soft-ware, and if there is no way to make that 
distinction, any argument based on it must fail.” He goes on to say that this is so 
because there is no “blueprint” available to differentiate functionally between 
hardware and software: “In the case o f the organism, the blue-print is precisely the 
thing that is missing.”
Reznek makes no case for his claim that a “blueprint” is not available, but since that is 
the eventual claim of this discussion, I will leave that till later. True, there are 
difficulties in making the hardware-software distinctions when it comes to organisms, 
but that does not detract from the usefulness of the metaphor.
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As has been pointed out, psychology has always defined its subject matter by 
whatever the prevalent metaphor was at the time. And we have seen why the 
computer metaphor is prevalent and useful. And of course every metaphor/analogy 
has its limits. But it is not always possible to know what the limits are in advance and 
we have to be careful that we do not cross the limits. Across-the-board milking of the 
metaphor is probably going to be counter-productive. Von Neumann (1958), one of 
the inventors of the modem computer, himself pointed out in one of the earliest 
comparisons between the human brain and the computer that this analogy has its 
problems, especially because the nature o f the brain's physiology rules out any 
possibility that the brain is organised in any way similar to a digital computer.
In the human brain/mind there is no clear cut way to distinguish between software 
(psychological) descriptions and hardware (physiological) ones. But we must 
recognise that this is true in the case of computers too; the hardware/software 
distinction is relative to the purposes of the investigator. A programmer working in a 
higher level language can see the lower level one as built-in hardware. Admittedly, in 
biological systems the edges or the layers become even more blurred.
In the case of the brain and mind the architecture is more important than in simple 
everyday computers because here the program can actually change the hardware, the 
physical level changes too. Some parts are made more efficient, building faster 
processors in areas that are more often used. A way to look at this process is to see 
that what originally was program dependent becomes hardwired. We know that brain 
circuitry is modified by learning processes and that the brain probably designs new 
modules or subprocesssors if  one is damaged. It seems senseless to differentiate
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between hardware and software in the brain when in biological terms they may not be 
differentiable, unless that is, we change our definition of what is hardware and 
software.
Wilkes (1990) notes that we have to be careful that the metaphor does not grow into 
the theory itself, so that the statement, “the relation between brain and mind can be 
looked at like the relationship between hardware and software” does not become “is 
like the” and finally “is”. Another area of concern is we must not let the methodology 
o f the analogy itself become the methodology of the discipline under study. As she 
says about the metaphor:
All this tends to suggest that there are psychological competencies that 
can indeed be studied in isolation from their genesis, and manifestation, in 
sensori-motor control; from psychophysiological capacities that constitute 
them; and hence in isolation from behaviour, from ethology, from 
developmental psychology, and from neuroscience. This, if true, would be 
at least surprising —  unless we subscribe implicitly to an unregenerale 
Cartesianism. (p. 67)
4.2) The Analogy as Applied to Mental Illness
So let us use this analogy while keeping in mind that it is a loose analogy and not a 
statement of fact about the mental/physical relationship. This analogy immediately 
shows that the problem of the overdetermination of mental illness is a non-problem:
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two types of defects, hardware and software, could cause the same sort o f malfunction 
o f the whole system.
If a computer is malfunctioning, in the sense that it is not doing what it is supposed to 
be doing, some repair work needs to be done. There are many things that can go 
wrong, the fault can be in the hardware or the program or both. One o f the things that 
could go wrong, in a very broad sense of the word wrong, is that the environment 
could change: what is expected of the computer has increased, as when we upgrade 
programs or hardware. Possible variations on this theme, on what can be done to fix 
the computer are:
1) The hardware can be repaired or some malfunctioning part can be replaced. An 
example would be where chips can be replaced or a new mouse connected.
2) The program can be changed, bugs or glitches removed or side-stepped, keeping 
the same hardware. For example, if the one of the keys in my keyboard is not 
working, I can program another key operation to enter the same letter.
3) If the hardware is faulty but not seriousiy faulty, the program can be modified to 
take into account, ignore or compensate for, whatever part o f the hardware is not 
functioning, as when later versions of programs are run on earlier models of 
hardware, perhaps sacrificing speed.
4) The fault could be in the program, but if  it is necessary to keep the program, the 
hardware can be modified to run the program. A simple case o f this would be 
where my program cannot handle a mouse, I can use only the key strokes to type 
in commands.
96
5) Both the hardware and the program can be tweaked to make them more 
compatible or perform better, faster, for example, by writing a program that sends 
all numerical calculations to a math’s processor.
6) And finally in extreme cases, both the program and the hardware can be replaced 
altogether.
All these possibilities correspond to what psychotherapy and psychiatry attempt to do, 
separating what are functional disorders from organic disorders. Even option (6) 
which seems quite drastic has its human analogue when people, for whatever reasons, 
are seen to be beyond “repair” or outside the control o f their society and are judged 
too unstable or dangerous and are imprisoned or worse, executed.
Analogous to “pure” communicative psychotherapy would be options (2) where the 
program is changed, and (3), where the program is modified to take into account 
mechanical faults, an example being a case where a patient had some neurological 
damage but could be given therapy to compensate for any organic disorder. This 
could be as simple as changing eating habits for some one who has Pnenylkeioneuria, 
or as radical as when a person with one sensory modality impaired or lost is taught 
how to use the remaining ones to carry on leading a full life. In the case of option (2), 
as a computer analogy it seems obvious that it is a valuable option, when the 
simplicity of reprogramming is compared to the cost of overhauling the whole system.
But does the analogy really hold? We know what a program is supposed to do, we 
know how to judge a program’s usefulness and we know what we want it to do. Any 
reprogramming is done by some one who knows all these things and knows how to
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affect repairs, keeping the function or the purpose of the system in mind. The concern 
here is with human beings and mental illnesses, so how can the computer metaphor be 
used? I will make another list and compare it with the computer list and see if it might 
help in identifying points that are actually worth examining.
1) What is a mental illness?
2) Is there necessarily a physical basis for every mental illness?
3) Even if there is a physical basis, can psychotherapy help to cure or alleviate it?
4) Does it follow that just because there is a physical basis for some mental illnesses 
only physically based therapies must be used?
5) What would count as a cure?
6) Does psychiatry actually cure or merely alleviate the symptoms?
7) Perhaps right now for some mental disorders psychotherapy is the only possible 
solution, but as more and more mental illnesses are seen to have purely physical 
causes, will psychotherapy be phased out?
8) Does the cost of treatment need to be taken into account?
9) Are some types of therapy more suitable for particular types of problems or 
disorders? If so, why?
Further explanation may be needed for point (8) The idea of “cost” may not only be in 
financial terms but also in terms of the trauma caused. Invasive surgery to help mental 
illnesses may be painful and need extended hospitalisation or interfere with the 
patient’s daily routine or lifestyle, while psychotherapy may not. On the other hand 
perhaps the total time involved may be longer for psychotherapy while surgery needs
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a far less commitment. This question may also be connected with the earlier one, in 
that as medical techniques improve, the trauma and time will be lessened.
It can be immediately seen that that the first six questions are a precis o f the 
discussion in the last chapter. It can also been seen that the rest follow from the first 
six. If the thesis could be rewritten without references to mental phenomena and only 
with references to physical or organic problems the latter three are more dependent on 
societal beliefs, the state o f medical practice, etc. than are the earlier six.
Is there a logical relationship between these nine questions? Some of these questions 
are prior or fundamental. It is obvious that answering questions (1) to (3) would 
provide answers to the rest. For example, if we knew what a mental illness was (1), 
we could then go on the say what curing it (5) would mean; then it would possible to 
go on and answer (6) the question of curing or alleviation. From this rules could be 
formulated for checking success rates, thereby answering (9). Answering (2) and (3) 
would provide an answer for (4) by answering (8). Question (7) seems dependent on 
(2) in as much as it is connected with (8): If there was no necessity o f a physical basis 
for mental illness there would be no need to wait for a “completed neuroscience”.
This list can be compared with the earlier one about computers. With reference to the 
computer analogy, answering (1) and (2) would be the same as discovering that 
something has gone wrong with the computer and then trying to find out if it is the 
hardware or the software or both that are malfunctioning. Question (3) asks, even if 
there are hardware faults can programming be helpful in repairing the system? In the 
computer list we have seen that the answer is yes. This does not necessarily mean that
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we would know how to fix the computer, since that may just be dependent on the 
extent of our knowledge about computers, hardware and software. We will have to 
wait for the computer version of (7).
So the questions we are left with are: What is a mental illness? And, does it 
necessarily have to have a physical basis? In the case of computers there are 
obviously functional problems for which only the program needs to be fixed, even 
though, theoretically it might be possible to keep the program and make changes in 
the hardware to solve the problem. But what is primary is knowing what the computer 
is supposed to do. Once we know what the computer, program and hardware, was 
designed to do we can go on to say when it is malfunctioning. The normative element 
arises from function. This is the same conclusion that the TMM came to about mental 
illness.
4.3) Function and Mental illness
Using this idea of “what something is supposed to do” let us immediately return to 
mental illness. What is the relationship between an understanding o f the notion of 
function and mental illness? The step forward can be seen in an important article, 
Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Dysfunction, by David Papineau (1994). 
Papineau examines the notion of illness and its connection with physical and mental 
disorder and addresses the question of whether mental disorders which do not have 
organic dysfunction as their cause can be called illness. What he is doing, as he points 
out, is showing that the argument of those who are against psychiatry is usually a two
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step one: 1) Mental disorders are not always caused by physical disorders. 2) They are 
therefore not illnesses.
He agrees that (1) is possibly true, but not that this implies in any way, (2).
His discussion is based on the same sort of arguments he puts forward in his 
Philosophical Naturalism (Papineau, 1993) on non-reductive physicalism. Using the 
notion of multiple realizability o f brain states, he shows that one way multiple 
realizability can be achieved in reality is because of an understanding of what things 
are designed to do. Artefacts, made by humans, obviously show this kind of design, 
but so do living organisms because they are “designed” by evolution through natural 
selection.1
He uses this to make a rather interesting point about “design”. (I will drop the quotes 
around the word design, though some philosophers would object to the use of the 
word without them since it implies a mind-like behaviour.) Will we find different 
physical realisations of mental structures within humans? What kind of designer could 
be at work in individuals? Papineau points out that there is an assumption that 
“biological design stops with the intergenerational natural selection.” (p. 78) He 
suggests learning as one factor in the multiple realizability argument: learning could 
be a design process which works in a way similar to natural selection. There is no 
reason why learning the same thing in different humans would have to result in the 
same neuronal processes in each case. This is obviously true in the case of people who 
have lost portions of their brain and have had to relearn a skill after an accident. Quite
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a few mental states and processes could be acquired in the course of individual 
learning rather than from some specific gene format.
Papineau defines disorder to mean something that is not working as it is supposed to, 
that is, it is not doing the job it was designed to. He uses the software/hardware 
analogy: if  there is a bug in a program, this does not mean that there is something 
physically wrong with the program. Since there is no physical description of what has 
gone wrong, it is the program that has to be fixed rather than the hardware to be 
changed. So a mental disorder, a purely mental disorder,
...[I]s the failure to perform some function where that function can only 
be specified in structural terms and not physically... (T)here might be 
humans whose brains are doing everything they are supposed do at the 
physical level — they have all the right molecules, enough 
neurotransmitters, and so on — but are still failing to do something else 
they are supposed to do, in the sense that some aspect of their structural 
design has gone awry. (p. 80)
Papineau’s use of the word structure suggests that it is the relationships between 
mental entities, their configurations and the whole psychological make-up, rather than 
an individual belief, that is faulty. To complete his case that mental illnesses can be 
illnesses without any physical malfunction of the nervous system, he goes on to make 
some assumptions about biological dysfunction: first, medical illnesses are a matter of 
biological dysfunction —  of things not doing what they are biologically supposed do.
1 He uses arguments which are parallel to Millikan’s, which we will be looking at in Chapter Six
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Second, biological dysfunction is nothing more than items not producing those effects 
they were designed to produce, that is, not producing the effects in virtue of which 
they were naturally selected, (p. 81)
We have already examined the first of these assumptions. And we will examining the 
second by asking what the relationship is between something being considered a 
biological entity and its function. We shall see that any biology based on evolution 
and natural selection is at some level a study of function. Once we have an 
understanding of function, we can understand malfunction. This is what medicine, as 
in the traditional medical model, does: it studies the normal function so that 
malfunction can be seen. Boorse’s suggestion was that deviation from a statistical 
norm for a particular species could be seen as a malfunction. Is this correct and is it 
the only way in which normativeness can be achieved?
To summarise, while looking at computers or human mentality, the conclusion we 
have arrived at is that the idea of what something is supposed to be doing gives it 
normativeness. Once we know whai the function of something is, we can teli if  it is 
fulfilling that function. This gives us a greater understanding of the concept of health, 
disease and illness.
To set the stage for the rest of the discussion: suppose we accept that mental processes 
are biological in nature, which means they were selected for during evolution, insofar 
as they were useful for the proliferation of a species, then they can be seen to have 
functions. As with any biological device, these functions can go wrong. This can be 
either because the process itself has gone wrong or because the environment has
changed and the function may now be maladaptive. So if  we find the function of 
various psychological states perhaps we can actually draw the line between mental 
health, mental disease and mental illness in much the same way as the line is drawn 
between physical health, physical disease and physical illness. In our study of mental 
health, we are going to have to ask if the mind has a function. How do we go about 
searching for the function of the mind? Before we start looking for its function 
however, we need to see what we mean by mind.
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Chapter 5 
Folk Psychology
I HAVE argued that finding the function of the mind will help us in understanding the 
criteria to be used in judging if it is malfunctioning. However, before we attempt to 
find this function we need to answer two questions. What is it that we mean when we 
use the term “mind”? And what do we mean by “function”? This is not necessarily 
going to be a conceptual analysis o f the words but a way to find something we can 
work with, something that can be used for our needs. For example, in the case of the 
mind we do not want to be in a position where, if  we have found a function, we end 
up saying, “But that’s not what I think the mind is in the first place”. There are 
various uses of the word and not everyone will agree to each use, so perhaps the best 
we can hope for is to find a definition o f the word which will serve our purpose. (Or, a 
part of the mind which is central to our study of mental health, in case minds are seen 
not as one thing, but as a conglomerate of many entities.) We will start by trying to 
see what it is about the mind that gives us reason the think that the mind is separate 
from some physical substance.
In a similar way, we will need to look at “function”. Like mind, the notion of function 
is something we employ regularly. The paradigms of function, especially proper 
function, are artefacts and tools made by us. Generally, we try to stretch and apply 
this concept to the rest o f the world. But it does need some clarification and 
exploration if it is to serve our needs in understanding the function o f the mind. This 
will be done in the next chapter, but the two chapters are closely related.
In a sense, the biological notion of “function” we will be examining in the next 
chapter is related to the concept of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. As 
Georges Rey (among others) points out (1997 p. 179) functionalism permits a level of 
psychological explanation that is relatively autonomous from the physical level: it 
does not need to ignore or deny the physical substrate. So physiology can be taken 
into account, yet it can be acknowledged that physiology does not tell the whole story; 
the mental does have a validity as a theoretical posit and there is a mental 
organisational level which can only be specified in terms o f other mental states. And 
studying only the physiology that gives rise to those states would not provide a 
complete explanation of those states. So here we will looking at those mental states.
One of the standard philosophical methods in trying to understand the mind is to look 
at what use we make of the mind, how we attribute mind to other creatures and the 
words we use in describing the mind. These questions are related and can be best 
approached by looking at human interpersonal behaviour in general: How do we get 
along with each other, how do we know what another person is thinking or planning, 
and how do we use this knowledge to predict theii behaviour? In tne philosophy oi 
the mind these questions are usually answered by invoking folk psychology. The term 
was originally used in a derogatory or dismissive sense, like “folk physics” or “folk 
chemistry”, to indicate that this was a system of pre-scientific thought that would 
eventually disappear, being replaced by a scientific psychology or neurobiology. 
However, since this replacement does not seem to be even close to happening — 
some philosophers claim that such a replacement may not even be possible —  the 
phrase seems to be here to stay. Folk psychology is also called “commonsense
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psychology” and sometimes “belief-desire psychology”. The reason for this latter 
phrase will become apparent.
A major part of what it means to be a fully functioning psychological human is that 
we explain the behaviour of ourselves and other people by reference to what is going 
on in our and their minds, in terms of beliefs, desires and emotions. This attribution is 
central to folk psychology. Its network of causal explanation is what gives us 
“psychological competence”: the possession of the skills and resources required to 
predict, explain and anticipate the behaviour of other people and be able to co­
ordinate our own behaviour socially. These causal explanations are in the form of, 
“He is drinking water, therefore he must be thirsty.” “She is buying tickets for the 
cinema so she must want to see the movie.” These mental states are thought of as 
being connected to the outside world as well as our bodies and they are supposed 
provide us with reasons for our actions and reactions. This can be best seen by a
— believe, suppose 
— know, expect 
— doubt, suspect
Perception
Basic emotions/ 
Physiology —
— see, hear, smeil 
—touch, feel
Belief
Action -
— hit, grab 
— travel 
— search 
— attend to
*  Reaction
— happiness, sadness, anger 
— surprise, puzzlement
■> Desire
— love, like, enjoy 
— hate, dislike, fear 
— hunger, thirst 
—pain, arousal
— want, desire 
— wish, hope 
— ought, should
diagram:
How beliefs and desires hold together our commonsense conception o f  the mind.
From Wellman, (1991, p. 100)
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The diagram shows how beliefs and desires are based on perceptions and the 
emotions and lead to action. The most important states which make up folk 
psychology have a standard form consisting of three things: they have content, that is 
they are about something, secondly, they have or take an attitude towards that content: 
belief, desire and so on, constituting propositional attitudes. (This phrase will be 
explained presently.) Thirdly, there is the subject who is taking this attitude, for 
example, John, as in “John believes that it will rain.” This is the basic form of the 
attribution we use to explain and predict behaviour and to recognise, explicitly or 
implicitly, that other people have “minds”.
This is a central topic in this discussion and in order to emphasise its importance I 
would like to reiterate the above points. As social beings, humans continually engage 
in a host of cognitive practices that help them get along with each other. We do this 
by making use of a web of ordinary psychological notions concerning internal mental 
states. Along with this there are practices connecting these mental attitudes to each 
other, to perception, and to actions or behaviour. This is provided by folk psychology 
and is dependent on a conceptual framework and a network of principles, explicit or 
implicit, used by ordinary people to understand, explain, and predict the overt 
behaviour and mental states of themselves and of other people. So folk psychology 
consists of at least two parts, I) a set of attributive, explanatory, and predictive 
practices, and II) a set of notions used in those practices.
In terms of language, these practices and notions depend on the use of “propositional 
attitudes”. What identifies these attitudes is their propositional content, content that is 
usually identified in English by “that” clauses. Belief, desire, intention, hope, fear,
love, hate, and other such terms are all propositional attitudes. If a person x believes 
that p, hopes that p , desires that p  and so on, then x is described as having a attitude to 
p  that can be defined propositionaly. They are fundamental to us in our every day 
lives and in thinking of ourselves as human beings; one o f the reasons for this being 
that they are used to explain behaviour. That is, they have a causal explanatory role. 
This causal role of propositional attitudes depends on how such beliefs and desires 
interact with each other and the outside world, and how they go on to result in action 
(or behaviour). For example, the belief that it is raining outside, acting together with a 
belief that an umbrella keeps you dry, and the desire to not get wet, would result in 
your carrying an umbrella when you go outside. Though there are many kinds of 
propositional attitudes in English, beliefs and desires are usually used as paradigm 
cases, since they seem primary, in that they mirror (in loose terms) cognition and 
volition.
5.1) Intentionality
A noticeable feature of propositional attitudes is that they are about something in the 
world or directed at objects or states of affairs in the world; x has some sort o f relation 
to p. In this they show intentionality. When one believes, intends, desires, hopes, one 
believes, intends, desires or hopes something. (In linguistic terminology, this 
something is known as the proposition.) So folk psychology is primarily about 
intentional explanation; it is the idea that people’s behaviour can be explained by 
reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. This intentionality is seen as the 
hallmark of the mental because intentionality resists description in purely physical 
terms. In some respects, this is the mind/body problem, because “aboutness” or
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directionality seems difficult to account for in any way that does not already include 
the mental. Which is to say, it cannot be “reduced” to other terms.
What is the relationship between an intentional state and the object or state of affairs 
that it is about or to which it is directed? If I am thinking about something, say 
Glasgow, or wishing I was in Glasgow, my mental state has a certain mental content, 
Glasgow, in addition to any other formal properties it may have. Intentional states 
seem to “contain” or represent the objects they are about. So mental states like beliefs, 
desires, hopes, and other propositional attitudes represent the world as being in a 
certain way. This, semantic content — since this is what gives them meaning and 
allows them to be differentiated — is again difficult to explain in physical terms. How 
can something inside the head stand fo r  something outside in the world? And how 
does this relationship obtain when the propositional attitude is about something that 
does not actually exist. “I believe that Santa Claus lives in the North Pole.” Perhaps 
the relationship between my brain and the North Pole can be explained, but then 
explaining the relation between my brain and Santa Claus is far more difficult?
(In these discussions we should be careful to acknowledge the fact that the way we 
report mental events may not bear any resemblance to what they actually are. That is, 
we should avoid confusing the structure of the language we use to report beliefs and 
desires and other mental states with the actual structure of those beliefs and desires, 
whatever that may be.)
I said above that intentional states represent the objects they are about. In a sense, this 
idea of representation encapsulates the problems of mind. When we say “A represents
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there is obviously some sort of connection between A and B. This connection 
itself exhibits intentionality with its characteristic “aboutness”. The difficulty in 
understanding how representations work can be seen when considering everyday 
representations like road signs or a child’s drawing. There is something that makes 
these shaky squiggles a representation of an obstruction ahead or a house but it is 
difficult to say what that something is. It does seem as if there can be no 
representations without a mind to say that it is a representation, use it as such, or give 
it meaning. From here it is simple regress to a Cartesian theatre where all the acts of 
perception are being seen by something that is the soul or in modem terms, the mind.
These features mentioned above are tightly connected: propositional attitudes are 
rooted in the idea o f content and the idea of content is rooted in intentionality, which 
is supposedly what makes propositional attitudes unique in the natural world. Finally, 
both content and intentionality are dependent on representations.
5.2) Consciousness
These facets of the mental can seem to be academic when compared to what seems to 
be fundamental to a personal understanding of mind: consciousness. Where does this 
fit in? Mental states are usually divided into two categories, which may or may not be 
exclusive. The first o f these categories which we have already examined are 
intentional states. The second class o f mental states are phenomenal states, those 
which have a qualitative “feel” associated with them, what are called “qualia”. There 
are other states, like some emotions or perceptions, which have both a qualitative feel 
and intentionality. An obvious point that should not be missed when talking about
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these mental states is that we know about them or have access to them, that is, they 
are transparent. This transparency means that we are aware of them. All of this is a 
roundabout way of say that some form of consciousness exists in those organisms 
which have such mental states. (Or as we said above, it seems as if there can be no 
representations or meaning without a mind in the first place.)
There seem to be a large amount of literature about consciousness written by 
philosophers as well as scientists, all of which is controversial, in that few workers in 
the field agree with each other. Part of the problem is that there does not seem to be 
one universally accepted definition of consciousness since the word is generally used 
in many different senses, some of which segue into each other. Choosing one or the 
other sense as primary is a difficult choice for two reasons. Firstly, because the 
dividing line between one “form” of consciousness and another is difficult to discern. 
And secondly, the argument can always be made that another “form” is more 
important because it is fundamental or basic to the others. In spite of this, we do need 
to recognise that consciousness involves many phenomena, each of which may need 
to be accounted for in different ways.
Generally, in lay terminology, when we speak of consciousness, we mean awareness. 
It is also used to differentiate from non-conscious, as in reference to inert matter, or 
unconscious where it means accessible to knowledge. Philosophically, the consensus 
seems to be that there are varieties, or maybe levels, of consciousness and awareness 
should not be conflated with all the varieties. It is interesting to note that some forms 
of mental illness and the case histories of brain damaged patients have helped to show 
just how complicated the subject really is and how many aspects there are to what we
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call consciousness. These cases have also shown that it is difficult to doubt that 
consciousness —  or at least, some varieties of what we call consciousness —  are a 
product of brain activity, as is shown by brain scans, modem imaging methods and 
studies of sleep and wakefulness.1
A warning must be given here. Consciousness is a problematic area and any 
discussion of the subject is going beyond the scope of this essay. So I will only be 
making a short foray into the area to see the connection, if  any, with the notions of 
intentionality, content and representations. One way we can explore this subject 
without going into it too deeply is to see if we can tease out the different senses of the 
word. There seem to be three basic forms of consciousness (from Block, 1991):
1) Phenomenal consciousness, the experience o f seeing, hearing, etc.;
2) Access consciousness: being in this state means that you can think 
about what is happening to you, report its content and use it to guide action. 
(This is not necessarily in the present, since what is happening to you can 
include memories.)
3) Monitoring or self-consciousness, which implies a concept o f the self 
and the ability to think about it as separate from the rest o f the world.
We can separate out these three senses further. Lycan (1996, p. 2-5) suggests that 
from common usage, eight different philosophically interesting uses or senses of 
“consciousness” can be teased out:
1 See Baars (1997) for example.
113
1) Organism consciousness: a thing is a conscious being as opposed to a 
non-conscious being i ff  it has the capacity for thought, sensation, etc., even 
if the capacity is never used.
2) Control consciousness: consciousness in the sense o f being awake and 
responsible for actions, similar to Ned Block’s “access consciousness”. A 
person who is unconscious in this sense can still be conscious of things, for 
example when a person is dreaming.
3) Consciousness o f  an organism is conscious in the sense o f being 
aware o f an object. The object can be external or internal, abstract or 
concrete.
4) State/event consciousness: a state o f a organism or an event occurring 
within the organism is a conscious state or event i f f  the subject is aware of 
being in the state or hosting the event.
5) Reportability: an organism is conscious only of those items on which 
it can communicate a report. As Lycan points out, this is not an ordinary 
sense o f the word, since an organism could be conscious but not be in a 
position to report. Some say a person in a persistent vegetative state is in 
this state.
6) Introspective consciousness: An organism focuses its attention on the 
internal character of its experience: a sort of Lockean “inner sense”.
7) Subjective consciousness: This is usually seen as having “a point of 
view”, or “what it is like”. It is supposed to be something that can only be 
described in the first person.
8) Self-consciousness: Said to be true of an organism when it has a sense 
of itself as an individual.
All these uses have their associated problems. (Though again, many philosophers 
would question the use o f the word “problem”. I am using the word to suggest that 
these are not understood yet.) For example, Lycan says that 1) and 2) are basically 
versions of the mind/body problem, and 3) and 4) seem to be special cases of 
intentionality. Though the inclusion o f 5) in the list is commonsensical, there is a 
problem with it that can be seen in Putnam’s classic example: it is certainly possible 
to design a simple machine which, every time it is in state A, prints out a statement, “I 
am in state A ”. We would not accept this as an example o f consciousness. Then, 
introspective consciousness (6) seems to be an empirical problem in the way that 
perception and attention are. Lycan goes on to argue that 4), State/event 
consciousness, is a special case o f 6) introspective consciousness. And it is this, 
state/event consciousness or introspective consciousness, that I shall concentrate on 
eventually.
It is interesting that this type of consciousness is what is commonly called awareness. 
Awareness is av/areness o f  something, which leads us back to representation. Let us 
keep in mind that there is a difference between the intentionality that is characteristic 
of propositional attitudes and the intentionality of perception, for instance, or other 
content-bearing states. What this difference is, is debatable, but part o f it is the fact 
that we are conscious of some of our mental states and that there is the availability of 
content o f these states for verbal reports to self or others. It can be seen that this form 
of consciousness must have some kind of representational content.
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Some writers feel that consciousness is simply higher order thought, thought in many 
layers, useable representations about useable representations about useable 
representations.1 So consciousness becomes a multi-layered system of representations. 
But with this view the problem of understanding consciousness becomes transferred 
to the problem of representation.
5.3) Misrepresentation
We have already seen what the problem there is: What is it that makes something a 
representation? Or, what does this representation represent? A particularly interesting 
aspect of this was pointed out earlier: A represents B\ what if  B does not actually exist, 
as in the Santa Claus example. This is the problem of the occurrence of a 
representation without the represented. But there is another problem too. For example, 
take the belief that there is a book in front of me. Sometimes this belief will be caused 
by things other than a book, for example, a pamphlet, a thick file or a hologram of a 
book. This means that this kind of belief is caused not just by the presence of a book 
but by the disjunctive condition: book or hologram or file or a pamphlet and so on, for 
all possible causes of the belief. This would make it impossible for the belief to be 
falsely held, since anything that can cause the belief will thereby be counted as a part 
of its disjunctive truth condition. (I am using the word “cause” in a general sense, not 
as in the sense o f “causality” since the view that representations are casual is 
contentious.)
1 For example, Rosenthal (1993).
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We shall see that trying to understand how something that does not exist can be 
represented is a productive method of approaching the whole area o f representation 
and intentionality. But there are actually two sorts of problems mentioned above, the 
problems of misrepresentation and disjunction are two distinct issues; but they are 
related: The problem of misrepresentation is that if  some sort o f indication is 
supposed to be necessary condition of representation, then X cannot represent Y in the 
absence o f Y. If  it is a necessary condition for some spots to represent measles that 
they indicate measles, then the spots cannot represent measles in the absence of 
measles. The disjunction problem is that o f sufficient conditions o f representation, 
what if  all types of spots represent measles? Let us keep in mind that the central 
question is still “What does this representation represent?” So the two problems are 
related in the sense that they both imply the further question, how is error possible? 
This is because the misrepresentation problem makes error impossible by ruling out 
the representation of some situation when the situation does not exist. The disjunction 
problem, makes error impossible by ruling in the representation of too many 
situations.
These problems would be solvable if it was possible to distinguish a set of typical or 
ideal conditions for the formation of beliefs. For then we could equate the truth 
conditions of beliefs specifically with their causes in such privileged circumstances 
and thus allow beliefs to be false when they arise from other possible causes in non­
ideal circumstances. The point here is that we are asking what is it that gives 
intentional states or representations their normativity. There are a few ways in which 
such ideal circumstances could be specified. For instance Dretske (1986) suggests that 
truth conditions are those conditions with which beliefs are associated while we are
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acquiring the ability to form them; other causes which operate after learning is over 
are excluded from truth conditions and hence can give rise to false beliefs.
However, we will leave that till we develop some ideas which might make clear this 
notion of a set of ideal circumstances. For now, let us return to beliefs and see how 
they are connected to our everyday life. Perception is obviously related to belief. The 
story is that perceptions make it possible for a person to form the corresponding 
belief; beliefs make it possible to draw certain inferences —  and beliefs and desires 
together make rational the formations of particular intentions and from them, lead to 
the performance of appropriate actions. (See diagram on page 86.)
These actions are differentiated by pointing out the person’s relations to things in the 
environment. If a person wants to satisfy his or her thirst, believing that the glass of 
water over there will satisfy his or her thirst makes it sensible to reach for the glass. 
This means that perceptual knowledge of the environment is necessary in forming 
particular attitudes. We need external conditions to cause those beliefs which adds 
another layer to the causal explanatory conception of mental states. Now instead of 
just thinking of causal explanatory roles in terms of those mental interactions that 
occur inside the agent, interactions between mental states and conditions external to 
the person also need to be included.
So what makes intentional explanations of mental phenomena problematic is that they 
show properties which are difficult to explain:
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■ Intentional states seem to have causal powers. Beliefs, desires and thoughts make 
things happen, cause behaviour, etc.. Simply put, the problem is, how can they do 
this?
■ Intentional states are semantically evaluable. Beliefs, for example, are about how 
things are and therefore true or false depending on whether things are the way 
they are believed to be. But it is not clear what kind of truth condition this is.
There have been various theories put forward to answer these questions. Some 
suggest picture theories, where the representation is “like” the represented. This 
likeness can be a straight isomorphism or a projection through a mapping rule which 
relates the representation to the represented. The likeness could be simple, like a 
photograph or a drawing, or more complex, like a mathematical mapping. There are 
also causal theories, in this view representations are connected to the represented 
because they are caused by and only by, the represented. So a representation cannot 
occur without the presence of the represented, and the representation ‘tracks’ the 
represented. These two are the most prominent theories but they are not the only ones, 
there are also accounts which use both causal/informational and picture theories. 
These theories are not just of arcane philosophical interest because, as we have seen, 
representation is one of the more intractable problems of the mind. So if we have a 
useful theory of representation we can go a long way towards explaining ourselves.
5.4) Explaining Away Folk (Psychology)
At a fundamental level, it becomes apparent that any attempt to explore, explain, or 
even explain away, folk psychology, has to account for intentionality, content or
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representations, and the connection these have with propositional attitudes, as well as 
the misrepresentation/disjunction problem. Somewhere along the way it also has to 
show how these states lead to reportabilty (or awareness) and hence consciousness.
As mentioned earlier, there are some philosophers who feel that some of these are 
philosophical non-problems and are instead subjects for empirical study. Further, they 
reject the whole idea o f folk psychology as an explanatory system. They feel that it is 
a theory-driven folk science and should be replaced by a real psychology not 
dependent on folk principles. Many feel that this will actually happen when science, 
and especially neuroscience, reaches a point at which all mentalistic phenomena can 
be explained in terms of neurobiology. Since philosophers who feel this way claim 
that folk psychological terms will eventually be eliminated, this position is known as 
eliminativism.1
However this eliminativism is more than just an arcane philosophical discussion. To 
give up folk psychology in favour o f Paul Churchland’s “completed neuroscience” or 
some other sort of scientific psychology which excludes beliefs and desires and other 
propositional attitudes would be a serious move. Giving up folk psychology would 
mean renouncing the very idea of self and humanity as it is now, since folk 
psychology is so intimately interwoven with our view o f ourselves as active agents 
and our place in the universe. This cuts to the core of what it means to be a human 
being: because folk psychology is supposed to be a comprehensive account of 
ourselves, it has to explain ourselves and others as human beings: our minds and our 
behaviour. Again, folk psychology supposes that we know about these mental states.
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This transparency, or self-awareness, cannot be divorced from the idea of 
consciousness, since, as we have seen, if  nothing else, consciousness means an 
awareness of ourselves. So any replacement theory, along with everything else, is 
going to have to explain how awareness of these beliefs and desires takes place, that 
is, how we are conscious. And how it happened that these strange features, mind and 
consciousness, arose in the world.2
5.5) Naturalisation Again
From all this it seems as if  the attempt to understand folk psychology by the methods 
of science would have drastic results. However, it need not be that way. Let us go 
back to an idea introduced in the second chapter, that of naturalisation. Naturalisation, 
as applied to some particular field of study is the idea that everything that exist in that 
field is empirically understandable and has empirically understandable features. 
Along with this, naturalisation also implies that these features are linked to the rest of 
the world. This last idea, of the link to the world, means that— in principle at least — 
the laws and theories of science are applicable in that field. Naturalism in the 
philosophy of mind is often allied to materialism or physicalism and these imply 
dependence on the laws and entities of the material world, generally physics. Because 
of this, reduction seems to be implicit in physicalism. However, this is not necessarily 
true for naturalisation: naturalisation does not have any necessary connection with a
1 The most notable proponents of this view are the Churchlands, Stich and, if I read him right, Dennett.
2 Has Churchland changed his mind? In an interview he seems to be saying that his views may have 
wavered. (Baumgartner and Payr, 1995) “...I don’t think we are going to eliminate qualia, we keep 
qualia, but we have a different understanding now than before.... This is an example of how something 
need not be eliminated but can be explained and therefore kept. In the case of beliefs and desires this 
may happen too, and I will be happy with1 1 (p'42)
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reductionistic programme. At this stage all that is important is that by naturalisation 
we mean the attempt to integrate the study of the mind into the rest of the sciences.
In the first chapter I have pointed out why I think an attempt at naturalising mental 
phenomena is valuable and useful. What is important is the decision on what science 
to use as the base. I have suggested that biology is best suited to this task because it 
provides a research strategy. But there is another reason that biology rather than 
physics, chemistry or even biochemistry is the best lens with which to view the mind. 
This is because biology depends on functional explanations at all levels: biological 
objects, phenomena and devices, are defined by their function, a function which 
comes from natural selection and evolution. We will see why in the next chapter.
Before I go any further let me clarify what is being attempted here. What I am looking 
for is an account o f the mind including representation and intentional phenomena, that 
can be incorporated into mainstream science. There are two things that should be 
demanded of any such account: as pointed out earlier, it should explain everyday 
action; and any theory of behaviour and consciousness should fit seamlessly with the 
other sciences, neurobiology, for example.
The idea that whatever mental states and or events may be, they are intimately 
connected with the brain seems hard to refute, even if there is no consensus on 
whether they are the same as, supervene on, or are ontologically distinct from brain 
states. Following on from this, the notion that mental states are biological phenomena 
is also widely held. For instance, Searle, in Intentionality, says,
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... I think of intentional states, processes, and events as part of our 
biological life history in the way that digestion, growth and the secretion 
of bile are part of our biological life history. From an evolutionary point 
of view, just as there is an order of priority in the development of other 
biological processes, so there is an order o f priority in the development of 
Intentional phenomena. In this development, language and meaning, at 
least in the sense in which humans have language and meaning, comes 
very late. Many species other than humans have sensory perception and 
intentional action, and several species, certainly the primates have beliefs, 
desires, and intentions, but very few species, perhaps only humans have 
the peculiar but biologically based form of Intentionality we associate 
with language and meaning (Searle, 1983, p. 160) (Searle spells 
Intentionality with a capital letter to distinguish it in the technical sense 
from the common use.)
However, I do not think that Searle goes far enough in his consideration of 
mtentionaiity as a biological phenomenon, and his statements implying that “tnat’s the 
way things are, and that they can’t be studied further” are not very helpful. For 
example, he says the question o f “ ...how intentional states are realised is not 
ontologically important” (Searle, 1993, p. 14) This is particularly useless in terms of 
suggesting a further research strategy. Even more useless is McGinn's (1991, p. 73) 
idea o f “cognitive closure” where he suggests that because of the way the mind is, any 
way o f studying it is closed-off to itself. Let me make it clear that I am not 
questioning the logical validity of these writer’s arguments —  which may or may not
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be correct — but I am saying that they do not indicate a way to go forward. In this 
section we have seen what it means to have a mind. To go further we need some tools.
Chapter 6 
But What Is It Supposed To Do?
TO STUDY the mind we need to use the tools of biology. One of the ways of doing 
this is to make use of the idea of reverse engineering mentioned in Chapter Two. 
What an organ is, is dependent on what an organ does in a body, its function. Again, 
as noted in Chapter Two, a biological theory is dependent on evolutionary theory as a 
framework, therefore we should look towards evolution to provide a research strategy 
in this area. We will see that it does indeed provide a general strategy for dealing with 
function and intentionality.
Before we start on functions a slight detour has to be made to look at teleology, since 
this is a notion which is connected at a basic level with function. Teleology is 
generally the idea that certain phenomena are better explained in terms of purpose or 
goals rather than cause. Historically, teleological explanations were rejected in the 
sciences because they seemed to call for some grand purpose to the universe, or God, 
or at least an anthropomorphic view of the world. Then with the advent o f the theory 
of evolution it was realised that teleological explanations in biology could be seen as 
shorthand for long sequences of mechanistic explanations. In this form they were 
deemed acceptable, since all teleological phenomena can be ultimately explained in 
terms of genes and selection processes.
How does this relate to organs since organs have functions not goals? Like standard 
teleological explanations, the problem is that when a function is ascribed —  “this is
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supposed to do that.” —  it looks as if the explanation is forward looking. However, 
when we use purposive teleology we are ascribing purposes to an organism so that we 
can explain behaviour. But in the case of functional teleology in ascribing a function 
to parts or products of living things we are not implying that these have goals o f their 
own, just that they have a function in the larger system of which they are a part.1
6.1) Function
There are some standard ways to look at function and teleology, for instance those of 
Larry Wright (1973) and Robert Cummins (1975). Both these writers try to examine 
what the notion of function means scientifically. In any bodily organ, how do we 
decide what is its function as distinguished from what it does as a by-product of 
fulfilling that function? The classic example is the human heart: it pumps blood and it 
also makes a beating sound. Wright proposed that functions can be picked out from 
mere effects by their explanatory significance: that particular effect which explains 
why it is there is its actual function. The function of the heart is to pump blood 
because that is how the heart evolved, as a blood pumping mechanism, not a sound 
making one. According to Wright, the function of X  is F  means that: X  is there 
because it performs F  and F  is a result o f X  being there. There are problems with this 
theory in that it is over-reliant on context. The standard example used to show this is 
the case of a small rock supporting a larger one in a fast moving stream. If the large 
rock was not there, the smaller one would be washed away. So is it the function of the 
smaller rock to hold up the larger rock? (From Boorse, See Godfrey-Smith, 1998)
1 See Woodfield, (1973).
Cummins feels that explanations are important, too. Not explanations of how the 
entity came to exist however, but how the entity fits into some larger scheme of 
things, for instance, a system. So the heart's function is to pump blood around the 
body to oxygenate it. In fact, an explanation could be made up of both aspects, as is 
often done in ethology; a behaviour pattern is explained by why that particular pattern 
exists in that species and also how it helps in the survival of the species.' (Cummins 
functions are also known as causal role functions.)
A slight variation on the Cummins model could be made by seeing what the 
contribution of the part is to the whole system’s goals. This is what Wimsatt (1972) 
claims, for example. He argues against Fodor and Putnam who say that functional 
descriptions and explanations are not causal explanations. (They regard functional 
descriptions as relatively abstract or higher level descriptions while causal 
descriptions are specific, molecular, “micro-descriptions”.) Wimsatt points out that 
“ ...there is no reason to suppose that either functional or causal descriptions must be 
limited in applicability to any level of abstraction or degree of specificity.” (p. 11) He 
gives the example of billiard balls bouncing off one another as being a paradigmatic 
case of causal description. But if  the billiard balls were made of different materials the 
interactions at a molecular level would involve different causal micro-descriptions, 
which would then mean that the macro-descriptions were not causal.
The way Wimsatt analyses function statements is by first forming a schema for 
function statements using the following variables:
lA discussion of this can be found in Godfrey-Smith, 1996, p. 15-20
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■ The Item (z) under study itself. A particular organ or organelle; a single salivary 
gland, let us say.
■ The System (S) to which the item belongs or is a part. This is important since the 
same item may be a part o f many different systems. For instance, salivary glands 
are a part of the digestive system, but they are also a part of the oral lubrication 
system, as well as the system which prevents infection of the mouth and teeth.
■ The Environment (.E) to which the item and the system belong. A classic example 
is the swim bladder in fish which in some species also functions as a lung, 
depending on the environment. In the case of a salivary gland, the environment is 
the mouth and the body in which it occurs.
■ The Purpose (P) of the item, that is, what it is being used for. Providing oral 
lubrication, enzymes to digest food, etc..
■ The Behaviour (.B) of the functional item. When and how it provides lubrication, 
enzymes, etc..
Also needed is a system of causal laws appropriate to that system. This he calls the 
Theory (T). This could be an account of why human beings need food, how they 
acquire and process it and what the final product of this process is for, etc..
Using these variables he comes up with an “equation”: “[According to Theory T, a 
function of behavior B o f item i in system S in environment E  relative to purpose P  is 
to do C.” (p. 32) If you know all the other variables, you could come up with a 
logically derived statement of C.
However, it has been noted by many philosophers1 that these attempts to formalise the 
notion of function do meet their objective, that is they do show that functional 
explanations are causal explanations, but they do not provide the necessary normative 
element. This is because to malfunction, according to these writers, is merely to fail to 
do the explanatory thing. And that is circular as a research strategy. Sober (1990) says 
this of the Cummins function, but it is an appropriate reply to all these systems, it:
...is an extremely minimal interpretation o f function, ....according to 
which everything has a function, the function of a part of a system is 
whatever that part does to contribute to the containing system's having 
whatever properties it has. For instance the weight of an heart has a 
function too and according to Cummins there is nothing wrong with this 
labelling. It’s not very useful, or interesting, since there is nothing as a 
thing not having a function, we can always find a function and we can all 
ways find a difference in function, (p. 104)
There was another idea of function mentioned above, that of Wright. It is the 
paradigmatic version of the historical type o f such theories which tries to explain 
functions by looking at why they are there; it is a modified version of this type of 
theory which we will be using. What we need then is an understanding of function 
which provides a normative standard to distinguish it from malfunction. An added 
bonus would be if such an account were based on evolution and could be directly 
applied to whatever naturalised account of the functions of mind we are using.
1 For example, Godffey-Smith mentioned above.
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6.2) Teleofunctions
Many writers have attempted a naturalised account o f mental states or intentionality, 
for example, Dennett (1995) Lycan (1996) Neander, (1991, 1995) Papineau (1993). 
One of most comprehensive of such accounts was developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) 
in her book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories and it is actually 
dependent on a biological notion of function. This was followed by a series o f articles 
on the same theme, some of which are reprinted in White Queen Psychology and 
Other Essays fo r  Alice. (Millikan, 1993) Millikan’s work is difficult to follow but I do 
not need it in its entirety. We will see as we go along why Millikan’s theory is most 
suited to the present task.1
Before I start with Millikan’s theory it is important to explainexactly what is being 
attempted here; with the aim of not only making clear the purpose of the exercise but 
also the advantage of Millikan’s system. We have seen that there is a problem with 
intentionality and representations in that they do not seem to fit into the material 
world. Sc what is being done is tc “legitimise” intentionaliiy by naiuralising it. This 
means attempting to “build it” out of elements which are non-intentional and hence 
non-problematic. This naturalistic breaking up of intentionality into its “components” 
can be done in various ways: Lawrence Shapiro (1996) distinguishes two broad 
categories o f such attempts: the top-down and the bottom-up. The bottom up approach 
is closer in some ways to the naturalising aim, since it seeks to build representation up
1 A succinct summary of Millikan’s views are given in Macdonald, 1994. See also Lyons (1995, p.75- 
96). Also see Dennett, (1995) p.406-407. Karen Neander’s (1991) The Teleological Notion o f  Function, 
is an excellent short version of the etiological account, her development o f a teleofunctional theory is 
very similar to Millikan’s even though it was independently developed. Often, it seems simpler and
from “ ...non-intentional and hence naturalistically unimpeachable, correlation 
relation.” (p. 523) The standard author here is Fred Dretske (1988) whose starting 
point is the notion of “indication”, which according to him is an objective relation: 
clouds indicate rain, weathering indicates wind direction, rings of a tree indicate age., 
etc.. They are natural information carriers and either something indicates or it does 
not. There is no intentionality associated with them: indicators naturally mean and 
cannot be wrong. What is needed then is a correlation between such indication and the 
use o f that indicator in the context of what an organism needs to do, in terms of 
behaviour perhaps. This “use o f ’ is seen as the function. Putting these two together, a 
representation exists only when it indicates whatever its function is to indicate. What 
makes representations different from indications is that only those indications that 
have a function to indicate are representations, so what it indicates is what it is 
supposed to indicate. This “recruitment” (as Dretske calls it) o f indicators happens 
because of evolution. But there is also recruitment of indicators taking place in life 
span of an individual organism and this takes place by learning. It should be noted 
that because of Dretske’s dependence on natural indicators, there may be 
misindication, but there are no misrepresentations.
For Dretske, indication comes first, then function. On the other hand, Millikan’s is the 
top-down approach and functions come first. For her, representations do not need to 
be natural information carriers. She just has to claim that content arises from the parts 
of the environment, which if they were not there would cause a failure on the part of 
whatever uses it. So whatever it is that causes, historically, the adaptation which uses
easier to understand. However, in this chapter I will be sticking close to Millikan’s own explication of 
her theory.
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that content is the representation. Instead of using facts about correlations between 
representational states and things in the world and using these facts to ground content, 
Millikan uses evolution and the organism-environment relationship; asking how that 
resulted in selection gives us evidence of what the content is. What is needed is the 
description of the adaptive problems which gave rise to those indications. So in the 
earlier version, “content is determined by correlation; on Millikan’s, content tells us 
which correlations matter.” (Shapiro, op cit. p. 532)1
Let me attempt a brief precis of this theory. Millikan provides a teleofunctional 
evolutionary account of representation, content and intentionality. Putting it as 
generally as possible, the teleofunctional account says that functionality arises 
because some variants within a group have new features which have capacities 
favourable to their possessor’s ability to reproduce. “Favourable” means more 
favourable than the non-possession of those features by the other members of a group: 
that is, the variants give the possessor some advantages which the others do not have. 
Such features are transmitted to their descendants, proliferating within the group in 
the process. They will then, and only then, have as their function the exercise of the 
favourable capacity. So the context has been provided for a Wright type theory of 
functions.2
So only living things and products made by living things have a function. A simple 
way to see this and connect it with our earlier discussion of health is to ask, (as
‘i have used Shapiro’s (1996) description of the two theories here. A comparison of Dretske’s system 
with Millikan’s can be found in Millikan (1995), p. 123-133, where she explains that we do not really 
know what it means for something to indicate something else.
2 I will not go into detail o f Wright’s version because Millikan’s version, though independently 
developed, can be seen as an extension of it.
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Millikan does) why is there no idea of disease in organic chemistry? The answer is 
that there is no notion of function in organic chemistry and hence no malfunctioning. 
The distinction here is between what something does or is doing, and what it is 
supposed to do.
One of the problems we talked about while discussing representation was knowing 
how misrepresentation can occur. This can be accounted for if  we know what the 
representation is for, or what it is meant to do; and that can be understood if we know 
what the system is meant to do for which it is a representation. So if  we have any 
theory of how mental states work —  for instance, a reducing theory —  the same 
theory must also explain how they sometimes do not work. Functions are what give 
normativity to an object, by showing us what it is meant to, or supposed to, or 
designed to do.
As applied to the mind, intentionality derives from the functions of mechanisms 
“designed” by natural selection to make and use abstract “pictures” or “maps” (read 
representations) o f the world, in order to produce actions appropriate to that world. 
These mechanisms have biologically normal ways o f accomplishing the map making 
and map using tasks, but may also fail. This means that sometimes maps are “wrong”, 
given how the biological system is designed to use them. (When it is specifically used 
to discuss meaning, this teleofunctional account is known as teleosemantics.)
Apart from the fact that it is comprehensive and detailed, Millikan’s account has other 
advantages. These advantages make it obvious why, methodologically speaking, I
have chosen Millikan’s system. We will spend a little time on some of these points 
later, but briefly, they are:
■ It is possible to integrate her view into mainstream evolutionary theory. In fact, a 
teleofunctional account is dependent on reproduction, variation and selection, the 
cornerstones o f evolutionary theory. From an evolutionary understanding of 
function we can see that the history of an organism is at least as important as the 
organism’s present condition. (This is why it is also known as an etiological 
theory.) There has been some criticism of Millikan’s theory on the grounds that it 
does not explain new functions. (This is done, for example, by Ariew and Walsh 
(1996, p. 498). Presumably such new uses of organs, if they are immediately 
useful or contribute to fitness, would constitute a novel function. This goes against 
the adaptationist programme, but I feel a defence can be attempted in a way 
similar to Dennett’s (1995, p. 282-299) criticism of punctuated equilibrium: There 
seems to be foreshortening of the time frame involved, is the novel function really 
that immediate?1 We will discuss these criticisms again in section 6.4
■ Millikan suggests that intentionality is not a tight category with sharp lines 
separating it from other phenomena. Further, there may be various levels of 
intentionality which are wrongly lumped in one category. We have seen that there 
are no clear cut edges anywhere in biology, so these two points are what we 
should expect from any evolutionary account.
1 Also, I feel this criticism depends on intuitive understanding o f function. Millikan’s theory is 
counterintuitive in many respects. In Section 6.4 we will spend a little more time on intuition.
It is a deeply ecological theory. This means two things, first, that the 
inside/outside the body distinction, as far as psychology is concerned, is shown to 
be an artificial one. Second, while at one level her story is satisfactorily 
“reductive”, in as much as it uses lower level organisation to explain higher level 
workings — biology to explain psychological events — it also provides a deeply 
holistic account. At the same time it is not reductive in the sense that a physicalist 
would use: when biologists talk about the function of an organ, this function 
cannot be reduced to physics or chemistry. (I use the word “holistic” in its general 
sense, not as a label in epistemology.) An added advantage connected with this is 
that her account neatly side-steps metaphysical arguments on meaning; for 
example, the extemalism/intemalism or swampman debates have no place in the 
present discussion.
It provides an explanation of why things go wrong; why mental representations 
can often be mistaken. This means that, it provides a solution to the problems of 
disjunction and misrepresentation on which other theories sometimes flounder. 
Function provides normativity and can also tell us when and why biological 
entities are not always perfect. (However, it must not be assumed that this 
normativity is going be the same as the evaluative normativity needed in 
psychotherapy.)
From all this we can see that, as Millikan suggests, psychology should be seen as 
a branch o f biology. Millikan emphasizes this repeatedly, and explanations of why 
this is so can be found throughout both her books, for example, Millikan, (1993)
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It must be said at the outset that non-adaptationist evolutionary positions would prove 
a problem for this sort of view, especially when it comes to specifying truth 
conditions of propositional attitudes. This is not a problem for the present discussion 
because we have already stipulated as one of our primary assumptions that the 
programme we are following is based on adaptationism. The second point is that we 
are not dealing with semantics as such, we are trying to find a notion of function that 
can be applied to the mind, so I do not feel that I have answer to criticisms of that 
nature.1
The point can be made (Neander, 1991b) that this theory seems to entail the following 
disjunction: Natural selection is true or there are no proper functions. Given that there 
are proper functions, this implies that the theory of natural selection is true as a matter 
of logic rather than contingent fact. Neander notes that this problem cannot be 
directed at this teleofunctional theory since it is a system of definitions, not a 
conceptual analysis. Since Neander is attempting to defend the etiological theory on 
conceptual grounds too, she goes on to say that the only problem this causes is a 
slightly different disjunct: “ ... Natural selection theory is true or there are no proper 
functions in the modern biologist’s sense o f  'proper f u n c t i o n s (her italics, p. 177) 
Which is not really a problem. In any case, we will shortly see what the difference 
between analysis and definitions are.
1 Though it can be done. See Neander, 1991 and 199lb, for example, and Millikan in both her books 
mentioned above.
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6.3) Historical Explanations
Before we start the teleofunctional account, it might be necessary to clarify one point: 
Are historical explanations o f the mind allowable? As far as the present discussion is 
concerned perhaps the question is not of importance. After all, our search has been 
theory-driven: given the theory o f evolution, we are asking, “What is it that the mind 
does?” or “Do mental phenomena fit into this theory?”. But in the larger context, we 
should see if  there are any grounds, a priori or otherwise, on which we can rule out 
historical explanations? It certainly does not seem so. Michael Tye, (1995) —  who is 
pushing his own particular brand o f a representational theory o f mind —  addresses 
those resistant to studying the mind using evolutionary history by pointing out that it 
has not been shown that facts pertaining to evolutionary history are not relevant to 
any phenomenological character. It is possible that two different organisms that 
evolved in two different ways, while, nonetheless sharing the same microphysical 
states at some particular time differ in their phenomenal states. He writes that,
The pertinent optimal conditions are the ones in v.hich the sensory mechanisms arc 
discharging their biological functions. So it is possible that, with variations in 
biological function environments, phenomenally relevant representational differences 
arise without any internal physical difference, (p. 153)
Millikan’s answer to the question, why look at history, would be, “Why not?” (1993, 
p. 28) She feels that resistance to historical explanations is deeply ingrained in us 
because conscious intentional action is the defining form that intentional purposeful 
phenomena takes. It goes against any view to deny that awareness o f your own
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intentions are “...given, simply and wholly given, to consciousness.” Evolutionary 
facts are obviously not given in such a way. Therefore conscious intentional action 
cannot be dependent on history. She labels this particular fallacy, “the myth of the 
given”.
It is interesting that Millikan presents her work as a reaction to what she calls 
“meaning rationalism” — of which the myth of the given is a part —  the 
epistemological theory that has been the mainstream since Descartes. Meaning 
rationalism is the view that the world is perceived only through the mind. The mind is 
known firsthand through consciousness while everything else is known through the 
mind. This means that there is a line drawn between the mind and the world. We can 
be sure of what is in our minds, while the rest is shrouded in Cartesian doubt.
For Millikan, the biology of belief is what we can rest our certainty on. Believing — 
or more correctly, belief formation — is the activity of a device which is designed by 
evolution through natural selection to have the effect of producing true beliefs. So for 
her, belief is a real feature of the world, not a linguistic or subjective one. 
Intentionality is a biological feature, produced in humans by evolution as much as 
hearts, legs and other parts of the body.
This is a counterintuitive position on many levels. Under this view, for example, the 
molecule for molecule replicas that spring up spontaneously with all your physical 
and mental characteristics would have no properly functioning organs, let alone 
beliefs or desires, since a history is needed to produce organs or beliefs. They might 
have something that seems similar but it is not the same thing; since instant replicas or
accidental doubles could not be placed in any biological categories. Also, the structure 
and present actions and dispositions o f a particular object do not alone determine its 
function, it is its history that does that. So this means that biological functions do not 
simply supervene on physical substance. Theoretically, in biology, functional forms 
can differ while physical structures can stay the same and vice versa. For example, 
how would we decide if  the front legs o f a turtle are flippers for swimming or 
designed for digging in the sand to lay eggs? (See Millikan: 1993 p. 17-19, also p. 
153)1
Further, as pointed out by Fodor (See Lyons (1995) p. 86-96) you could generally 
extend the teleofunctional notion, there is nothing special about brains. With a theory 
based on proper functions, the “aboutness” seems to infect all evolved objects, which 
would mean that lungs are about oxygen consumption, the heart about pumping 
blood. This is true and if it is counterintuitive, it is perhaps our intuitions that have to 
change. There may be a difference in the way content is realised, but this does not 
mean that the theory is wrong. This is where Millikan’s opposition to meaning 
rationalism is most obvious.
6.4) Problems with Historical Accounts of Function
There are more intuitions that go awry when the mental is seen in an evolutionary 
light. Some of these can be seen when we take a look at the problems and criticisms 
directed at Millikan. For it must be admitted that the theory is not without problems.
1 See Hull's, A Matter o f  Individuality (1978). The article was mentioned earlier in relation to historical 
notion of “species”, but also interesting is his dismissal of philosophical thought experiments where an
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Some of these problems are not of concern to the present thesis, but others are more 
serious, such as those concerning the concept of function.
Some of the problems stem from the question of what exactly evolution — and 
especially natural selection — explains. Can natural selection explain why any given 
individual of a population has a particular trait? Or does it only explain the frequency 
of that trait in a population? This question does serioucly impinge on the issue of 
normativity imparted by evolutionary notions o f function but this is an ongoing 
debate, and discussion of this topic is beyond the limits of this thesis. However, since 
I have stipulated that adaptationism, and more particularly, optimality theory, is the 
basis for the present work. I will leave that problem aside. (The debate can be found 
in Neander, (1995, 1995b) Sober, (1995) and Walsh, (1998))
More pertinent to this thesis is the question of whether historical accounts are the only 
correct accounts of function. (Walsh, 1996 gives an useful summary of the different 
ways of looking at function.) The claim has been that biological categories are 
identified looking at their history and that function is one such category. 
Unfortunately, a lot of discussion on the subject has resulted from a misreading of 
Millikan which suggests that her view is that no other ways o f looking at function are 
possible except the etiological one.
Millikan has often pointed out that this is not a correct reading or at least, a 
misinterpretation, of her work and has defended herself against those writers' who
individual is instantaneously created from scratch, p. 349-350.
1 Notably, Preston, (1998) Walsh (1998), and Walsh and Ariew (1996)
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claim that her understanding of function is too narrow and that she totally rejects out 
o f hand Cummins functions; (See Millikan (1999) Wings, Spoons, Pills and Quills: A 
Pluralist Theory o f  Functions, and (1999b) “Biofunctions: Two Paradigms''’ which 
show that her views are actually quite pluralistic.) Millikan would say that causal role 
functions which are biologically interesting are historical functions, a view echoed by 
Walsh and Ariew (1996) who say that historical functions are a subset of C-functions. 
And also that (p. 510) “We claim that C-functions most commonly ascribed by 
anatomists and physiologists are also E-functions and are interesting because they are 
E-functions.”
The argument that function means many things and that the term is used in biology in 
many different ways may be valid, but it is not pertinent to the present discussion 
since this not a conceptual or linguistic analysis. (These are definitions of function.) 
Other ways of looking at function may be compatible with different explanatory 
projects. See for example Godffey-Smith, whose view this is.
Criticism of the historical conception of function seems to be motivated by two 
primary objections: 1) the idea that there can be novel functions which have no 
history; and 2), the idea that there are uses of the concept of function which are not 
historical. The classic article on this position is Amundson and Lauder’s (1994) 
Function Without Purpose: The Uses o f  Causal Role Function in Evolutionary 
Biology. Amundson and Lauder claim that evolutionary biology is not the only 
context in biology to which the notion of function applies and that this notion is not 
necessarily etiological. They give examples o f sub-fields of biology in which a more 
Cummins style analysis is commonly used. They call historical functions “selected
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effect functions”. (Neander’s definition of function given below explains why this 
phrase is used.)
I will return to the first point shortly but I feel that the second objection misses the 
point, the no one is denying that Cummins (or causal role) functions are used by 
branches of biology with no reference to the historical functions.1 But what force does 
this claim have? What Amundson and Lauder attempt to do is show that not all 
biological categories are historical categories, and they site the fields of anatomy, 
morphology1 and other non-purposive concepts o f function are used. (p. 239) 
However their point does not seem to be valid as a criticism. Of course, there are 
going to be fields where evolution is not going to be applicable, no one denies this. 
Furthermore, most anatomical terminology was given before any understanding of (if 
not evolution) the relationships between different organism was understood. So the 
claim has to be more than the fact that many names of organs or body parts are not in 
themselves functional terms. You could for instance, classify all body parts according 
to colour. Another way to look at this would be to ask, what is that denies a butcher or 
a carpenter the title of a biologist? They work with organic objects that were once 
living, yet, we would not consider them biologists. The question is one of how a 
subfield fits into the overall science of biology, a science which is not just informed 
by, but held together by evolutionary theory. This is the point o f the quote from
1 In the literature some of the confusion occurs because of the attempt to draw hard lines between 
causal role functions and historical functions which is a misguided project, we are not going to know 
the exact historical function of every trait, and certainly in that case, causal role functions will have to 
do.
Dobzhansky made in Section, 2.3, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the 
light of evolution.” Also, let us not forget that these scientists who, in their field do 
not use evolutionary notions, can usually be seen to have “helped” themselves to basic 
biological categories based on historical notions, such species, leg, ear, etc.1 In 
biology when biological categories are used, sooner or later, the question is going to 
be asked, “what does it do?”, and “what is it supposed to do?” this is where a 
historical understanding needs to be used.
Let me return to the first objection, that of novel functions. Can there be functions 
which have no history? (Obviously this question does not apply to artifacts or the 
products o f intentional action.) It seems extremely counterintuitive that nothing which 
does not have a history does not have a function. For the purposes o f this thesis I 
would be willing to rule out novel functions as a stipulation since they seem to clash 
with adaptationism. (The discussion on exaptations and the two famous papers by 
Gould and Lewontin and Gould and Vrba on “Spandrels” and “Exaptations” along 
with the criticism leveled against them by various biologists and philosophers is 
apposite here, since the issues are symmetrical if  not the same.)
However, some remarks can be made in defense of this view. Firstly, the idea that 
there can be novel functions depends on intuition. If an organism does something 
now, perhaps using a limb in a particular way, something which its ancestors have 
never done before, and this something helps it to survive, surely we can intuitively say 
that that limb has that particular function? Further, it seems intuitively wrong to say
1 But then they also say that (p. 244) “Anatomical distinctions are not normally based on CR function 
either...”
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that in an individual the function of the heart is to pump blood only because that is 
what it was selected for in the past, since we can see that the individual is only kept 
alive now by its heart functioning.1 But this is indeed why it has a function. And 
understanding this enables us to rule out attributing function to accidents and 
miracles. (See Millkan, 1999b.)
Most of the examples given in defense of novel functions depend on intuition. (See 
for instance Walsh (1996, p.559-560) where he designs a thought experiment to show 
how an imaginary creature can be shown to have new functions for body parts in a 
new environment.) The point is that evolutionary considerations break down 
intuitions. Again Walsh, {op cit.) mentions the case of ex nihilo lions and asks why it 
is misguided to say that their hearts pump blood. But since evolution says that all 
living things arose through a process of gradual evolution, it might be just as pertinent 
to ask if these lions are alive. Is their DNA genetic material? Or echoing a far earlier 
discussion, do they have navels?
However, more in keeping with the needs of this thesis are concerns of evidence. We 
can guess what the function of something is, but we can only know what the function 
of something is by seeing if its ancestors performed the same function. As Dennett 
says (while talking specifically about intentionality) (1996, p 267-268:
...W hat makes an intentional thing intentional is its function. No mention 
o f history yet. But if  you go on to ask me how I know what its function is,
1 As Dennett has pointed out at various times. Though Walsh (1996, p 509) claims that this is not so, 
since historical function attributes are not necessarily prior to causal role functions.
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if you ask me how I support my ‘metaphysical’ answer, I have to tell one 
historical tale or another. If a thing is an artifact of human engineering, I 
cite the relevant details o f its R and D history and the contemporary 
‘history’ of its current use; if  a living thing, I cite its evolutionary history 
and current use. Nothing else is or could be relevant to its function.”
However, there are other methodological reasons for preferring Millikan’s approach: 
Millikan’s system allows us to get a handle on adaptationism. And as pointed out by 
various writer’s including Millikan herself, the notion of proper function coincides 
with purpose. Cummins functions are not designed to answer the question o f “why is 
it there?”as are historical ones. Amundson and Lauder (p. 244) remind us that 
Millikan is not interested in a conceptual analysis or all the possible uses of the word 
“function” but rather the use of function in its purposive sense. They show that the 
notions of historical functions and adaptation are similar: or as they say: (p. 231) “The 
two terms are interchangeable. If a law were passed against a selected effect concept 
of function, its use in biology could be fully served by the historical concept of 
adaptation.”1
Or as Godfrey-Smith (1996 p. 191) notes, “The concept of adaptation has become 
analyzed along the same lines as the teleonomic sense of function. An adaptation is 
something that has a Wright-style teleonomic function.” where (p. 16) “Teleonomic” 
is explained as “ ....those parts o f traditional teleological thinking that can be given a 
foundation in the operation of natural selection.
1 This is also dependent on seeing the individual as an atemporal natural kind; a view like Dawkin’s 
selfish gene theory would deny even that. Again, counterintuitive.
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I would like to reiterate the point made earlier, that if  you don’t look for a function, 
you won’t find one. And this is our task. But this is not to say that the discussion on 
the right way to view function is exhausted; there is still an ongoing debate on the 
subject. We will continue, keeping in mind that the primary objective o f this thesis is 
to show that naturalism is possible as an approach to the mind and that naturalism will 
allow us to incorporate psychotherapy into the medical model. This method can show 
us a way, we do not have to claim that this is the only way. In no sense is evolutionary 
biology with its attendant philosophical discussions a completed science
6.5) Purpose and Function
How does Millikan’s theory work? For any organ the starting point for any biological 
theory is the idea o f function. For as Millikan says, (Note the capital “N” in 
“Normally”, we will see below why it is spelt in this way.)
Imagine a physiologist trying to study the liver or eye without having any 
idea what its proper functions are —  what it is supposed to do. Clearly his 
first job will be to try and find out what it is supposed to do, what it is for 
it to “work.” Until he has formed some kind of hypothesis about this there 
is no way of proceeding to the study of how it works. There is no way of 
knowing even when it is working, let alone working right or well, and no 
way of distinguishing the Normally constituted and properly functioning
1 Braddon-Mitchell, and Jackson say (1996 ) p. 203 “We can think therefore o f a trait’s biological 
function as explaining why it exists and what it is for, as explaining its purpose, or telos.”
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samples of its kind from those that are malformed, diseased, or
malfunctioning Nor is there any way of proceeding to a study of how
it works without knowing something about the surrounding conditions 
upon which it Normally relies. (Millikan 1993, p. 61)
To clarify this, let us ask some questions; what makes an organ fall into a particular 
organ category? The lungs of human beings, other primates, fish, birds, a lung 
dissected out o f a body and put on a mortuary slab, a smoker’s lung, the lung of a 
diver using bottled air, what puts all these into the same category? If  we study lungs at 
various stages of an evolutionary tree, at what stage does it stop being a membrane for 
the exchange of gasses and become a lung? Why should a malfunctioning lung be 
even called and studied as a lung? Finally, is the wheezing sound a smoker’s lung 
may make, part of its function? According to Millikan, organs such as kidneys, hearts, 
as well as behaviour and semantic items such as words, are assigned to their 
biological categories in terms of their functions. This function is understandable not 
by looking at what they are doing now, but what they have, historically, been doing.
Connecting this with the idea of natural selection, what a biological system does as a 
biological system is what its ancestors have historically done that enabled them to 
survive and reproduce. As a biological system, it does only what its biological 
“purpose” or its “proper function” is to do. To have a purpose is to have been 
selected by a mechanism which favours certain results; something has a function if  it 
is there because of something it can do. But what strength does “because” have in that 
statement? If  in fact the word “purpose” in the biological sense means “function”, we 
have to show what explanatory power “function” has.
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The most important term in the teleofunctional account is that of “proper function”. 
Millikan says,
My claim will be that it is the ‘proper function’ of a thing that puts it in a 
biological category, and this has to do not with its powers but with its 
history. Having a proper function is a matter o f having been ‘designed to’ 
or of being ‘supposed to’ (impersonal) perform a certain function. The 
task of the theory of proper functions is to define this sense of ‘designed 
to’ or ‘supposed to’ in naturalist, non-normative, and non-mysterious 
terms. (1993, p. 17)
What constitutes an entity’s “proper function”? To explain this term in the sense used 
by Millikan, she needs to depend on a series of other terms, some of which are 
recursively defined. A word to note first of all is “Normal”. Because the word is not 
being used in its usual sense of “statistically average” or even “usual” it is capitalised. 
It is used in the biological sense, of what has historically been useful in the best 
possible case scenario, in other words, historically optimal. It is worthwhile 
remembering that in the attempt to define disease statistical normalcy was not a very 
useful normative notion. A disease was no less a disease because the majority of the 
population has it; we cannot cure a disease by passing it around.
What is Normal may actually rarely happen: for example, a defensive instinct has to 
be needed and used correctly only once in a family tree for descendants to exist and 
most generations do not actually even have to perform the appropriate behaviour. The
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camouflage colours o f some juvenile animals are supposed to protect the animal from 
certain predators. If  this actually happened in even the majority of cases, the world 
would be overrun by that species. Millikan’s classic example is sperm cells. The 
sperm is supposed to find an ovum. The majority of sperm cells do not, in fact, do 
this; just one does. The biological conception o f proper or Normal is ideal rather than 
based on a statistical average. “Normal” as it applies to explanation explains the 
performance o f a particular function by telling how it has historically performed on 
those occasion when it functioned properly.
6.6) Definitions and Analysis
To understand how this teleofunctional theory works we have to first use Millikan's 
definitions. They are complex and recursive and she spends the first few chapters of 
Language Thought, and Other Biological Categories explaining these definitions and 
using them to explicate proper functions. As such, they are not necessary for this 
discussion, since I could just adopt her definition of proper function. However, 
working through her system helps us in two ways. Firstly, it shows how closely the 
notion of function is dependent on evolutionary theory: All functions involve natural 
selection and all present day functions are determined by past functions. Only if  a trait 
is selected for can it be counted as a having a function. Secondly, her system shows 
particularly clearly how intentionality and content, can be looked at through 
evolutionary theory. Both these are important in the search for the function of the 
mind.
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It could be asked, “Why are definitions so important? Surely biological phenomena 
stay biological phenomena no matter what labels you give them?”. Definitions serve 
two purposes. First, they allow us to “carve” the world into different types of entities 
for further study. That is, they provide a system of classification in which to order the 
world. This order can be loose or tight; demarcations between one class o f entities and 
another may be fuzzy or sharp, but that is not really important, since in biology there 
is no real sure distinction between classes anyway. But also, definitions give us 
ontological categories and then allow us to study them further:
Now to study how an entity as falling within a biological category “works” involves 
(1) understanding what functions are proper to it and to its constituent systems, parts, 
and states and (2) understanding how these functions are Normally performed. It does 
not involve studying just anything at all that the entity might be disposed to do and 
any old way that one might induce it to do this.” (Millikan, 1993, p. 59)
Secondly, definitions serve as tools. What is it about some phenomena and not others 
that makes a certain definition applicable? Answering this question shows up 
connections, similarities and analogies that can be useful. Once we have such a tool, 
we can also see what makes a faulty entity fit into that type. In the present essay, what 
we are trying to do is to see what exactly it is that we are saying when we say “The 
proper function of A is B ”1
1 Because of the recursiveness o f her definitions, Millikan’s work has often been accused of being 
circular. But we must keep in mind that we are looking for a tool, not a logical analysis o f the words 
used.
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It is important to acknowledge that this is not conceptual analysis. Millikan is scathing 
in her attack on conceptual analysis of meaning and intentionality. We do not have to 
deprecate it so strongly for our purposes here, just acknowledge that we do not need 
it. However, Neander (1991b) does feel that there is something to be said for 
conceptual analysis, and in Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s 
Defense, she shows that such analysis can support an etiological account. The 
difference between conceptual analysis and theoretical definitions are instructive. 
Basically, as she says, theoretical definitions are about “ ...answering empirical 
questions.” But a better way to explain the difference might be:
Conceptual analysis is the attempt to describe certain features o f the relationship 
between the utterances of the term under analysis, and the beliefs, ideas and 
perceptions of those who do the uttering. It involves trying to describe the criteria of 
application that the members of the linguistic community have (implicitly or 
explicitly) in mind when they use the term. (p. 177)
Generally also, conceptual analysis is also seen as a search for meaning and necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the use of the term. This can be compared to theoretical 
definition which is “ .. .is an attempt to explain some aspect of the thing referred to, or 
some aspect o f relationship between utterances of the term and the actual world.” (p. 
170)
David Papineau (1993) calls theoretical definitions “theoretical reductions”. The word 
“reduction” is problematic and would need a deeper digression on the meaning of 
“theory”, but the example he uses points out the difference quite well:
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Consider for example, the theoretical reduction of the everyday notion of 
a liquid to the notion of the state of matter in which the molecules cohere 
but form no long-range order. This is clearly not a conceptual analysis of 
the everyday concept, since everyday concept presupposes nothing about 
molecular structure. In consequence, this reduction corrects some of the 
judgements which flow from the everyday concept, such as the judgement 
that glass is not a liquid, (p. 93)
6.7) Proper Functions
So, after that long but necessary preamble, on to the definitions. To begin, proper 
function : A direct proper function is a function that an item has as a member o f a 
reproductively established family (ref). Here is the definition Millikan gives of proper 
function: (All of the following definitions are from Millikan, 1984. I will dispense 
with the quotation marks for this section since it makes it difficult to read.)
Where m is a member of reproductively established family R , and R has the 
reproductively established or Normal character C, m has F  as a direct proper function 
iff:
1) Certain ancestors of m performed F.
2) In part because there existed a direct causal connection between having the 
character C and performance of the function F  in the case of these ancestors of m, 
C correlated positively with F  over a certain set of items S  which included these 
ancestors and other things not having C.
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3) One among the legitimate explanations that can be given of the fact that m exists 
makes reference to the fact that C correlated positively with F  over S, either 
directly causing reproduction of m or explaining why R was proliferated and 
hence why m exists.
What this means is that for an entity to have a proper function F  it is necessary that at 
least one of two conditions hold. First, that the entity originated as a reproduction of 
some prior entity that, thanks to the property reproduced, has actually performed F  in 
the past, and the entity exists because of performance of that function. Second, the 
entity originated as a product of some prior device that, given the right circumstances, 
had performance of F  as a proper function and that under those circumstances, 
normally causes F  to be performed by means of producing the entity. So having a 
proper function is connected with the history of an item, not its causal powers: direct 
proper functions are functions of devices that are members o f families of devices 
similar to each other, such families being reproductively established families. Proper 
functions are not always direct: they can be derived proper function, if  they are 
functions that derive from tne functions of the devices that produce them. An example 
of derived proper functions could be functions of functions of states of the nervous 
system; states, for example, which result in part from learning.
Neander gives this as her definition of function: “It is the/a proper function of an item 
{X) of an organism (O) to do that which items of X s  type did to contribute to the 
inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, o f which X  is the 
phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.” (Neander, 1991, p. 174). It 
can be seen that this is very similar to Millikan’s definition, but also that it needs a
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system, such as evolutionary theory and genetics to fit into. I prefer Millikan’s 
definition because she provides further definitions so that it becomes part of a 
comprehensive system in which to view intentional phenomena.
To make the notion o f proper functions watertight some more definitions are needed. 
An individual B is a “reproduction” of an individual A if f
1) B has some determinate properties p } ,p2, p 3, etc., in common with A and (2) 
below is satisfied.
2) That A and B  have properties p j p 2 p 3, etc., in common can be explained by a 
natural law or laws operative in situ, which laws satisfy (3) below.
3) For each property p h p 2 p 3, etc., the laws in situ that explain why B  is like A in 
respect to p  are laws that correlate a specifiable range of determinates under a 
determinable under which p  falls, such that whatever determinate characterises A 
must also characterise B , the direction o f  causality being straight from  A to B.
Reproduction results in families which come in two types, first and higher order 
reproductively established families. The definition for first-order reproductively 
established families: Any set of entities having the same or similar reproductively 
established characters derived by repetitive reproductions from the same character of 
the same model or models form a first-order reproductively established family. 
(Members o f a species would be the most obvious examples of this.)
Higher-order reproductively established families have to meet one of three conditions:
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1) Any set of similar items produced by members of the same reproductively 
established family, when it is a direct proper function of the family to produce 
such items and these are all produced in accordance with Normal explanations, 
form a higher-order reproductively established family.
2) Any set of similar items produced by the same device, when it was one of the 
proper functions of this device to make later items match earlier items, and these 
items are alike in accordance with a Normal explanation for performance o f this 
function, form a higher-order reproductively established family.
3) If anything x  (a) has been produced by a device a direct proper function of which 
is to produce a member or members o f a higher-order reproductively established 
family R, and (b) is in some respects like Normal members of R because (c) it has 
been produced in accordance with an explanation that approximates in some 
(undefined) degree to a Normal explanation for production of members of R , then 
* is member of R. (Examples of this would be organs or body parts.)
This means that not everything produced by a first order ref is a higher order ref; only 
tnose items produced by the same first order ref when it is a direct proper function of 
that family to produce such items, and these are all produced in accordance with a 
normal explanation. For example, hearts are not reproductions o f each other, and so 
not members of a ref, but hearts produced in Normal conditions according to the 
proper functioning of genes that are copies of one another form higher-order refs, that 
is, these hearts are produced in normal conditions according to normal explanations.
Two definitions that fill up the background for this evolutionary understanding of 
function are: A Normal explanation is a preponderant explanation for those historical
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cases where a proper function was performed. And similarly, Normal conditions are 
preponderant explanatory conditions under which that function has historically been 
performed, (p. 34)
However, Millikan produces the following warning: a malfunctioning member of a ref 
can be produced provided that it has been produced by a device the proper function of 
which is to produce members of the ref in question, that is m some aspects similar to 
other members o f the ref, and that its production has an explanation which 
approximates (in some undefined degree) to a normal explanation for the production 
of members of the ref.
Millikan calls the properties common to all members o f a ref the Normal Character of 
the ref. A member, m, o f a ref, R, has the function F  as a direct proper function iff 
(some of) its ancestors performed F, F  correlates positively with the Normal 
Character C, of R, and one of the explanations as to why m exists refers to this 
positive correlation, either by directly causing reproduction of m or by explaining the 
existence of m as a resuit o f the proliferation of members of R such proliferations 
being due to the possession of C (and its positive correlation with F). For example, 
the long necks of giraffes have the function of helping giraffes reach high leaves; their 
long necks correlate positively with this function and so the possession of long necks 
is partially explanatory of the proliferation of more long necked giraffes.
Another important definition is that o f a relational proper function. An item A that has 
a relational proper function is supposed to produce something that bears a certain 
relation to something else B, B  being so situated in relation to A. So this is a function
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to do something bearing a relation to something else. For instance, chameleon skin 
colour mechanisms have the relational function of making the chameleon's skin match 
that of its environment, whatever the colour may be of the environment.
So when a ref has a proper function, this function is always direct. But sometimes a 
function may be adapted: When a device has a relational proper function, given some 
specific thing that the device is now supposed to produce in relation to, the device 
acquires an adapted proper function. The proper function o f adapted devices are 
derived proper functions, derived from the proper functions of the devices that 
produce them. In the case of the chameleon, given a specific colour to adapt to, the 
mechanism then acquires an adapted proper function. It does not matter that that 
particular colour may have never been produced by the chameleon before. Human 
artefacts also fit into this category: Intentional selection by a person will also have an 
intending function, along the lines o f the standard artefact functions. Artefacts that do 
not “evolve” have derived proper functions, functions that derive from the makers’ 
intentions which have proper functions thanks to the evolved biological functions of 
ihe intention making mechanisms.
To summarise, what Millikan has done is to give, using the above series of 
definitions, a more rigorous footing to an etiological theory of function. Using this set 
of definitions, we can say that an item x has a function y  i f f  item x  is now present as a 
result o f causing y. The paradigmatic application o f the etiological theory is the 
situation where x  has been naturally selected by a mechanism which picks out things 
that cause y, as in the case of biological selection. Here, functions are determined by 
the histories of the organisms possessing them; functions that were selected for by
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natural selection for instance. We should keep in mind that natural selection does not 
stop after the emergence of a structure but has a role in preserving it against the 
arrival of less fit structures by random mutation. So things like function and design 
should not be seen as just referring to origin o f the structures under observation.
Millikan’s theory is comprehensive: it can be applied not just to biological entities but 
to all entities and artifacts which show the following features:
• Members of a group show variations in their features.
• Some of these are selected for.
• These selected features are variably transmitted to their descendants.
These three features seem to describe a large group, but this large group contains not 
only organs, but also interesting things like language, instinctive behaviour and 
biological organs. Notice that these criteria also fit artefacts such as tools or mass 
produced consumer items.
How does all this help in the examination of intentionality? Let us look closer at some 
biological phenomena. One natural device that works by picturing something else is 
the bee dance. (The example is from Millikan) The bee dance represents the location 
of nectar that has been spotted by the dancing bee to other bees. It is “about” the 
location o f the nectar. The transformations — which could be seen as syntax —  of the 
dances have a one-to-one correspondence with transformations of the location of the 
nectar relative to the hive and the sun. It is a kind of map designed by evolution and 
can be explained by the bee’s evolutionary history.
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The dance is a map, in a loose sense of the word, an abstract likeness of where the 
nectar is. Yet, there is no need for something to understand or interpret the likeness. 
A ll that is needed is a reaction, the watching bees react to the dance appropriately, 
allowing it to guide them to the nectar. We would perhaps say this is not intentionality 
yet, but a point to note here is that bee dances have a feature which we mentioned as 
being important to intentionality: the bee dances can be about something that does not 
exist. The bee dance could be wrong for many reasons. When a bee dance is wrongly 
executed it does not point out the location of any actual nectar according to bee dance 
rules, it could be because it is wrongly generated by the producer bee, someone could 
have moved the source o f the nectar, strong wind could have moved the bee in the 
wrong angle. Many such other environmental factors could be out of place as well as 
factors in the bee itself. But no matter why it is wrong, it is still a representation for 
the bee. As long as it is still a well-formed bee dance one can still say where the 
nectar would have had to have been for it to serve its normal proper function.
Is it right to use the word “map” or “representation” in the above description? I am 
not sure, since her views seem to waver, but I think Millikan would not count the bee 
dance as a real representation, since in her view one criterion for a proper 
representation is that the user must realise the significance of the representation. To 
realise the significance is another way of saying that the user “knows” what the 
representation is. So beliefs and thoughts are real representations, while the bee dance 
is not, since the bee does not “understand” the dance as a symbol. Millikan would call 
these “intentional icons” and reserves the use of the word “representations” for 
intentional entities which differ in six different ways from those of bees. (Millikan 
1993, p. 78. See also p. 97-101) In true representations,
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■ There are more than just self representing elements: most intentional icons are self 
representing, real representations have more variables than a just time and place.
■ Genuine representations can be stored. Only higher organisms seem to store 
representations. Lower organisms have to use them at the time and place that they 
appear.
■ There is a difference between indicative and imperative representations. Simple 
representations are both at the same time. (See below.)
■ Inference making is possible: once imperative and indicate representations are 
separated they need to be reintegrated which may results in new representations. 
By which is meant that they participate in inference making.
■ Acts o f identifying are possible: There is the ability to compare representations, 
which is dependent on mediate representations and also dependent on knowing 
what the representations are about.
■ Negation is possible. In bee dances there does not seem a way in which one bee 
can indicate to another that the nectar does not lie in that direction, contrary to 
what the dance indicates.
However, I do not agree with this, since one o f the things that comes out from 
approaching representation in a teleofunctional way is that there is no clear-cut 
difference in intentional and nonintentional phenomena. What Millikan seems to be 
saying is that in a bee dance or other simple animal communication one animal is 
saying to the other “Do this now.” There is no sense in which the animal can say “do
this tomorrow”, or “do this unless the this particular situation holds ” Yes, perhaps
it is pointless to ask whether a bee dance says “The nectar is over there” or “Go to the
nectar over there” since there seems to be no difference between the two for the 
individual bees. And it is true that higher animals separate indicative and imperative 
representations and then have the need to integrate them again, giving rise to 
inference making. But now that it is known that bee dances are far more complicated 
than was previously thought —  as mentioned in Chapter One —  I am not sure that all 
the above differences hold.
What is being represented in the dance? This, says Millikan, depends upon the 
dance’s proper function, a function it can only have as a member of a ref. The direct 
proper function is to move the bees in a direction having a specific relation to its 
concrete from.
What is it for a system to use a representation as a representation? An important step 
has to be taken here. If  it is actually a system’s function to produce representation, 
these representations must function as representations fo r  the system itself. We can 
separate the system into two discrete entities, the producer and the user of the 
representation, or in Millikan’s words, fne consumer. There is the dancing bee which 
has discovered the position of the nectar and dances or produces the dance, and there 
is the waiting bee (the consumer) which will use the dance to find the nectar. Let us 
take the consumer unit first, the part that uses the thing as a representation. This part 
o f the system must be able to use or “understand” the representation presented to it. A 
examination o f the properties of this unit should be all that is needed to determine 
representational status and representational content.
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It is obviously true there is usually an infinite amount of natural information in any 
environment. The problem is that separating out useable information from noise all 
ready presupposes some kind of intentional act. What Millikan’s theory has done is 
shift the burden on to the user rather than the maker o f the information. All this noise 
or natural information could not be used by the system as information, unless the 
signs were understood (in the sense o f used) by the system, and furthermore, 
understood as carriers of whatever specific information they, in fact, do bear. The sign 
producer’s function will then be to produce signs that are correct as the consumer 
reads the language. (Compare this with Shannon and Weaver's idea of what 
constitutes information.)
So for the naturalistic account of intentionality, the crux of the matter is not 
representation production at all. Although a representation is always something that is 
made by a system whose proper function is to make that representation correspond to 
the world, what that rule of correspondence is, what gives “usability” to this function, 
is determined entirely by the representation’s consumers.
It seems that at least the following two conditions need to be met: 1) that the 
representation is related to the represented by some sort o f rule, perhaps a mapping 
rule, so that it becomes the proper function of the consumer to respond in some way 
to the represented and the consumer does not react unless this rule be followed. 2) 
That there be some way in which the represented can vary depending on the form of 
the representation. There can be some aspects of the representation which perhaps are 
invariant but others are variable and the representation can be said to be composed of 
these aspects together.
162
Unless the consumer can use the representations as a guide in enough cases. (If we are 
talking about beliefs, this would mean there are enough true beliefs.) there would be 
no representations and no beliefs. Enough does not mean most, it is not required that 
the majority of beliefs must be true; we should remember that a biological advantage 
can accrue from a feature which performs its function on very few occasions, since 
such is the biological idea of Normal.
To apply some of the above definitions to the case of language seems straightforward 
once we start off with the assumption that, as with other biological entities that are 
regularly reproduced by biological systems,' a natural-language device continues to 
thrive because it has served a stable function or set of functions. (A ref can have many 
proper functions, some of which may be independent of each other: feathers can be 
waterproofing, thermal insulation or streamlining elements and are also used in 
mating displays.) Language devices have direct proper functions as members of a ref, 
they also have derived proper function, perhaps derived from the speakers intentions.
Let us take a look at the misrepresentation and disjunction problems mentioned 
earlier. This is where such aetiological theories show their usefulness. We have seen 
that as a biological phenomenon, intentionality is dependent on what is Normal, and 
therefore can be described in terms of its proper function rather than what actually 
exists at the present moment. We can pick out a desire’s real satisfaction condition as 
that effect which it is the desire’s biological purpose to produce. And similarly, the 
real truth condition of a belief is that condition which it is the biological purpose of 
the belief to be co-present with. This account views beliefs and desires as entities with
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biological purposes and analyses their truth conditions specifically as those conditions 
that they are biologically supposed to act with. For example, a book belief stands for 
books because it is their purpose to be held when books, not files or holograms, are 
present. Let us remember that normal conditions are those that have historically 
figured in the explanation of how the system has functioned properly when it has 
functioned properly. This is true even if  not all parts of a system function properly.1
Following Millikan, one way to look at the differences between beliefs and desires is 
to compare them to two different types of sentences, indicatives and imperatives. 
Representations can be divided into two types, indicative: those inner representations 
that are designed to mirror an organism’s environment or provide maps of what is, 
and imperative representations, those which show or provide blueprints for what is to 
be done, or goals to be reached. Note that this is the same difference that obtains 
between cognition and volition. Another point to note is that false beliefs are defective 
but unfulfilled desires cannot be called defective or wrong, they are unsatisfied. 
(Millikan 1993, p. 72)
6.8) Normativity as a Tool
A point should perhaps be clarified at this stage. The idea of normativity has arisen 
twice in the present work so far. The first was in the discussion of mental health 
where we saw that any discussion of health and disease depends on applying
1 It should be noted that the disjunction problem is separate from the indeterminacy problem often 
discussed in the philosophy of language. See Neander (1995) in Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning, 
where she examines the difference between the two. Especially interesting is her discussion of
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normative principles. We saw further that this normativeness comes from a biological 
understanding of function and dysfunction as applied to an organ. So if we were going 
to apply the concepts o f health and illness to mental health, we saw that we needed to 
find the function of the mind which could be used for check for dysfunction and 
hence illness. In this chapter we have again been using the notion o f normativity. 
However, what we have been doing here is using normativity as a tool to understand 
what it means for something to represent something else and again we came upon the 
notion o f function. The two uses of the normativeness and function should not be 
immediately conflated. We have not made use of the normativity notion that arose 
from Millikan’s work except as an approach to beliefs, to actually anchor our 
understanding of intentionality, but this normativity is not necessarily going to be 
“carried over” into psychotherapy; the normativeness used in this section is different 
from the normativeness in the earlier section when we were discussing how we can 
decide if  some one has a mental disorder or not. But here we have used normativity 
and function as a tool.
For example, we may know how the organic chemicals in muscle fibers cause 
contraction of the fibers, fulfilling their biological function. This however, may not 
tell us anything about why someone has a sprained leg. We need to also know how 
(for example) that particular muscle is used, how it is connected to the skeletal 
structures, and what the person was doing at the time.
Dretske’s bacteria, where what the magnetosome represents is what the consumer needs it to represent, 
oxygen free water, not the pull o f the magnet.
165
6.9) The Human Mind
So, what does all this tell us about the function of the mind? We said that what was 
problematic about any studying of the mind was intentionality and from there, the 
question of what makes a representation a representation (chapter 5). The question 
this chapter set out to solve is, can these two notions be looked through the lens of 
naturalism? We saw that this was possible and that we can also think of them in terms 
o f function. Using the aetiological system we can attribute functions to beliefs and 
desires. We can say very simply, as does Papineau, (1987 p. 64) that biologically, the 
function of a belief is to be present when a certain environmental condition is present. 
Millikan would agree but insist on some quite important differences from Papineau by 
making use o f her notion of intentional icons. The icon has a role in the interaction 
between two cooperating mechanisms, the consumer and the producer. Consumers 
have the function of modifying their behavior in response to the right icon being 
produced by the producer.
So, in the case of a belief like state, the perceptual end of the information processing 
system is the icon producer and the part of the behavior that produces behavior is the 
consumer. This way of consuming icons has been successful because the environment 
is such that the producer and hence the organism of which the producer is a part of is 
successful in living in this environment and helped it multiply in the past. (It is 
possible that in the present the icon consumption is useless or may even cause the 
organism to die out.) We have to take into account this differentiation between the 
consumer and the producer of the representation in understanding what a 
representation is. The producers work is not that important since it is the consumer
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that determines it by reacting to the right representation. What the consumer can use, 
what works, is what the representation is. Briefly, the truth condition o f an icon is the 
state o f the environment required for the icon to affect the activities o f its consumers 
in a way which leads to their performing their own functions. The mechanisms 
responsible for mental representation are evolutionary products and they will have a 
proper function, but the representational features of such a mechanism derive from the 
environment.
This means that the function here is to be seen in terms o f what Millikan calls 
relational proper functions. We have seen that normal functions are generally defined 
relatively to some environmental feature. A function is specified in terms of a relation 
to an environmental item, since that character has in fact evolved to meet some 
environmental problem. So we can see that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
a belief and a belief forming mechanism. The mechanisms will have an evolutionary 
history and hence a proper function and this will be to make and use of beliefs. So the 
representation derives from the relational proper function of the mechanism that 
produces it.1
We can now ask what beliefs are for. They exist to carry information about the 
environment, that is why they were selected. This is commonsensical and perhaps 
what we would intuitively expect. But what is not intuitive is that it is the beliefs
1 The analogy often used here (especially by Millikan) is that of a photocopier. A photocopier can copy 
a book, a map,even run off a copy of a hand placed on it. The function o f the photocopier gives a 
relational function between the copy and whatever it is that is being copied.
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selectional history or its biological function that decides which part o f the 
environment it is designed to carry information about.1
However, let us return to our real problems, that of finding the function o f the mind, 
the human mind. All that studying bees and other simple organisms tells us is that 
these can be said to use representations which gives an indication of their function. 
However, the human mind is more than that. What is it that separates the human mind 
from a simple behaviouristic animal or an artifact that uses representations? Let us go 
back to folk psychology and the attribution of belief and desires and try to unpack the 
notion
As an analogue of the eye of an organism receiving input from the environment, let us 
take a camera with a lens which focuses the light from the outside on to a 
photosensitive screen. The camera cannot be said to be “seeing” the world. The 
camera is then connected to a computer which is programmed so that every time a 
white surface is in front of the lens it flashes the word “white” on to a monitor. Would 
we say thac this machine can now see? Not yet. If a machine could be rigged up to 
“know” (in some sense of the word “know”) that there is white surface in front of the 
lens we would then be able to say that it “sees”. Note that that this is not just a 
regression, it is not a computer connected to the first computer connected to a camera, 
but something qualitatively different happening here, it is levels or orders of 
intentionality itself. This qualitative difference is what is unique about our psychology
1 It is worthwhile remembering that, as Papineau, says, (1996) p. 130: “We were offering a posteriori 
theories of representations, rather than conceptual analyses of an everyday notion, we were prepared to 
reject common sense intuitions.” The connection between mental states, evolutionary history and the 
environment is unintuitive and because of this many conceptual problems which are dependent on 
intuition (such as the swampman and zombie scenarios) do not work.
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and why we started looking at folk psychology as an indication of minds. Folk 
psychology is the ability to use and attribute second (or higher) order intentionality as 
part of an explanatory causal chain. First order intentionality can be seen as the 
elements out of which the superstructure o f folk psychology is built.
It is because o f this that we do not have to question whether thermostats have 
intentionality or not. Part o f the reason for this are empirical or methodological 
constraints: we will see later that there is no “test” for first-order intentionality. (We 
will also see in the next chapter that there are clear ways to recognize the presence of 
second-order intentionality.) We have also seen that biologically speaking there is not 
going to be a hard line drawn between intentional and nonintentional phenomena. 
There is no dividing line between simple forms and more “advanced” forms, between 
the bee and what we do in when it comes to first order intentionality. This is the 
nature of biological entities; there are going to be gradations of intentionality and it is 
going to be difficult to show where basic intentional icons end and true intentionality 
starts. But one thing we can be sure of is that if  there is second order intentionality, 
then there must be first order intentionality “beiow” it. So we turn to beliefs about 
beliefs. Our species could have survived very well without this second order 
intentionality as do other animals. But somewhere in our evolution we developed it, 
and it is this that makes us truly human.
Let us go back to the diagram in the last chapter (Section 5.1) Beliefs are information 
bearing states that arise from perception, which together with appropriately related 
desires lead to intelligent action. All organisms need to receive some input from the
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environment. For a simple organism this means that it has some way to react to the 
environment. More complex organisms get information from the senses about the 
environment that they can use to run their lives. We will be investigating just exactly 
what sort of information and what sort o f environment in the next two chapters, but 
first we need to take a brief look at behaviour, since that is what we will be using to 
understand the evolution of the human mind.
One of the reasons for this is that the earlier discussion on truth conditions, etc, moves 
us into the realm of philosophy of language. Language leaves very few fossil traces, 
and there seems to be an ongoing discussion about what came first, language or 
intentionality; and whether human language is actually discontinuous with other 
animal communication systems. We will instead look at behaviour. Behaviour is 
seemingly continuous across any phylogentic tree and all living organisms exhibit 
some form o f behaviour, and most important, it will be accepted that, at least in 
animals, behaviour arises by the process of natural selection.
6.10) Behaviour as a Functional Form
What is behaviour? Ethologists usually say that behaviour is the functional form of an 
animal’s activity and these functions are to make specific impact on the environment. 
Roughly, any activity has to satisfy three conditions to be called behaviour:
■ Behaviour is the external change in activity exhibited by an organism. This 
differentiates behaviour from physiological processes. (However, this
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internal/external distinction however is fuzzy and relative to what is being studied. 
See below.)
■ It has a function in the biological sense, and
■ The function would normally be fulfilled via mediation of the environment or 
results in a change in the organism’s relation with the environment. (From 
Millikan, 1993, p. 137)
Millikan makes a point that we have noted in Chapter One, that o f reverse 
engineering. The behavioural sciences considered as life sciences are the engineering 
sciences in reverses. The engineer starts with certain functions in mind that she wishes 
to see performed and then figures out how to build a device that will perform those 
functions. The behavioural scientist begins with a device that has already been 
“designed” to perform certain functions and then tries to figure out what these 
functions are and what the connection between these functions and the design of the 
device is. So in ethology, the notion of function is going to be very important. 
Without it there is no real way to separate out “chunks” of behaviour which can than 
be studied independently. (See Millikan 1993, p. 141, and passim, especially chapters 
7 and 8 which are on how to define behaviour.)
How does one study behaviour? Ethologists begin the study of an animal by building 
ethograms, which are just a list or description of the basic ways an animal can behave. 
At its most basic level, this description can be a series of muscular or movement 
patterns. But then there has to be a move in which the context of those movements has 
to be included. This means acknowledging and incorporating the environment into the 
description. This means a shift from purely physical descriptions (for example,
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swimming in tight circles) to functional descriptions, incorporating references to the 
behaviour’s function (swimming in tight circles is a mating display, and as such, 
attracts females). The point here is that the same considerations which have been used 
to define functions and differentiate them from effects also distinguish behavioural 
forms from mere motions. (Millikan, 1993, p. 140)
So unlike the other sciences, in biological fields, functions c'une before anything else. 
Otherwise we have the same problem that we did with representations; that of 
figuring out what counts as behaviour. To paraphrase Millikan, (1993, p. 151) An 
organism in its life has an infinite number o f responses and receives an infinite 
number o f stimuli, each of which is describable in an infinite number o f ways. But the 
only responses which are behaviourally interesting are those which are biological 
functions and these have to be described as functional forms.
As for stimuli, the only ones of interest are those that the organism is designed to use. 
And explanations of behaviours must refer to their functional forms. This also implies 
that since often the same behaviour can be performed by different physical structures 
in different animals, so the same behaviour in different animals may have to be 
causally accounted for differently.
Since these inputs are going to be environmental, behaviours can only be understood 
in relation to the environment in which —  and because of which —  they function. 
This immediately leads to the question of where the organism ends and the 
environment begins. The answer is that there is no sharp distinction. Apart from the 
internal environment, a co-operating outer environment is as important as the skin
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bound internal systems for the proper functioning of the organism; (Some examples: a 
bird and its nest. For a bodily organ, the hormonal environment. In the swimming in 
circles example, the other animal is the environment.) What is spatially inside and 
what is spatially outside has no real biological significance. What is important is the 
proper functioning o f both systems as they interact to form one large system. 
Biologically, the idea is of the evolutionary interaction between the two. (See 
Millikan, 1993 151-170 for the non-existence of the organism/environment 
separation. Section heading like: “The organismic system penetrates into the 
environment.” (p. 179) and statements like “The organismic process has no skin”, 
show how important this idea is to her. She notes that this is similar to Dawkin’s 
(1983) idea of the extended phenotype, especially since, as she points out, spider 
webs, bird nests and beaver dams are reproduced by genes out of environmental 
materials exactly as are bones, wings and eyes.)
6.11) Meeting Needs
Let us take one form of behaviour, that of doing some action to meet a need, for 
example to satisfy hunger, the need to find a mate, etc.. O f all the infinite number of 
mechanisms that were able to get their genes incorporated into an animal’s ancestors 
through random mutations, a small number survived. Among the survivors were some 
mechanisms that made their owner a goal achiever and that is why they survived and 
the genes selected for. So that is the explanation of why that particular animal 
contains mechanisms that make it a goal achiever. It inherited those mechanisms from 
a gene pool that contained them because they are mechanisms that make their owner a 
goal achiever.
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These goals or desires should not necessarily be seen as our beliefs and desires, types 
that are expressed as propositional attitudes. These can exist on a “low level” in 
organisms that do not have any language. An organism that has the capacity to use 
representations can reason about the states of affairs that are not true of its current 
world or even any possible world. Planning to achieve some goal involves the use and 
representation of states of affairs that are not true of the current world and plan 
recognition could involve attributing to some other acting agent beliefs about past, 
present and possible state o f affairs. Further, the ability to plan and recognise the 
possible plans of other agents does not require an ability use language. Thus the 
absence of language does not imply that the organism does not have the ability to plan 
or recognise the plans of other agents.
The evolutionary point of having the capacity to represent goals is to make it possible 
to alter them, evaluate them, arrive at them rationally and then arrive at rational means 
of achieving them. (Millikan 1993, p. 166) It is not that one first has a goal and then 
represents it, representing a goal is a way of having it. But the function of having a 
goal is to fulfil it and representations of goals are supposed to guide the organisms 
towards their own fulfilment. The capacity to “generate” goals is maintained in a 
species only in so far as desires “become” goals and then become intentions.
I used the word “rationally” above, and it is a problematic word. I do not need it for 
the purposes o f the present discussion but Millikan does go on to use the 
teleofunctional account to build up a whole theory o f rationality. To give some 
indication of her method, Millikan suggests that we take a small leap here: Put an
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analogue of the bee dance or the stickleback mating ritual inside a larger organism so 
that it mediates between two parts of the same organism and you have an inner 
representation. And these inner representations would guide and control complex 
behaviour. We can then go further and ask: What would be the critierion of identity in 
this system, when are two representations the same? If one representation is stored in 
memory and needs to be compared with a present one, one needs another system 
which can be one level higher to compare the two. And obviously if  there was no 
difference to the organism between the immediate representation and an earlier one, 
the organism would be in trouble. For example, there must be a way o f differentiating 
between a perception happening now and one that happened two days earlier. This 
difference would be one of quality. This would be especially true for any animal with 
more than one sensory modality needs to be able compare them and know that both 
senses refer to the same stimulus. Since the act of comparing implies a step away 
from pure stimuli and its representation a basic form of awareness must take place. 
The case could be made that identity, in the sense of recognising when two things are 
the same, is central to the evolutionary development of consciousness, both in the 
sense of awareness and phenomenal consciousness.
Having seen that intentionality, representation and behaviour can be best understood 
from the perspective of proper function, what is the next step? We are looking for the 
function of the mind. We will continue using the behaviour of other people and our 
explanations o f it as a key to the mind. We will see if  there is at least some human 
behaviour that can be understood as behaviour having a proper function or a derived 
proper function. I would like to end this chapter with two quotations from Millikan 
which will lead us into the next chapter.
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If man is a natural creature and a product o f evolution, it is reasonable to 
suppose that man’s capacities as a knower are also a product of evolution. 
If we are capable of believing and knowing things, it must be because 
these capacities, and the organs in us or organization of us that are 
responsible for these capacities, historically performed a service that 
helped us proliferate. Knowing must then be something that man has been 
doing all along—certainly not something he might get to someday when 
the Peircian end of inquiry arrives. Knowing must also be something that 
man has been doing in the world, and that has been adapted him to that 
world, by contrast with which not knowing, being ignorant, is something 
objectively different and advantageous, (her italics, Millikan 1984, p. 7)
Yet the relevance of folk psychology to cognitive science would not rest 
on its feeble ability to predict and explain. If the contentful entities of folk 
psychology have proper functions and if these functions are correctly 
understood by folk psychology, then folk psychology describes the 
“competence” (in one of Chomsky’s senses) of certain devices inside us. 
It is then up to the neuropsychologist to look for devices that have this 
kind of competence; and to describe the processes by which, under the 
right circumstances, actual performances of these functions are effected. 
(Millikan, 1993, p. 63-64)
In this chapter we have seen that the concept o f function based on evolutionary 
principles gives a firm foundation to our conception of the intentional. It also gives
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rise to the idea that cognitive agents have the ability to make mistakes: we can have 
false beliefs about the world, we can misrepresent it to ourselves, we can make invalid 
inferences, and so on. To identify a state as misrepresenting the world, it is necessary 
to identify that state independently of the part of the environment which might have 
caused it to occur. We must be able to say that, despite being caused to occur by this 
aspect o f the world, the state is “meant” to depict some other aspect. And using the 
notion o f proper function, we know what “meant” means.
Now we will try to see what it was that the mind was meant to do, or, taking the word 
from the first o f the two quotations by Millikan above, what it was that we were 
supposed to “know”.
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Chapter 7
The Two Paths: 1) How We Develop Folk Psychology
SO FAR in this thesis we have been accepting philosophical arguments to examine 
what we mean by mind and function. However, now we need to use our 
understanding of these and actually search empirically for the functions of the mind. 
This is going to involve going down two paths: one developmental, and the other, 
historical. These paths are convergent and will meet at the same destination: the 
biological function of folk psychology. These two paths are not a version of the 
simplistic “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” argument, but a way to show that both 
do, in fact, imply the same thing. The developmental story is going to be explored by 
studying how children, from birth onwards, develop mentalistic concepts. The 
historical story (in Chapter Eight) is going be the study of species related to us. This 
may help show why we, as a species, need psychology and will give an indication of 
its function.’
On these two paths the arguments are of two types. When we study how mind 
develops in children the emphasis is going to be on simplicity. We will see that 
though the edifice of folk psychology is a very complicated structure, its building 
blocks are very simple. During the examination o f how our species could have 
acquired the ability to use folk psychology, the emphasis will be on plausibility, that 
this historical reconstruction is feasible. We will also look at some predictions this
1 A similar approach can be found in the collection, (Whiten, 1991) Natural Theories o f  Mind, where, 
though for different ends, a programme similar to mine is followed.
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evolutionary hypothesis makes so that we are not accused of making up “just so” 
stories.
We must remember that according to the idea o f function that we have arrived at, we 
need to also note the environment in which that particular function developed or was 
designed for. We need to see what the Normal conditions are for folk psychology to 
fulfil its function. In this chapter, however, we will focus on the organism rather than 
the environment. But even here we will see that the demarcation between organism 
and environment is arbitrary.
7.1) Are We Born With Folk Psychology?
Let us start by looking at how human beings acquire this understanding o f folk 
psychology. Do we need some kind of education to develop a theory o f other minds 
that enables us to explain and predict other people’s behaviour? Let us accept that the 
mental states of others are completely hidden from our senses and they can only be 
“inferred”. This process of inference is a subtle —  we usually do it unconsciously —  
but essential part of our everyday social life. If you had to explain folk psychology to 
a non-human alien it would be so complicated that it looks as if  it would need an adult 
mind to memorise, and use such a system of rules and inferences.
The development of the mind in children has been quite well studied through some 
interesting and intriguing experiments. The facts do not seem in dispute, even though 
the interpretation of the data has occasionally resulted in conflicting claims. In the last 
few decades, both the learning theorists as well as those who claim the child has
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iinnate knowledge have modified their views to form a more holistic account, one 
which depends on both a genetic or innate component as well as an enviommental 
component.
7.2) Domains
Innate systems are generally characterised by a number of mechanisms securing their 
effectiveness: They are based upon in-built, relatively stable and universal programs; 
they develop rather early during ontogeny; and they find adequate behavioural 
counterparts that co-evolved in social partners, often in surplus.1 It is important to 
note that innate and learned are not polar opposites. As Cosmides and Tooby (1987) 
note, while forcefully making this important point, this is a distinction that should 
disappear the way the nurture-nature debate has disappeared. Learned merely means 
that the environment has an influence.
Infants seem to be bom with complementary forms of knowing and they use this to 
develop experience o f their world. No infant is bom with a mind like a clean slate. 
Children have areas of knowledge about the world from birth. It is a moot point 
whether this is “knowledge how” rather than “knowledge that” but as some of the 
examples below show, it is difficult to separate the two. Such areas of knowledge are 
specific and it is not definite how many such areas there are. Some of these areas that 
seem to be confirmed are knowledge of the material world, knowledge of motion, a 
knowledge of the biological world and knowledge of the social world. These different
1 See the preface o f Papousek, Jurgens and Papousek, (1992) who use this as a definition of innate.
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areas are called domains of intelligence and could be seen as cognitive 
“dispositions”.1
Cosmides and Tooby (1994, p. 91) give three main reasons why domains must exist in 
the mind. The first o f these reasons is that, in terms of behaviour, there are going to be 
very few things that are going to be useful all down the line, that is, there is no notion 
o f success or failure that is going to be applicable in all areas of life. Something that 
increases fitness in one domain would not necessarily increase it in another. The 
example Cosmides and Tooby give is that of sex and kin recognition, (p.91-92) 
Having descendants is one of the primary goals of life and once the connection is 
made between sex and reproduction, should the animal have sex at every opportunity? 
Such a species would not do very well and probably disappear after a few generations. 
There are, for example, large fitness costs associated with incest, so there will evolve 
a constraint on having sex with kin. But what about food and shelter sharing or 
defending? In this case kin are going to be very useful. So the decisions about both 
are going to have to be made in different “places.”
Secondly, most behavioural patterns are responses to environmental pressures which 
cannot be observed over a lifetime. It should be noted that fitness is the relationship 
between the organism, its behaviour and the environment, and this relationship is 
statistical and can be seen only over several generations. As they put it: “The 
systematic statistical consequences of many courses o f action on fitness are not stably
1 A summary of the work on domains and articles by leading workers in the field can be found in 
Sperber, Premack, and Premack (1995). The volume also mentions studies on monkeys and primates 
which attempt to see which species share any of these areas. Also see Hirschfeld and Gelman, (1994) 
which contains more discussion on domain specificity.
181
assessable for several generations, and then only by evolutionary biologists, Divine 
Beings, or — this is the essential point — natural selection.” (p.93)
Finally, how would any organism decide what the important variables are before 
t aking any course o f action if  it did not have at least some domains? This is a version 
o f  the “frame problems” in Artificial Intelligence.1 Evolution solves the frame 
problem by building domains.
We will be coming back to domains throughout this chapter and the next. But right 
now, the most important of these for our purposes is the domain of social interaction. 
But this domain seems to need other domains and environmental influences to provide 
inputs which can activate it. Two of the most important for the development of social 
knowledge is first, an understanding of the difference between inanimate objects and 
animate objects, and second, motion. These two domains seem to be connected since 
this animacy is seen in terms of movement associated with agency: Infants are already 
assigning intentionality to self-powered movement; they seem to distinguish between 
objects whose motions are internally caused and externally caused.
How do these modules work? Leslie, (1995) in A Theory o f  Agency claims that it may 
be based on core cognitive capacities. He suggests that there may be three modules 
which contain three different representational schemes. (He also postulates two 
mechanisms, one of which is specifically intentional.) Gelman, Durgin and Kaufman 
(1995, p. 157) suggest that an infant’s test for animacy is that they perceive a moving 
object as inanimate when its motion path is consistent with Newtonian laws of
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motion. If it violates Newtonian principles, then infants attribute animacy. But how do 
these domains actually work? One of the most studied of modules is the one 
connected with vision.
7.3) Infant-adult Interaction
Human infants respond to their mother’s eyes and establish eye-contact by the fourth 
week of life. Eye contact or gaze plays a central role in the earliest sequences of social 
behaviour with a parent. These gaze phenomena occur in all cultures, but the length of 
time which may be appropriate to hold the gaze may differ. Even though the primary 
function of seeing is to gather visual information, gazing is also significant in social 
behaviour and has meaning at all social levels. Human stimulus is always more 
interesting than other stimulus, and the concept o f person permanence seems to come 
before object permanence according to Smith (1988, p. 96-97).2
This is obviously tme in the way we as adults, use our eyes as an adjunct to 
conversation, but what does it mean when infants gaze into their parents eyes, and 
make noises? Are the child and mother interacting? Is this communication? If  so, is it 
two-way and does the infant contribute anything to the conversation? Perhaps the 
noises are just noises similar to animal vocalisations. Scherer (1992) says this while 
talking about primates: “[Mjost animal vocalizations serve three functions at the same 
time: They are a symptom of the state of the animal, they are symbol for the object or 
situation that produced this state; and they act as an appeal to conspecifics to behave
1 Cosmides and Tooby call it the “combinatorial explosion”, (p. 94)
2 See Spelke, Phillips and Woodward (1995) on the same topic.
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in  a way that is appropriate with respect to the state of the vocalizer.” (p. 49) Are 
infants simpler creatures than this, as has been generally thought?
In his much cited paper, Conversations with a Two-month-old, C. Trevarthan (1974) 
shows how infants, practically from birth, interact with mothers or caregivers in a 
communicative way. An interpersonal communication mechanism seems to be innate 
or built in and necessary for further development. This gojs against what standard 
developmental models —  for instance, Piagetian ones — which postulate that infants 
do not have a feeling of separateness from other objects. Infants are supposed to react 
by reflex to other objects including other people. This does not seem to be true; 
infants are very social beings. As we have noted earlier, the stimuli provided by other 
people are qualitatively different from those provided by inanimate objects. 
Trevarthan confirms this:
But, our films show that infants are adapted, at the latest by three weeks 
after birth, to approach persons and objects quite differently. The 
elaborateness o f their social responses and social expressions in the 
second and third months, before they have begun to deliberate and 
controlled handling and mouthing of objects, indicates that 
intersubjectivity is fitted into development from the start as a determining 
influence. Human social intelligence is the result o f development of an 
innate human mode of psychological function that requires transactions 
with other persons.1 (p. 235)
Because the games the mother and child play are so full o f meaning and necessary —  
just like an adult’s —  Trevarthan calls them conversations. For example: (p. 232)
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there are games where the infant or the adult first looks at an object and checks to see 
i f  the other is looking at the same object and then starts playing peek-a-boo. “If an 
infant of four months or so reacts to the attentions of an adult by looking pointedly at 
o r deliberately reaching for or pointing to something, this thing becomes at once the 
cientre of interest o f the partner too. Around five months many of the infants we have 
sltudied have exhibited a marked increase in such deliberate bringing o f a topic from 
the outside into a ‘conversation’”.2
It is not the face that directs the infants attention, but only the eyes, emphasises Collis 
(1979) in Describing Social Interaction in Infancy (p. 119). Eyes are necessary for 
diectic gaze, gaze directed not at the other person in the interaction, but at an object 
visible to both, a sort o f joint visual attention. The infant then turns to look at the 
object; or the other person does if the infant initiates the movement. Butterworth 
(1991) notes that children go through three stages of joint visual attention between six 
and 18 months: At six months: targets are restricted to those within the infant’s visual 
field; at 12 there is the ability to localise targets properly, but still no ability to localise 
those behind itself; and finally at 18 months the baby will look behind them, if there is 
nothing in the visual field. Diectic gaze is also connected with the development of 
pointing. It is interesting to note that when the infant is at the breast, its mother’s face 
(and especially the eyes) are at about the distance at which it can focus most clearly 
(Hinde, 1974 p. 180-191).3
1 This is close to implying the views of Nicholas Humphrey, whose work we will look at in the next 
chapter.
2 For an amazing description of how babies and adults respond to each other and communicate 
nonverbally, see Bullowa (1979) p. 79-88
3 How blind babies and their parents manage can be seen in Fraiberg (1979) Blind Infants, their 
Mothers and the Sign System , and in Baron-Cohen, (1995), p. 66-68. Also interesting in this context is 
how deaf children leam language: see Chapter 2 in Karmiloff-Smith (1992). Pages 118-119 o f the same
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In another article, Trevarthan (1979) goes as far as to make this strong statement.
For infants to share mental control with other persons they must have two 
skills. First, they must be able to exhibit to others at least the rudiments of 
individual consciousness and intentionality. This attribute o f acting agents 
I call subjectivity. In order to communicate, infants must also be able to 
adapt or fit this subjective control to the subjectivity o f others: they must 
also demonstrate intersubjectivity, (p. 322)1
The seemingly meaningless games that mother and infant play do have a lot of 
meaning and purpose. (Mother or other caregiver, since sometimes the infant may 
pointedly ignore the mother and chose to interact with less familiar persons.) Infants 
manipulate people into entering conversations.1 An example of this is the imitation 
games where the baby and mother imitate each other’s bodily movements. Babies 
imitate acts of others appropriately, even when to do so they must move part of their 
bodies which they cannot see, for instance the cheeks or lips. This seems simple but is 
actually quite difficult to do riince the baby must already have a model o f the mothers 
face in his brain, and this model must be properly mapped into the motor apparatus of 
its own face. This also involves the recognition of the equivalence between visual 
scenes and the set of bodily feels the baby has. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue 
that:
Imitation, then, suggests an innate link between mental states and actions,
volume explains how infants react to eyes and faces initially and through development move on to face 
recognition.
1 Note that this is not the usual usage of “subjectivity”.
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though this link is much more primitive than links among desires, 
intentions, and actions that underpin adult theory. Newborn imitation is 
nature’s way of solving both the problems of other minds and the mind 
body problem at one fell swoop, (p. 131)
We will be looking at this more closely in the next chapter, but an interesting point 
should be noticed here, that of imitation. When an animal copies something that a 
human does, it is quite often dismissed as just “imitation”. For instance, some species 
o f birds, like starlings, can mimic human speech. Of course, in no way is this sound 
production semantically comparable to the human language which it imitates, and in 
that sense perhaps the dismissal is valid. But though it may be an innate mechanism, 
the complexity of what is going on is extraordinary. As anyone who has heard their 
own voice on a tape recorder can attest, the sounds we produce when speaking and the 
sounds we think we are producing are completely different. Most of the difference is 
due to the resonance within the various chambers in the head and the different 
vibratory properties of the skull. So in a similar fashion the bird has to “calculate” 
from the sounds it is producing within itself — the air spaces inside a bird’s head are 
obviously completely different from the ones in ours —  with what the sound sounds 
like to an outsider. And then correlate it with its own sound producing apparatus.2
Coming back to infants, Trevarthan feels that these “conversations” are necessary for 
the infant. Mother and infant share in creative processes that constitute the child's 
cognitive development. “We conclude that human intelligence develops from the start 
as an interpersonal process and that maturation of consciousness and the ability to act
1 The significance of the word manipulate will become clearer later in Section 8.3, but here it refers to 
just one individual trying to influence another.
2 See Byrne (1995) p. 64-65 for a short discussion of this.
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with voluntary control in the physical world is a product rather than an ingredient of 
this process.” (p. 230)
It is known that the baby’s cry is “designed” to attract adult attention and that the cry 
has acoustic signalling properties which mothers use to recognise their babies soon 
after birth. This would be true of any species which looked after its young even for a 
little while. But do human infant cries have any more significance beyond just 
attracting attention and signalling discomfort or pain? Lester, and Zachariah Boukydis 
(1992, p. 149) report that crying becomes more and more significant when voluntary 
control of the cry starts, at 2-3 months. This is the stage at which parents start saying 
that their children are crying on purpose, to get attention or because they are bored. 
They actually go on to say that infants and parents develop a specific cry-signalling 
communication systems that can be acoustically described, and that this is done 
through a “negotiation” process. The infant contributes both a biological, evolutionary 
component and a learned component to this process. While on this topic, it is 
interesting to note that, Karmiloff-Smith (1992, p. 36- 37) quotes research which 
shows that 12-day-old infants are able to differentiate between sounds that indicate 
speech and other sounds. Though they do not do so at birth, after only four days they 
showed sensitivity to different speech patterns of different languages. In four months 
they are sensitive to clause boundaries.
Hinde (1974) in Biological Basis o f  Human Social Behavior, (p. 180-191) points out 
that the infant is as sensitive to the mother as the mother is to the infant. Infants 
exposed to the sound of the human heartbeat gain weight better than do infants not so
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exposed. Response to sounds characteristics of humans starts even earlier than face 
recognition.
It is interesting to note that most parents can recognise the basic meaning of their 
infant’s cries, whether the child is happy, joyful, playing, in discomfort or in acute 
pain. And they can transfer this knowledge to the cries o f other babies. That is, 
parents o f normal children understand the cries of their own children as well as others 
in terms of specific situations likely to elicit special emotions. The only exception 
seems to be autistic children. (Reported by Amorosa, 1992.) Autistic children do not 
follow standard speech patterns. Parents o f autistic children can recognise the 
meaning of the cries of their own children, but do not understand those of other 
autistic children, (p. 200)
We have been talking about crying but there is in fact a wide range of vocalisations. 
These sort o f vocal interactions between child and adult have also been studied cross 
culturally. Papousek and Bomstein (1992) Didactic Interactions: Intuitive Parental 
Support o f  Vocal and Verbal Development in Human Infants report on this. These 
studies belie the view that parent-infant interactions were consciously performed and 
culturally determined. They found that this is true to a very limited extent and the rest 
is, as they call it, “psychobiological preadaptedness” (p. 224). They attach a great 
importance to it:
Vocal matching plays a significant role in human preverbal 
communication and seems specific to humans. Parents encourage infant 
imitation, engage infants in playful applications of vocal matching, and 
affectively reward successful matching. Empathetic matching in vocal and
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facial expressions of emotional feelings provides infants with feedback 
which may function as a ‘biological echo’ or a ‘biological mirror’ and 
influence development of the self concept, (p. 214)1
One of the reasons studies such as this have not been done earlier is that parents are 
unaware and cannot consciously report their side of the interactions in interviews; 
only by videotaping and recording them can they be analysed. Parents do not know 
what exactly they are doing; they cannot explain why or for what purpose they do 
something with the child. This is why these sort of experiments could only be done 
once cameras and videos were available. Earlier (Chapter 2) we mentioned Blurton 
Jones’s distinction between emic and etic research options. That distinction is 
particularly noticeable in this context in that earlier researchers were dependent on 
emic forms rather than etic. When they moved away from questioning parents on 
what they were doing with their children to ethological studies of child/adult 
interaction, researchers were able to see just how complicated these interactions were. 
It is possible that another reason is prejudice: human babies used to be considered 
altricial because of their slow development of motor control and locomotion, and this 
view has been slow to change. Papousek and Bomstein (1992) suggest that, in fact, 
delayed locomotion appears to be adaptive, because it facilitates intimate dyadic 
interchanges for as long as it takes to acquire the first words, (p-211)1
We have been looking at overt behaviour, but is there a more basic level to the infant's 
reaction to the mother? Let us look at early infancy and the relationship between an
1 Also see Papousek, (1992) Parent-infant Vocal Communication in the same volume for more studies 
of cross-cultural maternal response to baby cries. More information on the 'tuning' o f mother and child 
to each other (as it is called in the literature ) can be found in Mutual Regulation o f  Neonatal-Maternal 
Interaction in Chappell and Sander (1979)
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infant and the mother or other caregiver. Gary Kraemer (1992) in A Psychobiological 
Theory o f  Attachment, shows that there is a neurobiological basis for the attachment 
o f  the primate infant to its caretaker. The infant develops an internal and 
neurobiological representation of the behavioural and emotional characteristic o f its 
caretaker that goes on to regulate features o f the infant’s brain function by organic 
chemical systems. The article provides a very strong basis for Bowlby’s attachment 
theory.2 Kraemer’s experiments show that there is in fact a neurochemical system 
which activates and monitors, and is in turn effected by attachment behaviour:
This suggests that some effect o f attachment is responsible for the 
development of critical neurobiological/behavioural characteristics of the 
infant....From an organismic viewpoint the neonate arrives with a genetic 
plan and a developmental schedule. The organism develops in relation to 
an accommodation between internal motivations and external reality.
(p.500)
Kraemer goes on to suggest that an organism develops its particular identity and its 
tra in  function in relation to a particular social environment. “The mechanisms by 
which brain function develops can be related to concepts of “symbiosis” or 
“attunement” in which the rules governing what root cognitive structures form in the 
infant are set by the infant and caregiver(s) across time in a generative behavioural- 
constitutional interchange.” (p. 496)
1 For more on the subject of preverbal communication, see, Brazelton (1979) Evidence o f  
Communication During Neonatal Behavioral Assessment.
2 Bowlby himself did suggest that his theory had a neurobiological basis, but did not really go much 
further.
After a while the infant starts to regulate its own behaviour and physiology; just as 
cognitive models develop in relation to the caregiver, so do physiological 
mechanisms, which become more and more like those of the caregiver by virtue of 
shared genetic endowment and exposure of the infant’s neurobiological system to the 
care giver. This cannot be tested in humans, but Kraemer says that disrupting this 
attachment behaviour in Rhesus monkeys means the disruption of virtually every 
aspect o f what it means to be a social rhesus monkey, including the regulation of such 
biological functions as eating, drinking, aggression, mating and caring for offspring, 
(p. 496) This is also seen in Harlow’s classic experiments where baby monkeys were 
separated from their mothers and provided with a choice o f two surrogate mothers, 
one made of wire with a milk bottle attached, the other was a soft cloth covered one 
without the bottle. It was the cloth surrogate they clung to, screaming if they were 
removed, and without it, they did not develop properly.
Kraemer shows that if the attachment process fails or the caregiver does not do what 
is necessary to fulfil that role, the infant may become dysfunctional. If there is such a 
disruption of this process, the infant, as it develops into an adult, may have some form 
of psychopathology: “Once isolation syndrome behavior is induced it is remarkably 
persistent and similar to that observed in human autism, schizophrenia, antisocial 
personality disorder, and explosive violence syndrome.” (p. 498). Since attachment 
behaviour is maintained in spite of parental maltreatment, this drive must be very 
strong. The first priority o f the infant is attachment to an object with particular 
stimulus characteristics regardless of its ability to sustain the infant.
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The fact that interaction with another living human being is necessary can be seen 
later too, when infants reach the language learning stage. For instance, as reported by 
Lieberman, (1984, p. 197) it can be shown that at this stage what is needed is human 
interaction, not just exposure to language. Children do not acquire speech even though 
they hear commercials, talk shows or soap operas on the TV. Young children exposed 
to TV in another language do not acquire that language. Compare this to birds who 
just need exposure; if  they are played tape recorded bird song o f their species when 
young, they will acquire that song.1 Humans need social behaviour that places speech 
and language in a productive framework. This also may be initially dependent on gaze 
behaviour. Mitchell says (1996) about language learning: when infants hear their 
mothers utter a word, they typically shift their gaze from whatever they are looking at 
to their mothers and then follow the mothers gaze, to assessing what she is seeing, (p. 
80)2
We have seen that certain forms of innate child-adult interaction seem to be necessary 
for a child's development into a normally functioning human being. We have also 
seen that there is some sort of communication, possibly involving intentionality 
between the preverbal child and adults. Whether or not we accept that this 
intentionality is of the same “order” as in folk psychology, does it tell us anything 
about its function? For this we need to travel further along the developmental road. 
The most useful way would be to see if there are any human beings that do not have a
1 Though it must be pointed out that this is a simplistic statement given as an example for comparison. 
Bird song learning methods vary from species to species
2For some conceptual analysis o f the subject of infant interaction and development, see, Bateson, 
(1976) whose Rules and Reciprocity in Behavioural Development shows a theoretical model of how 
environment and the infant interact to produce development in behaviour; and Dunn's (1976) How Far 
do Early Differences in Mother-child Relations Affect Later Development? which takes a critical look 
at early child-mother interactions studies.
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folk psychology. Before we do that we need to see how development could actually 
put folk psychology in place. There are many researchers who have worked in this 
field and again, the actual results o f experimental results are not in question even if 
occasionally the conclusions drawn from them are.
7.4) Precursors of Folk Psychology
One such researcher is Baron-Cohen, (1995) who shows that folk psychology — 
mindreading, as he calls it —  is dependent on four independent components that need 
to interact with each other to produce mindreading. These four seem to be the bare 
minimum necessary. These components start acting at different stages in a child’s 
development and according to him these correspond to four properties of the world: 
Volition, Perception, Shared Attention and Epistemic States, (p. 31) We will soon see 
why mindreading is an appropriate synonym for the practice of folk psychology.
The following may seem to be in far greater detail than is needed for this discussion. 
However it is necessary so that I can show that the complex system that will 
eventually develop, the edifice of folk psychology, can actually be composed of very 
basic elements or components. The simplicity of the components will be an argument 
supporting the biological nature of the whole.
The first o f Baron-Cohen’s modules is the Intentionality Detector (ID). Though we 
have seen how philosophically problematic the idea of intentionality is, this 
mechanism is far simpler than it actually sounds. All it has to do is attribute a goal or 
a desire to anything that moves. Any non-random movement or change in information
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picked up by any of the senses is given a goal and individuated, that is, it is made into 
a agent. This system has to be very simple so that it can react to a very large number 
o f stimuli. This also means that it is not dependent on any one sense modality. So if 
an organism sees/smells/hears/feels movement, whatever the information is, it is 
changed to “it wants”, “it desires”, “its goal is”. It is basically an interpretation 
system: “It will interpret almost anything with a self-propelled motion or anything 
that makes a non-random sound as a query agent with goals and desires.” (p. 34) (He 
presents the evidence for this on p. 35-38.)
Second, the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD) The difference between this and ID is that 
unlike the ID, which is geared towards working with any modality, the EDD is visual 
based. The EDD has three functions: 1) it detects the presence of eyes or eye like 
objects; 2) it calculates whether the eyes are directed towards it or at something else 
and 3) it infers that the other organism is seeing whatever its eyes are directed at. We 
have already seen that these three functions are in place in neonates. Their peek-a-boo 
games with the caregiver are enough evidence. The ID and the EDD mechanisms 
seem to exist from birth.
What is happening is that now it looks like three mental states are already accounted 
for with these two mechanisms: goal, desire and seeing. But Baron-Cohen points out 
that only two valued representations are possible (dyadic) with these two mechanisms. 
For example, “the thing wants to go there”, or “the thing is looking there (or at that)”, 
that is, only two objects relations are possible: agent and object or agent and self.
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The next and third mechanism kicks in at 9 to 18 months, the Shared-Attention 
Mechanism (SAM). SAM links EDD to ID so eye direction can be translated into a 
simple mental state whose function is specifically to build triadic representations and 
this triadic relationship contains a dyadic relationship in it: (agent/self relation- 
(self7agent-relation-proposition) this works out to [It sees (I see object)] or “we both 
notice that”, (p. 45)
SAM builds up this triadic representation by using information about what the senses 
of another organism, for instance the eyes, are noticing. It needs some information 
about the other’s perceptual state. This means that SAM receives its information from 
EDD. Baron-Cohen points out that this SAM-EDD relationship is the easiest to build 
a triadic relationship on, it is also possible through the other senses, but more difficult.
There is also a relationship between SAM and ID. This allows SAM to attach goals or 
desires to the representations. So eye direction can now be read off as the agent’s 
goals or desires. So the triadic representation can now be purely in visual terms like 
“looks at”, “notices” or “sees”, or with an intentional terms from the ID like “wants” 
or “has a goal” (p. 48). All three mechanisms are now linked so that you can have 
mental states resulting from the ID and EDD link, the “goal to refer to x”. (p. 49)
An interesting demonstration of the fact that there is already some sort of intentional 
activity taking place at an early age (As Baron-Cohen and the other writers above 
suggest) is the ability of very young children to participate (and in fact, initiate) in 
“teasing”. Vasudev Reddy (1991, p. 144) gives this as a description of teasing: “The 
rapid alternation of metasignals, which create and then remove doubt.” Reddy
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attempts to see if  there are alternative explanations which do not involve 
intentionality, perhaps behaviouristic ones. The conclusion he reaches is that teasing 
—  involving as it does the knowledge of the other persons expectations — cannot be 
explained in any other way. It is intersubjective behaviour. What could be the purpose 
of teasing? It seems as if it has no other benefits, it is not done for food, status or 
mates. Is it only done to help the infants develop their use of a theory of mind? “It is 
dependent upon the recognition by infants o f the psychological similarity between 
themselves and separate others.” (Endnote, p. 157)1
The final mechanism necessary is the Theory o f Mind Mechanism (ToMM). From the 
name it sounds as if  Baron-Cohen is postulating a mechanism that gives us a complete 
folk psychology and this would go against the earlier statement claiming simplicity as 
one of the characteristic of these modules. However, again, the mechanism is simple 
and the module seems to exist. (Evidence for the ToMM is given on p. 53-55.)
ToMM is the mechanism which gives us the ability to infer mental states from 
behaviour. The other mechanisms have given us “desires” (and perceptual mental 
states) and now the ToMM gives us “beliefs” and other “epistemic mental states” 
(This is Baron-Cohen’s term). It also gives us the ability to tie all these states together 
into a coherent whole which will result in a basic folk psychology. (Baron-Cohen 
credits the idea o f the ToMM to Leslie, 1994) The possibility of false beliefs as well 
as referential opacity starts here too, since the attitude is directed towards the 
proposition and since the imbedded proposition can be false while the whole triadic
1 Incidentally, teasing also takes place in chimpanzees. (Reddy, 1991, p. 143)
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representation can still be true. SAM's triadic representation are used by ToMM and 
their relational “slots” can be replaced by attitude terms.
So the ToMM has two broad functions. The first is to represent epistemic mental 
states and the idea is that this is done via propositional attitudes of the form [Agent- 
Attitude-“Proposition”] giving rise to mental states like, for example, “I believe Santa 
Claus brought those presents.” The second function o f the ToMM is to connect all 
these states into the web of folk psychology.
There is, o f course the question of the actual existence of SAM, EDD, ID, and ToMM 
modules and Baron-Cohen does go on to suggest where all these modules could be 
located in the brain in his chapter entitled, How Brains Read Minds (p. 84-96). His 
evidence is dependent on neuroscience. But I feel that more important for this 
discussion is the evidence Baron-Cohen sites for the presence o f these module from 
studies on two important stages in child development. Briefly, at 18-24 months most 
infants start pretend play and recognise pretending in others. Further, from 36 to 38 
months children start showing evidence of other belief states such as “knowing”. We 
will be looking at these two stages in detail further on, but we should note that there is 
something important taking place at this last phase:
“There is, however, a big difference between the other three mechanisms 
and ToMM, in that the small set o f mental states the other three 
mechanisms can represent possess only two of the properties of 
Intentionality: Aboutness (they are all about things other than themselves) 
and aspectuality (they can all be about specific aspects o f things)... By 
contrast, the episitemic attitude concept processed by ToMM possesses a 
third property of Intentionality: the possibility o f misrepresentation... ”
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(P- 56)
How complete is the four-year-old’s mind as far as folk psychology is concerned? Let 
me quote from another researcher in the field. Wellman (1991), in The Child's Theory 
o f  Mind (The age, as in all developmental processes is not exact; this stage is usually 
reached between three and four years.):
1. They evidence understanding of the basic ontological distinction 
between mind and world. ... In doing so, they evidence understanding of 
the hypothetical aspect of the mind.
2. They evidence understanding of the existence and nature of 
beliefs as well as desires. ... In doing so, they evidence understanding of 
the causal nature of mind in general and the convictional nature of beliefs 
specifically.
3. They understand, much if not all o f the coherent causal-
explanatory schem e including:
The difference between beliefs and desires
The interaction of beliefs and desires to cause action.
The intentional —  that is, belief desire dependent —  nature of human 
action.
The nature o f belief-desire-dependent emotional reactions.
At least something of the origination of beliefs in perception as well as 
origination of fantastical ideas in imagination.
4. They understand, in an early copy container sense, the
representational nature of mind (p. 316).
Is there any way to confirm if  the child now actually has a folk psychology as 
described by Wellman? And is it possible to confirm that this ability to develop a full­
blown folk psychology is innate and necessary for a fully functioning human being? 
We have to first look at the experiments done to get the above results. Then we have
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to see if  there are any signs that indicate, if the developmental process does not take 
place, the result will be serious, and will not be correctable by learning.
7.5) False Beliefs
What we need is a clear way to differentiate between a full blown folk psychology 
and its precursors. This is where the notion of misrepresentation again becomes 
useful. To understand this, a quick look at the history o f the field is helpful. This 
whole field started in the late Seventies with Premack and Woodruffs famous paper, 
Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory o f  Mind (1978). In this article they suggested 
that their trained chimpanzees had an understanding of mental states. Philosophers 
who commented on this paper1 pointed out that only when a person (or an organism) 
can show that they understand false beliefs in which a mental state clashes with actual 
events can a theory of mind be positively attributed. Only then could fears of 
anthropomorphism be brushed aside without reverting to behaviourism.
Development psychologists working with children had exactly the same problem, of 
knowing when to attribute folk psychology to children. This resulted in the devising 
of false belief tests. Experimentally, it was seen that children first become desire 
psychologists and then they become belief-desire psychologists. When belief 
psychology takes over, we say that a complete folk psychology is in place. Desires or 
more correctly, inferring that someone has a desire does not need a conception of the 
mental content, but just a reaction or response to something. But beliefs have to be 
representations since they require us to know that there are two separate entities, one
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in the world and the other in the mind. One of the ways this can be seen is false 
beliefs and its related notion, deception. (There will be more on deception in the next 
chapter.)
A series o f tests were done with children in different age groups to see when exactly 
folk psychology kicks in. These experiments, called “false belief experiments”, were 
designed to discover the developmental stage at which children are capable of making 
belief attributions.1
The classic experiments are those of Wimmer and Pemer (1983) and Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, and Firth (1985). They used puppets which acted out the following scene. 
There are two puppets, Sally and Ann. Sally is alone in a room and hides a chocolate 
bar in box A, and then goes out to play. While Sally is playing outside, Ann comes 
into the room, finds the chocolate bar and takes it from box A and puts it into another 
box, B. Ann too leaves the room. A short time later, Sally returns and wants her 
chocolate. After presenting this little puppet show the children are asked questions 
about the scenario to see if they have understood the events that have taken place. If 
they have understood, the children are then asked question, “Where will Sally look for 
her chocolate?”
There seems to be a dramatic difference in the abilities of three-year-olds as compared 
with four-year-olds to answer this question. Four-year-olds will say that Sally will 
look in box A, where Sally originally put the chocolate bar before she went out.
1 Notably Dennett (1978), and Bennett.
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Three-year-olds will say box B , where they, not Sally, have seen Ann put the 
chocolate bar.
There have been many attempts to explain this discrepancy, but when done alongside 
other experiments, they seem to show that four-year-olds can put themselves in other 
people’s shoes while three-year-olds cannot. Four-year-olds possess a complete folk 
psychology while three-year-olds do not.
Another task requiring appreciation of simultaneously contradictory models o f reality 
occurs when an object appears to be one thing but is really another. For example, a 
child is shown a sponge which has been cleverly disguised to look like a rock. The 
child is allowed to discover that it is really a sponge, and is then tested to see if  he can 
appreciate the contrast between what it looks like and what it really is. Again, it 
appears that most four-year-olds succeed while most three-year-olds fail.
7.6) Autism
The original series o f Wimmer and Pemer false belief experiments undertaken with 
normal three- and four-year-olds were repeated by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Firth, this 
time using a group of mentally retarded children with Down’s syndrome and another 
group of autistic children. Down’s syndrome results from a chromosome abnormality 
and occurs in 1 in 300 births. Children suffering from Down’s syndrome have 
standard characteristics, among which is an IQ o f between 20 and 60. In the past, few
1 The test and the results are not controversial so I have used a standard description from an 
encyclopaedia article, Children's Understanding o f  the Mental World (Leslie, 1987), but they can also
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sufferers survived to adulthood, but the figure is now rising as more and more support 
systems are put in place. Some even manage to lead fairly independent lives.
Autism is very different: it is a very rare condition that occurs in four out o f 10,000 
births and seems to be more common in males. The word itself means self concerned 
or independent and the disorder is characterised by social withdrawal. The autistic 
child characteristically appears to go through his or her early development normally, 
but a break in development occurs usually before two and a half years o f age. At this 
stage, the development of speech may stop and social response does not develop. 
Sometimes social response does not develop at all and the mother may notice that her 
infant does not cuddle normally from the beginning. Even slightly older autistic 
children do not like to be touched or hugged. Bizarre behaviour may show itself and 
the typical self-occupying movements may become obvious.
This stopping of the developmental process may result in relatively poor intellectual 
development. More than two-thirds of autistic children have an IQ of around 55. In 
later years, some of the more noticeable disturbances of behaviour may become less 
marked and less bizarre. However they do have serious disability with speech. They 
continue to show stereotypical hand movements and facial grimaces, they withdraw 
from adults and make no friends among other children. Autistic children do not 
engage in spontaneous pretend play. Their play is often characterised by typical 
inflexible repeating patterns and there is no pretend play where another person is 
concerned. Generally, it is thought that an organic cause rather than any psychological 
problem —  for instance, the child’s relationship with the parents —  is the cause.
be found in Baron-Cohen, (op cit.) or Gopnik and Meltzof (1997) or Wellman (1991).
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Also typical is that autistic children make no eye-contact. There is no “mutual gaze”, 
or peek-a-boo playing. This, as we have seen, is important inasmuch as it is one o f the 
factors needed in developing a theory of mind.1
Autistic children treat people like objects: asked what a brain does, they speak of it as 
making people do physical actions like walk or eat rather then thinking and feeling, 
which is what most normal children do. If shown a series of photographs of faces 
picturing various emotions, autistic children cannot match emotion to photographs. It 
should be emphasised here that autistic children do not have a problem with 
representations, only mental representations (Baron-Cohen, p. 192). They understand 
photographs and drawings, and some become excellent draftsmen.
Autism is actually a label identifying patterns, rather than a specific syndrome, all of 
which seem to have the above characteristics. But the children affected can range 
from those who show severe retardation to people who can lead lives integrated into 
the rest o f society or individuals not dependent on constant care. One variety of 
autism, Asperger's syndrome, is said to be the mildest version, in that those afflicted 
can come closest to normal living.
What happens to autistic children when they grow up can be seen in one case history, 
that of Temple Grandin as reported by Oliver Sacks in An Anthropologist on Mars (p. 
234 -282) Grandin wrote many articles on autism, did research on animal behaviour,
1 Ethological studies have shown that eye contact is an important part o f socialisation in animals too. 
See Gould and Gould. (1994) passim
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obtained a Ph.D. and became an assistant professor in animal sciences. She became a 
leading expert in the design of slaughterhouses and the treatment of cattle and pigs 
kept for slaughter and has written books on the subject. So it looks as if  she is well 
integrated into humanity.
7.7) Sympathy and Empathy Differentiated
But this does not seem to be the case: she can relate very well with the animals she 
works with, but cannot relate to other human beings. The word relate needs to be 
further explained: Grandin seems to care for and has a “feel for” animals. My 
understanding is that she seems to understand animals in purely what I would call 
behaviouristic terms. She can “read the minds” of animals by their behaviour but 
cannot do this with human beings, who seem to be a complete mystery to her unless 
she studies them behaviouristically. Unfortunately, the association with behaviourism 
seems to be that it is a “cold” unfeeling way to look at others. But this is not 
necessarily so, aP it means is that initially mental states are not ascribed to the animaf 
Then after repeated observation, a conclusion can be drawn in which a mental state is 
attributed, as a method o f  shorthand to describe the whole process of some biological 
need being fulfilled. There is no reason that a behaviouristic observer cannot feel 
sympathy for an animal when he or she sees signs of pain or fear.
The above paragraph may seem problematic and I would like to bring in a distinction 
here that may clarify it: the distinction will also be useful later. This is the difference 
between sympathy and empathy. I am not going strictly by dictionary definition, but I 
will be happy to be seen as stipulating the difference. “Empathy” is the power of
mentally identifying oneself with a person or object of contemplation. On the other 
hand “sympathy” is understanding what the other is going through. As can be seen 
from my definitions, the distinction is between identifying with and understanding. 
Empathy and identifying can only be achieved if  I have been through what the other is 
going through. On the other hand, sympathy and understanding need intelligence and 
an ability to recognise signs, for example, of distress or hunger. In everyday use, the 
word sympathy is used in the sense of recognising someone else’s pain or suffering 
and feeling sorry for them. This standard use of the word is related to the meanings I 
have given them, in that generally, sympathy does arise from feelings of empathy. 
Because we can empathise with someone, we feel sympathy for them. Though of 
course, one does not always follow the other, empathy can also be used to inflict pain 
on the other, because we know what hurts. However in my sense, sympathy can also 
arise, because we see behaviour which indicates that the actor is in pain and because 
we do not like pain, we sympathise.
Grandin has sympathy for what is physical or physiological but not for states of mind, 
she has sympathy but not empathy. This can be seen from the stories of her life. She 
does get along well with some of her colleagues but there was never any “human 
connection”. She had to deduce their behaviour from a sort of statistical samples of 
human behaviour, what she calls a “logical process” (Sacks, 1995, p. 248) The 
“shortcut” normal humans use, folk psychology was missing. She was like Dennett's 
Martian calculating behaviour (in True Believers) trying to find patterns which would 
give her a clue to what was happening inside the person. It is interesting that this case 
also shows that mind-reading and language are two separate faculties.
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Freeman Dyson has this to say on Jessy Park, another adult autistic :...[S]he has no 
concept of her own identity, she doesn’t understand the difference between ‘you’ and 
‘I’ —  she uses pronouns almost indiscriminately. And so her universe is radically 
different from mine. Concrete social relations are for her very, very difficult to 
comprehend. (Footnote, p. 219 in Sacks ,1995)
Let us further examine how normal children relate to other by going back to the false 
belief experiments. These tests are not about logical or causal chains, which even a 
child of two can understand. When questions were asked about straightforward causal 
sequences, children with autism performed at least as well as normal children and 
those with Down’s syndrome. It is only the ascription of beliefs to other people that 
causes problems to three-year-olds and autistic children.
7.8) Pretence
Some of this seems connected to pretence play. When a child is pretending, it is 
putting itself into someone else’s shoes, looking at things from another point of view. 
We have seen that infants start pretend playing at a fairly typical age. (Another sign 
that it is probably biological, since if it was based on some kind of organic module it 
would kick in at around nearly the same stage of development for most children.) 
Why should pretending be important? In one sense, putting oneself in some one else’s 
shoes is what folk psychology is. Pretending seems to be the key to the making and 
ascribing of mental states. If this is true then of course, “a developmental pathology, 
such as autism, that severely restricts the capacity to pretend should also severely
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restrict a child’s capacity to make and understand such ascriptions, even if in other 
respects the child’s intelligence is normal.” (Gorden and Barker, (1994) p .171)
O f course, not understanding pretence can cause problems in other ways too. For a 
child, not understanding that someone is pretending could be risky. A two-year-old 
observing its mother at a telephone is able to acquire useful information about 
telephones and social practices, even though the child does not yet really understand 
what is going on. But suppose that a child is playing with her mother and sees her 
pretending that a banana is a telephone. If the child takes this literally she may end up 
with some wrong ideas about bananas or his mother, or both. Moreover, at the same 
time as learning about objects and social practices from observing others, children at 
this age are also learning what words mean. So if a two-year-old interprets “Here, take 
the telephone” literally when what her mother is handing her is a banana, language 
learning is put in jeopardy as well. The fact that such socially shared pretence does 
not have ill effects shows that young children can and do understand (and enjoy) the 
alternative “reality” of pretence while relating it to the literal reality of what they see 
before them. (The exampie is from Leslie (1994) p. 141-142.) There is also a logicai 
connection between theory of mind and pretence play. Pretence play, with dolls for 
instance, has some of the properties we saw with propositional attitudes: referential 
opacity; the non-existence of the propositional referent; and the non-entailment of 
truth.1
1 For a discussion of this and its application to the study of primate mindreading, see Whiten and 
Byrne, 1991.
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7.9) The Difference Between Pretence and False Beliefs
While pretending, the pretence model is essentially merely stipulated or invented. 
And even where the child has to work out what it is that someone is pretending, it is 
usually the case that the pretence can be inferred from, or at least strongly suggested 
by, what the other person is actually doing. The false belief task, however, differs in 
both these respects, for here there is a right and a wrong answer —  it has to be worked 
out and cannot be read off. In the chocolate test, for example, Sally's belief has to be 
worked out by the child on the basis of what Sally saw and did not see. Once that is 
done the child must deduce what Sally will do on the basis o f that belief.
When the child works out that his mother is pretending that the banana is a telephone, 
she is attributing a mental state to her — the mental state o f pretending (attitude) that 
a banana is a telephone (content). A two-and-a-half year-old child watches another 
child who pretends to fill a cup with water and then turns this cup upside-down over 
the head of a doll. She reaches for a cloth and pretends to dry the doll, showing that 
she has worked out the consequences of an attributed pretence. This involves both 
attributing an alternative model and handling it cognitively.
In another experiment, researchers took three-year-olds who had failed  the false belief 
task and showed them a Smarties tube, asking them what they thought it contained. 
They were then shown that, in fact, the tube contained no Smarties, just a pencil. Most 
of the children could tell the experimenter, “I thought it contained Smarties, but I was 
wrong.” These children were then asked, “When we bring your friend in and show 
him the closed box, what will he think is in it?” Contrary to expectation, they all
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answered, “A pencil” ! These cases show that it is only in cases of ascribing beliefs to 
someone else does the problem arise.
These three-year-olds, despite their ability to model and report a false belief, were 
unable to understand where the belief came from. Despite the fact that they 
themselves had just undergone the process of acquiring that false belief, they were 
quite unable to understand and reconstruct the process, and were thus unable to 
predict what would happen to their friend. Only after they acquire this belief 
attribution “system” are children able to anticipate the behaviour o f others and to 
attune their own behaviour. This ability to model behaviour using a framework of 
beliefs and desires is what we have been calling folk psychology.
7.10) Theory or Modules?
There is some dispute about what these results actually mean as far as the philosophy 
of mind is concerned. Is what the child acquires a theory o f mind (the Theory theory), 
a tacit body of knowledge like a rough scientific theory? This “Theory” is our folk 
psychology and it contains theoretical entities like beliefs, intentions, desires and the 
rest, all connected by some sort of nomological principles. It is questionable if a 
young child can develop and use such a theory. The Down’s syndrome child often has 
a lower intelligence level measured in terms of IQ, than an autistic child and is unable 
to form a theory about anything else. But Down’s syndrome children do pass the false 
belief test and are capable o f attributing beliefs to other people. This fact is used by 
the opposing side who claim the child, and adults, do this by a process of simulation 
(the Simulation Theory), and it is not a theory but a skill. This leads on to other
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discussions on what a “theory” actually means, what it means to posses and “use” a 
theory.1
A lot of the discussion is, o f course, dependent on what is meant by module or theory. 
A fundamental point is that the difference between modules and theory is the 
relationship between experience and conceptual structure, between inputs and 
representations. For a theory, input is “evidence” and theoretical concepts change 
according to what the evidence is. It can be seen that this is an important topic, since 
if folk psychology is a theory it is a theory in the same sense as any other scientific 
theory. This means that it can be replaced by a more productive or coherent theory 
(hence, eliminativism). If, on the other hand, what we do is in fact simulation there is 
no way to replace it; it is what we do, it is what we are.
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) and Wellman (1992) have done work similar to Baron- 
Cohen's and come up with very similar results. But these writers instead of postulating 
modules or mechanisms, claim that mindreading is theory based. They use concepts in 
the philosophy of science to explain just what they mean by a theory and point out 
how scientists formulate theories about the world and how these theories change with 
time, eventually to be replaced by others. This to them is very similar to the process of 
theory replacement that a developing child goes through as it grows up. The way we 
do science is the way we acquire knowledge of the world in the ordinary sense and is 
the same way children develop their cognitive abilities and their conceptual 
categories. (Wellman calls it a framework theory, which is similar to what Kuhn 
would call a paradigm or Lakatos, a research programme. They are not specific
1 Carruthers and Smith, (1996) gives an overview as well as new arguments on both sides o f the debate.
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theories but a field in which other theories fall into and constrain such theories by 
providing ontologies.)
This question of theory replacement is interesting and is one of the major reasons 
Gopnik and Meltzoff call it a theory, since according to some philosophers of science, 
theories change by being replaced wholesale, not by being modified slowly. They 
claim that the way a child acquires an adult mind is by jumping qualitatively from one 
theory to another as they mature. Other researchers do not agree with this and say 
instead that there is a smooth progression of stages o f theory of mind development. 
According to Mitchell in Acquiring a Conception o f  Mind (1996, p. 164) “...there is 
no radical conceptual shift, akin to a paradigm shift in the progression of natural 
science.” He suggests that this replacement could be an artefact o f the way research is 
done, which always demands a yes/no answer.
But a qualitative jump could be possible even if there were modules, since different 
modules could start working at different times in development, depending on 
whatever factors triggered them of. This would more than explain the “shift” in the 
child’s way of looking at the world between the ages o f three and five.
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) (p. 53) make the point that there is a simple experiment 
that could help decide between the validity of modularity or Simulation theory and 
Theory theory. Place some children in a universe that is radically different from our 
own, keep them healthy and sane for a reasonably long period of time, and see what 
they come up with. If  they come up with representations that are an accurate account 
of our universe, then modularity is right. If they come up with representations that are
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an accurate account of their universe, the Theory theory is right. As they say, ethical 
and financial constraints preclude this sort of experimentation. But how radically 
different does the universe have to be? As the child studies show us, no matter what 
sort of parenting takes place, in whatever culture, we still come up with folk 
psychology. Unless, o f course, there is something organically wrong.
However, there are some confusing points. I am not too sure o f what Theory theorists 
mean: what is it that has the theory? To have and use a theory in any meaningful 
sense already presupposes a mind at least in the sense of an awareness. Now if we are 
saying that mind itself is based on developing a folk psychology, we seem to be in 
some kind of vicious circle. And if, as theory supporters Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) 
and others like Wellman (1992) say, it is an innate theory, what does it mean to posses 
an innate theory? If theories can indeed be innate there will be a problem separating 
out what is a theory and what is a module? For instance, if  we continue with the 
earlier computer analogy, this would mean that a computer program is or has theory. 
Does Terry Winograd’s SHRDLU program have a theory about its block world?1 (See 
Hofstadter, 1979). Further, how do Theory theory supporters explain a disorder like 
William’s syndrome, where those afflicted have generally poor cognitive skills but 
excellent language, face recognition and mindreading skills.1
Millikan, (1993, p. 51-82, the chapter entitled Thoughts Without Laws) whose theory 
of functions we have discussed in Chapter Six makes a point pertinent to this section. 
Since in her system psychology is based on teleofunctions, she claims that there are
1 This also brings in the problem of what it means to have “tacit knowledge” and hence what it means 
for something to be called a theory.
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no psychological laws and hence folk psychology cannot be a theory in the hard sense 
o f the word theory. However, the arguments contrasting laws and functions and why 
you cannot have laws based on functions is quite long and unnecessary here.
I will make one final point in this regard, a point which will give us a glimpse of the 
next chapter. Many researchers feel that other primates possess some form o f a theory 
o f mind. If this is true it would seem to support simulation or modular theory against 
Theory theory: because supporters of the first two can simply postulate that this is 
because o f an inheritance o f a common module or mechanism. Under Theory theory, 
it would be a remarkable coincidence that two different species had a similar 
“theory”. (See Heyes, 1998, p. 136.)
However these arguments are not really of concern to the present discussion. But it 
must be acknowledged that we do not really have a hard and fast rule to decide what 
is or is not a theory and how the term is to be applied, this is still a matter for the 
philosophers of science. (Pointed out by Samet, 1993). As we noted earlier, the 
expression “theory of mind” was first used in a landmark paper by Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) on whether chimpanzees have a theory o f mind. They used the term 
very loosely: “In saying that the individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the 
individual imputes mental states to himself and others” (p. 515). This is the sense in 
which I have been using the phrase, I am not suggesting that it is a theory. In fact if  I 
do have to take stand, I would go along with Jane Heal and Josef Pemer (both in 
Carruthers and Smith, 1996) who argue that our psychological competence consists of
1 More on William’s syndrome can be found in Karmiloff-Smith (1992) p. 168-169. Also mentioned in 
Baron-Cohen, p. 96.
214
a simulation-theory mix, with the primary, in the sense of fundamental, competence 
dependent on modules.
7.11) Modules
A note should be made here about the terminology used in this section. I have used 
words like “simulation” and “module” without going into detail since I wanted the 
ideas to develop as the discussion progresses. Above, as well as in the next chapter, it 
may seem as if  I have conflated the two distinct notions of simulation and modules. 
One does not necessarily imply the other. However, in the literature, support for 
simulation generally seems to be championed by those who support modular theory, 
both being opposed to Theory theory. Also, it is difficult to imagine how simulation 
could take place without specialised modules. So rather then separate out the two I am 
using them together because both are supportive of the biological basis for theory of 
mind argument. Further to this, I have been using the words “module” and “domain” 
interchangeably. It should be noted that there is a difference between the two. A 
domain is generally used to denote a system of representations sustaining a specific 
area of knowledge, like those mentioned earlier; language, physics or agency, for 
example. A module on the other hand is an information processing unit that 
encapsulates that particular knowledge and handles that knowledge. So modules 
presuppose domain specificity.1
1 See Karmiloff-Smith (1992) p. 6. Her views are that modularity is a developmental process rather 
than a fixed entity present in a complete form from birth. The suggestion is that modularity itself is a 
process started by domain specificity.
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Perhaps this point needs some more clarification. Standard accounts o f modularity are 
based on the work o f Fodor (1983). (See Guttenplan, 1995, p. 442, for example.) A 
module is considered as an autonomous component of the mind: it may receive its 
inputs from other processes or structures but it performs its own internal processing 
and it may have its own system of representations. For a process to be modular, it 
needs to meet the following eight criteria, some of which are self explanatory.
1) Domain specificity.
2) Mandatoriness: This means that whether or not a module is working is not open to 
any other cognitive or decision making processes. If  the environment or the 
stimulus to which the module responds is present, the module works.
3) Informational encapsulation: The information that a module can use is specific, it 
cannot use information from elsewhere in the system.
4) Speed: Modules work very fast, much quicker than generalised mechanisms.
5) Shallow output: This means that there is no “interpretation” taking place, the 
output is still “raw” and will need other systems to make it useful
6) Intermediate representations of the module are not available to other cognitive 
processes.
7) Neural localisation.
8) And finally, modules have a susceptibility to characteristic breakdown.
It is the biology of how we develop folk psychology that is of concern to this 
discussion, so I would like to indicate how research in this area is proceeding by a 
quote from Jill Boucher (1996):
... theories o f autism as fundamentally a cognitive disorder and theories of 
autism as fundamentally a socio-affective disorder are now converging
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onto the common ground of the very early occurring, innate or pre­
programmed pre-requisites for the normal development of social 
cognition.” (p. 240)
What is important is that we seem to acquire folk psychology at an early age —  an 
age that is nearly standard amongst most children — which gives us the ability to put 
ourselves in other’s shoes, that is empathise. Without it we are unable to socialise or 
interact with others in a human fashion. Connected with this ability to socialise is the 
fact that, from birth, perhaps based on a precursor module, children also engage in 
muscular mimicry of bodily postures and facial expressions. There is also eye 
tracking, in which the child looks wherever or at whatever another human’s eyes look 
at; and mutual gaze where a child locks into someone else’s eyes. The presence of 
eyes might require us to do so in an innate way or is the triggering factor for the folk 
psychology mechanism. (Baron-Cohen suggests this and gives importance to the 
language of the eyes.) Then we start, somewhere between three and four, to fill in the 
spaces behind a person’s eyes by ascribing reasons to their actions, and justifying 
their actions by beliefs.
But how do we know our own minds? This question is an indication of the next step, 
since it may show the biological function of folk psychology.
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Chapter 8
The Two Paths: 2) Why We Need Folk Psychology
IT MAY seem as if  a large part of the discussion of folk psychology has been about 
attributing beliefs and desires to others. But we closed the last chapter by asking how 
we know our own minds. Theory theory supporter Allison Gopnik (1993) makes an 
interesting claim: the way we know our own minds is a similar process to how we 
know others’ minds, a process of inference from theory. Gopnik suggests that our 
knowledge of our own minds is a question of expertise; that we infer our own beliefs 
just as we do other peoples’. Because we do it quicker and with greater skill we seem 
to think that our own knowledge of our own mental states is in some way infallible, 
unlike the mental states we attribute to other people.
I disagree with this because Gopnik’s theory seems wrong when looked at from an 
evolutionary point of view. For folk psychology to develop it has to have had some 
evolutionary advantage. Let us imagine two organisms; the first has the ability to 
introspect its own beliefs first and then carry the introspection to another individual. 
The second could have some sort o f theory which would help it put itself in the other 
individual’s place, but no prior knowledge of its own mental states as mental states. 
Which of the organisms would have an evolutionary advantage? Straight off, it is 
difficult to imagine how the second one would actually function in this respect since it 
couldn't know what those states meant.
We will see that the first organism would have an advantage over individuals who did 
not possess this ability. This ability is o f course the activity we have been calling
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mindreading or folk psychology. So what we are now asking is, what is the benefit, or 
the evolutionary advantage, of developing folk psychology?
(At a very late stage of working on this essay I discovered Radu Bogdan’s (1997) 
Interpreting Minds: the Evolution o f a Practice, which deals with this subject in much 
the same way that I do in this chapter. Bogdan starts with the problem of how we 
know other minds and moves on to the practice o f folk psychology to show its 
function and how it could have evolved. As in the present work, he uses child 
development studies, theories of autism and the study o f primate societies much as I 
have. What is interesting is that he calls the practice, “interpreting” (minds). This 
seems a pertinent addition to the terms we have collected for the practice of folk 
psychology. Also interesting is the way he divides up the factors involved in 
developing a social intelligence: Epistemic: which are connected with education, 
communication and the transmission of knowledge; communal factors: which are 
basically concerned with co-operation and family life; and finally, political pressures: 
which are connected with manipulation and deception.)
8.1) Phylogenetic Continuity
Now we are taking the second path. This route is a historical attempt to show that our 
mental processes have evolved. By historical o f course, I do not mean recent history, 
the past 10,000 years are not very important as far as human evolution is concerned. It 
is the Pleistocene epoch, during which the mind was shaped. This was the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation for human beings. While studying the 
evolutionary history of human beings we also have to study other species: there is
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nothing unusual about this, it is the way that most biologically based studies of animal 
behaviour proceed. When studying one species it is usual to study related species and 
species in the same ecological niche. For human beings this does not necessarily 
imply there is actually continuity between other species and us when it comes to the 
mental. There may or may not be, but it is not a necessary continuity and not what 
evolutionary theory would predict in the first place.
One writer who has examined this continuity question is Povinelli in his article, 
Reconstructing the Evolution o f Mind (1993). Part of his article is a review of the 
search for, and the needlessness of, postulating psychological continuity among 
species leading up to human beings and especially how it has hampered research on 
the subject. In the article he makes a succinct statement of the aim and basis of a 
program of the sort that I am trying to follow. This is rather a long quote but it gets 
the points across well and maps out the territory ahead.
The past few hundred million years of higher metazoan evolution may 
have been characterized by organisms that had “discovered” how certain 
categories o f reality, such as time, space, and causality, govern the 
physical world. With the advent of even a rudimentary brain, many of 
these organisms can, in some sense, be said to have been operating on the 
basis o f “intentions” and knowledge stored in their neural circuitry. Such 
operations require (in an implicit sense) that an organism takes into 
account the relationship between time and space and hence that they react 
as if  they had a concept of causality. But what remained to be discovered 
by such organisms was the existence o f these mental concepts and the 
understanding that they can be causative agents o f behaviour. In other 
words, what remained to evolve was an awareness of the reality of the 
mental world —  the evolution of metacognition. Such capacities can 
easily be seen to be advantageous because they can construct more
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accurate descriptions (or models) of reality. After all, organisms do 
operate on the basis of simple-to-complex representations of reality stored 
in their brains, even if  they are incapable of realizing it. To become aware 
of such representations does not require a detailed understanding of the 
biological hardware o f the system in which these mental states are 
encoded. An abstract understanding of the mere existence o f such states 
would be o f sufficient advantage. The task awaiting empirical research is 
to reconstruct the timing and order in which the pieces of this profoundly 
new psychology emerged, (p. 507)
8.2) Social Intelligence
A classic article in the study o f the mind is The Social Function o f  Intellect by 
Nicholas Humphrey (1983). This article has inspired quite a few workers, both those 
who are working with autistic children (For example, Baron-Cohen mentioned 
above.) and those who are studying primate intelligence. Humphrey has a theory 
about how consciousness developed in hominids. It must be pointed out again that 
many writers in this field use words like consciousness and intelligence without 
defining them, sometimes even interchanging them. We have seen that consciousness 
is difficult to define, and a slippery subject to work with, but with some slight 
modification his account can be used to show the function of folk psychology. 
Further, we shall see how and why human beings not only developed it, but developed 
it to the magnitude that they came to depend on it to such an extent that it become one 
of the defining characteristics o f the species.
Humphrey saw that the monkeys and apes he was working with in his laboratory had 
a high level o f intelligence. They could be trained to perform extremely complex tasks
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and could come up with solutions to difficult problems. However, what is this 
intelligence for? In the wild, chimpanzees, for instance, do not seem to do much, at 
least not much more than other species living in the same sort of environment. 
Evolution does not generally “give more” than is needed to solve a particular adaptive 
problem. Each solution is for a particular problem, not for all future problems that 
may arise. And it seemed as if  chimpanzees had far more intelligence than is needed.
As animals evolve they interact with the environment and that environment shapes 
them and their nervous system. As the nervous system develops in different species it 
will differ, depending on the kind of environment the species survives and thrives in. 
This means that the kind of information the nervous system uses will be different 
from species to species. This information is the picture of environment or the “reality” 
the animal has to deal with. For higher animals this includes how they divide up the 
information, the kinds of categories or “concepts” they use and the relationships 
between those categories, the logic and the laws of those categories, including the 
laws of causation.
For animals which are social, a part of their environment is the environment 
comprised by other members of their species, the social environment. This will be the 
most biologically significant factor after food and shelter, especially since the social 
environment is responsible for food and shelter in animals that hunt together, live and 
play with each other. It is also likely to be the most difficult to gauge, predict and use, 
since it is the most unstable — in the sense of constantly variable —  part of their 
environment. The animal must come up with the appropriate framework in which to 
calculate over the variables, i.e., the behaviour of the other members of the species.
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The part of their brains needed to calculate the behaviour of other individuals 
developed quicker and became more specialised, finally developing into what is 
called a “social intellect”. This was what Humphrey realised, that a high intelligence 
was needed to handle social information. Let us take a few steps back to see what 
kind of evolutionary pressure could cause the development of social intellect to 
accelerate.
8.3) Animal Manipulation
Krebs and Dawkins (1984) in their article, Animal Signals: Mind-reading and 
Manipulation, talk about animal “manipulation”, where one animal “exploits” 
another. These are strong words, but that is precisely what an animal does when its 
behaviour takes advantage of another animal’s behaviour. How is this done? First, the 
animal needs to predict or forecast the other animal's behaviour. Then the animal can 
go on to “force” the other animal to use some part of its behavioural repertoire which 
is useful to the first animal.
How does a victim of manipulation react to this (in an evolutionary sense)? Animals 
could develop a counter-manipulative skill: they could use the fact that their “minds” 
are being read and manipulate the mindreader by bluffing, that is, they could lie. This 
would lead to an escalating of mindreading abilities so that the animals could stay 
ahead of each other.1 (“Arms race” type escalations or feedback loops are a common
1 An interesting aside: One of the best ways to counter Machiavellian manipulation would be to behave 
unpredictably in certain situations. Even better would unpredictability coupled with an ability to 
maintain a poker face by hiding motivations from oneself. Could this have given rise to our feeling of
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theme in describing evolutionary forces.) This would be especially true if the victim 
was not really a victim but a willing participant of the process. The fact that it is being 
manipulated could be advantageous for the animal. It may want its mind read; mating 
rituals seem the obvious example of this. As Krebs and Dawkins {op cit.) say:
Any animal could benefit if  it could behave as if predicting the future 
behaviour of other animals in its world. At any moment an animal is faced 
with choosing which of its repertoire o f behaviour patterns to perform
next: feed, mate, drink, attack, flee, approach, withdraw, etc  The
optimal choice will depend on the probable consequences that would 
follow from each choice. For an animal that has any kind o f social life, or 
that is a predator or is preyed upon, these probable consequences will 
depend crucially on the internal motivational state and probable future 
behaviour of other animals —  rivals, mates, parents, offspring, prey, 
predators, parasites, hosts. Keeping in mind the problem of other minds, 
let us remember that mental states cannot be directly observed. A dog, 
faced with the choice of approaching or retreating from a rival dog, would 
do well to take into account any information he can glean as to the mood 
or motivational state of the rival, and hence, in effect to predict the 
probable future behaviour of the rival, (p. 386)
What Krebs and Dawkins are talking about is a kind o f fast statistical or probabilistic 
analysis of the animal’s situation, a situation which consists of the environment and 
other animals of the same or other species. But from here it is a few steps to actual 
mindreading. As they suggest, perhaps the step is taken by evolution selecting the 
animals who could mindread. (p. 386) “....‘Experience’ of the lawfulness o f the 
behaviour of the victims becomes internalised in the brain o f the mind-reader. In both
having free will? See Miller (1997) Protean Primates: The Evolution o f  Adaptive Unpredictability in 
Competition and Courtship, p. 313-240
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casies its mind-reading ability enables it to exploit its victim’s behaviour by ‘being one 
jump ahead’ of it”.1
8.4) Reflexive Consciousness
According to Humphrey, the next trick nature came up with was introspection or 
“reflexive consciousness” (what we have been calling “awareness” in our earlier 
discussion of consciousness): it proved possible for an individual to develop a model 
of others by reasoning by analogy from its own case.2 The development of 
consciousness was a stratagem for developing and testing hypotheses about what was 
going through the minds of others. Notice that this is what three-year-olds as well as 
autistic children are lacking. This would involve not just looking at one’s behaviour 
but looking into it. Reflexive consciousness is the source of psychological concepts, a 
set of subjective feelings which are available to introspection: sensations, emotions, 
volition and the rest. What Humphrey is saying is that being able to read the 
motivational states o f other individuals depends on having a conscious awareness of 
one’s own feelings. If we believe that another person also has the same set of 
subjective feelings, we can use these reasons to predict their behaviour, therefore we 
have a logic or a language of other people’s behaviour. There is also the assumption 
that the other possesses a similar inner life, as Anatol Rapoport points out: in playing 
any game the “assumption of similarity” about our opponent is always necessary,
1 For arguments on how knowledge of the outside world becomes internalised, especially as related to 
the view that children’s domains are internalisations, see Shepard. (1987) Evolution o f  a Mesh: Mind 
and World in Dupre (1987)
2 I am, of course, using the standard shorthand when I use words like nature; “nature” really means 
evolution and natural selection.
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playing is impossible without this assumption, for instance, that one’s opponent wants 
to win.
Humphrey says this about consciousness: “Our criterion forjudging that someone else 
is conscious is that we should have grounds for believing that he has subjective 
reasons for his actions...” (p. 35). But can we know what the subjective reasons are if 
we do not have subjective experiences ourselves?
...[I]f we assume that the first animal in history to have any sort o f 
introspective consciousness occurred as a chance variant in an otherwise 
unconscious population, the selective advantage which consciousness 
gave that animal must have been independent of consciousness in others.
It follows, a fortiori, that the selective advantage of consciousness can 
never have depended on one animal's conscious experience being the 
same as another’s. (1983 p. 35-36)
The same argument can be used for folk psychology. Knowledge of one’s own 
propositional attitudes may proffer some selective advantage; but knowledge of 
other's without knowledge of one's own first seems not to have any particular 
advantage. If an animal did not have the ability to model the behaviour o f other 
members o f the species on its own, if  it had to predict, account for and explain other 
animal’s behaviour only with external “objective” observation and without the aid of 
introspection, it would not be able to attribute any mental states to another animal. If 
an animal did not have any inner feeling to use as a template for the feelings o f others, 
it would be “behaviouristic” towards other animals; there would be no attribution of 
feelings mediating between stimulus and response. It would only be able to know
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what is going on by reference to behaviour, starting as it were, with a blank slate, 
much as some behaviourists professed to do.
Humphrey also has a theory about how this type of consciousness gave rise to qualia. 
(1992, p. 21-22.) It is a question of the type of mental representations. For any 
organism, there is obviously a benefit o f having the ability to assess what is 
happening to the animal at the time, but at a certain level of complexity this 
assessment would be in two forms, 1) “What is happening to me?”, and 2) “What is 
happening out there?” These two questions require two different types of answers, the 
subjective experience and the objective fact. As evolution proceeded, answering the 
first lead to qualia and first person knowledge; the second to the intentionality of 
cognition.
Crook suggests something similar (1988, p. 352) in The Experiential Context o f  
Intellect. He says the evolution of consciousness took place in the following way. The 
observation of another's behaviour calls forth feelings in the self which are 
empathetic, thus allowing the self to predict the other's behaviour on the basis of what 
the self might do in the same situation. There has to be a difference between the two 
and a way of distinguishing between empathetic feelings and those consequences of 
its own state. If  there wasn't, there would be a loss of an ability to predict. If there are 
two or three other individuals whose mental states have to be calculated, there must 
be a way to distinguish between those of the other individuals and those o f the self. So 
the point of awareness is the recognition of the model as a model.
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What is the advantage of this introspective psychology compared to the objective 
variety? An animal needs what we have called an “appropriate framework” in which 
to make sense of its environment in order to integrate all the different perceptions, 
location of food supplies, behaviour patterns of prey and companions as well as 
problems arising from generational overlap. Could this be done with just 
“intelligence”, some sort of ability to handle large quantities of information? If  it was 
not for social interactions of a complex kind, there would be no need for 
introspection; for example, we do not have to postulate that ants and termites have a 
need for introspection. Animals controlled purely by chemical messengers would not 
need to predict and plan for other’s behaviour; everyone had a “role” and would do 
what was “expected” of them. Therefore, they would not need to model another 
animal’s behaviour. An example o f this is the fact that fixed altruistic patterns can 
exist in insect societies because individuals genetically programmed to sacrifice 
themselves for the group are not those programmed to carry out the reproductive 
functions. This genetic separation does not exist in higher animals.
But once social interactions increase beyond a certain critical point of complexity, 
without introspection there could be no framework. Human behaviourists got rid of 
mentalistic terms but then had to invent and use drives, instincts, etc., and even then 
they had to “cheat” by using words describing “felt feelings” like “hunger” or “fear”. 
Without introspection how does a behaviourist know that they feel hunger or fear as a 
motivation? How do they arrive at these words, variables or constants that come 
between stimulus and response? What they actually do is make large scale surveys to 
see what behaviour patterns are important to the particular animal they are studying. 
They then put a wall around the experiment and include only what is being studied
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and/or collect large sets of data and then calculate the statistical correlation between 
different variables and assess which are the likeliest candidates for relevancy. In 
nature, the total amount of information available to any animal is theoretically 
infinite. So how does an animal go about choosing what is relevant? There are no 
controlled experiments in the real world. For any social animal, the survival of that 
animal will depend on it being able to “do” psychology. There will be selective 
pressures on social animals to represent those reasons for behaviour and all the 
members of that group are going to need the same sort of reasons. Every individual in 
the group should be able to predict what the others in the group will do in the near 
future.
In terms of evolution it could have happened either way: Reasons could have come 
first and become feelings, or feelings could have come first and then became reasons 
for behaviour. Once the process started it would have snowballed, since the advantage 
given to any individual who could successfully predict another’s behaviour would be 
immense. But it could be likely that feelings arose first since a non-social animal 
would have no need of feeling, it could be purely behaviouristic. (By feelings, I mean 
experienced feelings.) Once animals became social, feelings were needed to arouse 
other members of that species by “expressing” those feelings, in ways such as making 
noises when hurt, frightened or in need of a sexual partner. What would be the need 
for an animal to express its feeling if there were no other animals of the same species 
which it is manipulating by making that particular expression? An animal in pain, for 
example, beyond startling and scaring off an attacker, if  it shows that it is in pain by 
uttering a cry, would put itself in danger. For a lone animal the safest course of action 
would be to be as quiet as possible and attract no attention.
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Humphrey uses the term “Natural Psychologists” for those animals, like humans, 
which use this sort o f modelling of “internal” behaviour. It is a far better phrase than 
folk psychology since it has no derogatory connotations and also implies that we are 
active agents. An interesting aside to this discussion is that Humphrey has an 
explanation for why some people, especially in more “primitive” societies, treat 
natural things like trees and storms as if  they have feelings. Once a system of 
explanation has worked for one natural phenomenon it makes sense that it could be 
used for any natural phenomenon, if  it does not prove counter productive when used. 
The quickest way to “understand” a complex system is to attribute a mind to it. This 
also explains why we adapt the “intentional stance” towards our own artefacts. If it 
works for the most important and complicated part of our environment, why not use it 
for other parts? I will be using similar arguments below while discussing Mithen’s 
work in section 8.10.
8.5) Machiavellian Intelligence
But are social relations in primates really so complicated? And if they are 
complicated, are they important enough to act as selection pressures? In primate 
groups, at a minimal level, there is sexual competition plus social hierarchy plus 
groups with a mixed-age members. All of this results in interpersonal interactions that 
are at a much higher level of complexity than in any other species. Though this idea 
has been explored by many writers, Machiavellian Intelligence by Richard Byrne and 
Andrew Whiten (1988) is an excellent collection to use as a starting point, since it has 
articles by many prominent workers in the field. Some o f the work mentioned in the
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book reiterates points made earlier in the present thesis, but that is because these 
theories are based on research across many fields including child development 
studies. In the introduction, they point out that, generally, intelligence has focused on 
the physical or technical world and in fact our concept of intelligence has been shaped 
by this understanding. In reality, intelligence is most useful and most used when 
applied to social interaction, the intelligence needed to deal with other individuals.
We noted that the social environment is different from other facets of the environment 
because it is reactive and requires constant attention. Just building a stock of 
knowledge will not be enough and the predictive element becomes more important. In 
this context, Byrne and Whiten (p. 51-52) make the Rylean distinction between 
“knowing how” and “knowing that”. “Knowing how” would be: when stimulus S 
happens, perform behaviour R. But “knowing that” is, event A is almost always 
followed by event B. This is perhaps the shift that takes place when behaviourism is 
replaced by mindreading. With this idea of intelligence, they also have an idea of how 
consciousness evolved (p. 63-64): If animal A thinks that animal B thinks that A 
thinks that something is the case, what we have now is beliefs about beliefs, leading 
to the type of consciousness we have called thoughts about thoughts. This is the 
ability to work with different orders of intentionality, as Dennett proposed in his “I 
know that you know that I know that you know” example (Dennett, 1988, p. 185). 
Dennett suggests we can handle five or six orders. Chimpanzees seem to manage two. 
On the subject o f layers o f intentionality, Byrne and Whiten (1991) in their attempt to 
be sure about this, tried to tease apart behaviour using a computational system — 
what they call a “production” system — in an attempt to show that there are no levels 
of intentionality in animal actions. They show that it does not work, that there is no
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way to rule out intentionality in at least some of the behaviour shown by 
chimpanzees.
As pointed out by Krebs and Dawkins (section 8.2) animals manipulate and exploit 
each other for their needs and in this process, the other individual becomes a social 
tool. This is why Byrne and Whiten call it “Machiavellian Intelligence” rather than 
social intelligence. Just how complicated the social environment is for some species 
can be seen in De Waal (1982) who actually titles his book (from which the article in 
Byrne and Whiten is excerpted) Chimpanzee Politics, which has stories of deception, 
coalition forming, sabre-rattling strategies, and alliances formation among 
chimpanzee groups. All these are further complicated by the fact that since different 
generations live with each other even more social strategies have to be used. In these 
primates social dominance is not just a function of how physically strong an 
individual is, but also of trustworthiness and an ability to form friendships. In power 
struggles individual success quite often depends on the number o f friends and 
relatives the individual has. There also appears to be a class structure apart from a 
simple pecking order, and individuals try to associate with those of a higher class 
whenever possible. There are examples of mothers trying to force their children to 
play with children of a higher ranked female while attempting to exclude those of 
lower ranking females. (See De Waal, passim.) Friendships also seem to be extremely 
useful and there are indications that long term relationships are often maintained.
More reports and analysis can be found in Menzel (1988) and Leakey and Lewin 
(1992)1. De Waal, in another book, Good Natured (1996), has many examples of how 
complicated the lives of some social apes are. Interestingly, his book, which is about 
the evolutionary basis of ethical systems, has a whole chapter (p. 40-88) on sympathy 
and empathy. However, his definition and use o f the words is different from mine. 
With sympathy he is using the word in the sense of reacting to, and wanting to do 
something about the others’ suffering. His point is that you cannot have sympathy 
without empathy. This is the second sense in which I have used the words, as 
explained earlier in Section 7.7. He does note that you can have empathy but not 
necessarily sympathy; it does not necessarily follow that one leads to the other.
At first reading, most of the literature on primate behaviour seems unnecessarily 
anthropomorphic. As pointed out in chapter one, perhaps this need to avoid using 
certain words when it comes to animals should be seen as a prejudice. But on the 
other hand, as many authors point out2 it is very difficult to avoid using words like 
“lying” or “friends” or “celebration” when talking about primates. Perhaps it would 
be best to use quote marks around any word that implies a human-like mental state or 
relationship. Or better yet, we could describe everything in behaviouristic 
terminology. However it can be easily seen that this would become cumbersome very 
rapidly. For a word like “friend” you would have to mention about time spent in the 
other’s company, statistical analysis of the time spent in grooming, the number of 
times each came to the aid of the other, food sharing, sexual orientation, etc. The
1 Leakey and Lewin use Humphrey’s ideas as one of the guiding factors in the paleontological search 
for early hominids.
2 See, for example, De Waal’s (1996) introduction.
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difficulty in describing situations and relationships in this way is symmetrical to the 
present theory o f why the mind evolved!
I would have liked to give examples of the many ways in which these species 
manipulate and deceive each other but space limitations are a serious constraint on 
this topic. O f course, their behaviour is not all negative, they also look after and help 
each other —  especially friends and relatives —  in times of trouble. In the books 
mentioned in this section there are many of examples o f primates behaving in ways 
that appear to be extremely “human”. The similarities are eye-opening.
Could the need for complicated social interactions be an evolutionary pressure leading 
to intelligence? Most of the writers mentioned above certainly think so. Another book 
by one of the co-authors of Machiavellian Intelligence mentioned above, Byrne
(1995) is far more conservative, yet still inclined towards an affirmative answer to the 
question. In this book, Byme tests two opposing theories, Environmental Complexity 
versus Social Complexity to see which could have been more effective as a selective 
pressure. Environmental complexity is seen as a function of the kinds of foods the 
animals eat, and the time and effort involved in locating and obtaining food, what is 
called the foraging range. For instance, some species have to range over large 
distances to get their food, which means they would need a larger memory and an 
ability to handle this memory.
We will be comparing theories in Section 8.7, but one important point should be noted 
here. One of the clearest indications o f the validity of these theories is connected with 
the size o f the neocortex in the brain. The neocortex is very recently evolved and is
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known as the “thinking part of the brain”. If either foraging behaviour or social 
complexity was a selective pressure, species which have one but not the other as part 
of their environment should show a larger neocortex. It was found that neocortical 
size was dramatically larger in those species with large social groups compared to 
those primates which lived in smaller groups but had a higher level of environmental 
complexity (as measured by foraging range areas). (Byme (1995) p. 218-221, The 
research is from Dunbar, 1993) Byme concludes that neocortical enlargement does 
correlate with social complexity and machiavellian intelligence.1 An interesting fact 
that emerged while studying this data was that a large neocortex was found especially 
in primates that indulged in high levels of tactical deception. (Byme, 1995, p. 219- 
220)
8.6) Deception
What is this tactical deception that seems important in the evolutionary development 
of the neocortex? ? A lies to B  so that B believes something other than the actuality. A 
lies either because the actual situation may be harmful to A if  perceived by B or 
because A realises that deception may be useful in helping it reach its goal. It can be 
immediately seen that there would be no point to this form of tactical deception if A 
does not know what B believes. If put into words, A is saying, “I want B to think
that ” So we then have second-order intentionality. O f course, the case could be
made that this deception, as an adaptive strategy developed by evolution, does not 
need any intentionality. It could be said that this is similar to the markings on moths
1 But he does add that social complexity was possibly not the only force that resulted in a large brain 
and suggests that environmental challenges were probably also a selection pressure, especially for the
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which confuse predators, or birds that feign broken wings in order to draw predators 
away from nests.
Perhaps in the case of moths it is easy to draw the line and call it zero-order 
intentionality, but the second case is already problematic and it is not clear that there 
is no intentional behaviour taking place. By the time you reach the apes’ second order 
intentionality it seems that there really cannot be any doubt that this is deception in 
the strongest sense of the word.1 In this respect, some important points should be 
noted when comparing primate deception to what may seem to be similar behaviour 
in other animals. Tactical deception in primates is outside the standard repertoire of 
their behaviour, and is always a solution to a particular problem. That is, it is not used 
in every similar situation but only when the ape “sees” it as useful in that situation. 
The bird luring a predator from its nest does not use the same or similar trick to lure 
other birds away from a food supply. It is an inflexible device. Also, not every 
member of that ape community used a particular form of deception, only some 
individuals did.2
Is deception important? It certainly seems to be: deception is a social skill — it is a 
way of manipulating other people —  and could be useful in any social sphere. In fact, 
it has been shown that among groups of children those who are better at deception, are 
the ones who are the most dominant. (Mitchell, 1996, p. 68 - 72). This simple
sort o f intelligence he calls “insight”, the ability to see solutions to general problems.
1 See Gould and Gould, {op cit., p .161-163), and Byme, (1995, p-123) who also points out that there is 
no test for first order intentionality.
2 See Ristau (1991b) on why attributing intentionality to bird deception is problematic.
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correlation is resonant with the remarks made earlier about the importance of pretence 
in children's play.1
Because these are the first clear signs of intentional behaviour in non-human animals, 
considerable work has been done on deception in primates. This is one area of 
research where philosophical considerations have been taken into account and much 
effort put into making experiments as rigorous as possible. Not all species of primates 
use all forms of deception and different species show marked differences in their use 
o f social manipulation. However for the purposes of this discussion it is unnecessary 
(nor does space permit) to list or demarcate which species indulge in which form. So 
to simplify matters, I am using words like “apes” or “primates” to stand for the whole 
primate group, except where they are actually mentioned as a species.2
In the differences between species, there does seem to be a difference in dyadic as 
opposed to triadic manipulation (Byme 1995. p. 135-137). The great apes, 
chimpanzees and gorillas, are less likely to use triadic deception —  where a third 
animal is used as a social tool to manipulate a target animal—  as compared to 
monkeys, (p. 135) Byme comments that this is possibly because great apes may be 
too intelligent; the ability to attribute intentions may cause overt dyadic deception to 
become rarer as well as more subtle.3
1 For a succinct discussion of the connection between deception and theory of mind, see Stuart, 1998.
2 See Whiten’s (1996) Ape Mind, Monkey Mind for the differences between apes and monkeys as far as 
the theory of mind is concerned. For details of field research influenced by a philosophical 
understanding of intentionality and vice versa, see Cheney and Seyfarth (1991), Premack (1988) and 
Dennett (1988). Also interesting is Bennett’s How to Read Minds in Behaviour: A Suggestion from a 
Philosopher. Bennett (1991a,b,c) has written many articles on this subject and has devised what he 
calls a “unity condition” (Bennett, 1991c) and an “economy rule” (1991b) to see if intentional 
explanations are valid for these kind of cases. As he points out these are in some way similar to, yet 
possibly more useful than Lloyd Morgan's canon. (1991c, p. 27) We have seen the problem with this.
3 Also see p. 139 in Byme and Whiten (1991) on this subject.
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Most of Machiavellian Intelligence is dedicated to showing that there is ethological 
evidence to support Humphrey’s ideas.1 For instance, social intelligence implies that 
species which have it would indulge in more social play, especially triadic play with 
younger members of the group. Chimpanzees which have been shown to have this 
form of intelligence indulge in social play 25% of the time while baboons, who do 
not, play only 3-5% of the time. It is interesting to note that the beginnings o f 
mindreading in primates appears to be similar to humans: It starts with eye contact 
followed by diectic gaze. See Gomez, (1991) Visual Behaviour as a Window fo r  
Reading the Mind o f  Others in Primates.
8.7) Tool use, Foraging and Sociality
The Byme and Whiten volume also examines opposing views on the evolution of 
human intelligence. These earlier theories claimed that in human evolution the 
selection pressure was due either to tool use or the demands made by the hunting- 
foraging behaviour of early hominids. The articles are by pioneers o f both those 
theories. At least one of them rejects his earlier theory totally and supports the social 
intellect theory. Wynn (1988) in Tools and the Evolution o f  Human Intelligence, says 
that modem archaeological studies show that human encephalisation was far more 
advanced compared to what tool use would predict, and technological innovation 
itself played a very small role in the evolution of intelligence. The other writer, does 
not reject his earlier theory, but in Foraging Behavior and the Evolution o f  Primate
1 It should be noted that though Humphrey’s work is the most known, there have been other researchers 
who independently arrived at the social intelligence theory.
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Intelligence, (Milton, 1988) does say that [0]ne o f the strongest selection 
pressures on early humans would have been to develop the ability for cooperative 
behaviour, delayed gratification and the sharing of highly desirable and essential 
goods.” (p. 304) This seems to come back to social pressures again. (We have already 
mentioned evidence from neocortex development.)
Arguments against the Machiavellian intelligence theory can be found in Gibson and 
Ingold (1993). Though more correctly, the arguments in the book are —  except 
occasionally — not directed against it but supportive of a rival, the tool-use theory. 
The book is a collection of reviews on the work done on tool use as the major 
evolutionary pressure in developing human intelligence. However, it is worthwhile 
keeping in mind a few points. The present essay is not about general intelligence, 
whatever we may consider that to be, but about a part o f the mind, the part that 
specifically deals with belief/desire formations and how we recognise those beliefs 
and desires.
Further, in the volume, K.R. Gibson ((1993, p. 257) notes that there is an 
interdependence of tool use, social behaviour and language, and arguments about 
which are more important are fruitless since they are interconnected in humans and 
most tool use had a social function in early humans. This seems to be extrapolated 
from anthropological studies of present day “primitive” societies where supposedly 
solitary activities like hunting-gathering or tool making are usually acts which are a 
part of a complex social network. Their position in society and its hierarchies qualifies 
a member as a tool maker, and then puts them in a situation where the making and use 
of tools can be learned. Interestingly enough, there are some articles in the volume
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which seem to give support to the social intelligence theory. To mention two, Aspects 
o f Transmission ofTool-use in Wild Chimpanzees, by Boesch (1993), especially, p . 
171-183 on teaching and cultural transmission of tool use in chimpanzees and 
Reynolds’ (1993) The Complementation Theory o f  Language and Tool Use, on the 
social dimension of tool use.
The volume also contains an interesting article by Ingold (1993), Tool Use, Sociality 
and Intelligence: an extremely polemical piece which makes some interesting points. 
He says the debate on the Machiavellian intelligence versus tool use hypothesis is 
based on an artificial dichotomy. The dichotomy is a supposed difference between the 
spheres o f technical and social relations. Ingold claims that this separation comes 
from Durkhiem’s view of the two separate worlds of human activity, and with it, the 
idea that hunting and gathering were seen as non-social. He views this as a mistake, a 
view I concur with.
Ingold also feels that there is a paradox at the heart o f the Machiavellian intelligence 
hypotheses, the idea o f manipulation comes from looking at other beings as tools, a 
word usually applied to technical spheres. I am not sure that this is a paradox, just a 
useful choice o f words, which helps us understand how evolution works, much like 
Dawkin’s idea of a survival machine, the selfish gene.
Finally, an arms-race type escalation of brain size and power postulated in most 
theories of human evolutionary development does not really appear possible with tool 
use on at least two counts. First, the archaeological records do not really show much 
improvement in tool use with time corresponding to the change in brain size in
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primates or humans. Second, however trivial this may sound, tools do not “fight 
back”. The feedback loop such as deception and counter-deception between 
individuals could not take place with tools.
8.8) Social Intelligence Leads to General Intelligence
A clarification may be called for at this point. It could be argued that Humphrey’s 
original idea was inspired by his observations on the general intelligence of apes and 
questioning the need for such a high level of intelligence in apes. The solution arrived 
at was that social intelligence was highly developed in these animals. And we have 
since found evidence that this was indeed so. Is this a contradiction: if  it was a social 
intelligence module that was developed in these apes, why would chimpanzees have a 
general higher intelligence? According to the modular theory, they should just have a 
higher social intelligence. Could this mean that the modular theory was wrong, and 
that intelligence is in fact, general purpose?
Not necessarily. There are several factors involved, one of them being size. Once one 
part o f the brain starts getting larger under some selection pressure, the rest of the 
brain is also going to increase. This is the idea of allometry, where the laws of growth 
insure that all organs follow some sort of rule o f “sizing”. Let us say that a particular 
body part A is being selected for, resulting in a larger size. This body part interacts 
with numerous other body parts, not all o f which are under the same selection 
pressure. If A continues to increase in size without a corresponding increase in the 
ottar parts, let us say the bones that support that part, the system of which it is part 
will not be able to do its work properly and hence the increase in size will be
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counterproductive. Secondly, organs initially selected for one function could in the 
course of evolution be given another, secondary, function. In time, this secondary 
function itself could become primary. So an intelligence which was originally social 
in nature could have moved towards a more general sort of intelligence, whilst 
retaining its more fundamental basis. Also, there is a lower limit set on other “forms” 
of intelligence set by the size of the brain. Only after the brain has reached a certain 
“critical” size will it be able to develop further modules.
However, there is another more pertinent reason why social intelligence could 
manifest itself in a more general form. This is because social interaction itself gives 
many of the benefits which we see as intelligence. For example, a socially intelligent 
animal would be better at learning from others, either in the sense of copying actions 
or learning from the other’s mistakes. Social intelligence also means having the 
ability to see things from another perspective. As we know from everyday life, seeing 
things from a different viewpoint quite often helps in arriving at solutions to technical 
problems. Then there is the fact that knowing “why” the other does something would 
be useful at arriving at solutions or predicting what is going to happen. Having a 
knowledge of the other’s goals and using them goes hand in hand with the ability to 
plan. Finally, important general insights maybe attained through an understanding 
hierarchical structures, one of the requirements of any social intelligence. (Byme, 
1994, p. 222-223)
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8.9) Social Intelligence in Human Evolution
We have seen that there is evidence that the social intelligence theory holds for other 
primates, and that it was a possible factor in human evolution. In the next section we 
will search for more evidence, but before we move on, let me summarise the social 
intelligence hypothesis.1
Primates have a general higher intelligence as compared to other animals, but what do 
they do with this intelligence? This higher intelligence was directed towards the social 
arena and this was seen in that primates appear to manipulate social objects far better 
than they can physical ones. The social environments of primates is more complex 
than its physical environment in that it is less predictable and therefore more 
challenging. The idea is that social intelligence is qualitatively different from non­
social intelligence in that there is a progression from mapping physical features to 
mapping others actions in relation to the animals own intentions. As well as modelling 
its own intentions as actions, this mapping requires attributing intentions to others on 
the basis of their behavioural cues.
Social intelligence developed earlier in the evolutionary tree then general intelligence 
since group living itself was an earlier solution to problems o f survival: even in 
animals that are not postulated to have this kind of social intelligence, there are 
adaptations to help the group cohere, compete yet maintain social bonds. (See 
Dunbar, below, for more on group living.) Because o f the precedence, social
1 This summary is modified from Gigemzer, 1997, p. 265.
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intelligence either gave rise to general intelligence or is a precursor of it, taking over 
more and more domains until it became general intelligence.
Though the social intelligence hypothesis sounds plausible it must be admitted that 
there are conceptual problems with it. For example, there is a problem in comparing 
complexities: when we say that the social environment is more complex than the 
physical one, it presupposes that the physical environment is a stable one. Also, the 
connection between social intelligence and cognitive powers is not a necessary one: 
there is an assumption that complicated problems need complicated solutions and this 
assumption may or may not be true. (See Schmitt and Grammer, 1997.)
One way to assess the hypothesis would be to see what predictions it makes and see if 
they are borne out by empirical studies. This social intelligence theory was developed 
by ethologists studying primates and can be seen as an examination of species 
phylogentically related to us. Is there any evidence to show that this theory applies to 
human beings? Another way that some confirmation of the theory could be achieved 
would be to search the evolutionary history o f the hominid family. As mentioned 
earlier in connection with language, there are going to be problems in looking for 
fossil traces of behaviour. Yet, it can be done, as is seen in the work of Steven Mithen
(1996). What he did was look for archaeological evidence for the modules that have 
been postulated.
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8.10) Domains of Early Man
First, let me review and go slightly deeper into the topic of modules. Modules are 
different “intelligences” directed at, and able to use, one particular facet of the 
environment. (The terminology here is not very precise, writers vary between calling 
them intelligences, domains or just faculties. Rozin (1976, p. 245) calls them 
“adaptive specializations” to emphasise their biological nature. But as mentioned 
earlier, for my purposes the terminology is not that important; all that is important is 
that they have a biological basis.) They are similar to Lycan's homuncular 
functionalism where a person is viewed “...as a corporate entity which corporeally 
performs many complex functions.” (Lycan, 1990, p. 80) And even closer to Minsky's 
“society of mind” view: specialists in the brain that communicate only sparsely 
(mentioned in Horgan and Woodward, 1990, p. 409).1
Cosmides and Tooby (1987) call them Darwinian algorithms and show why they are 
necessary, as opposed to general purpose mechanisms. Their description of how such 
algorithms work is probably the best way to explain what I mean by them:
When activated by appropriate environmental or proprioceptive 
information, these innately specified “frame builders” should focus 
attention, organize perception and memory, and call up specialized 
procedural knowledge that will lead to domain-appropriate inferences, 
judgments, and choices. Like Chomsky’s language acquisition device, 
these inference procedures allow you to “go beyond the information 
given” — to reason adaptively even in the face of incomplete or degraded
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information, (p. 286)
They also go on to say: “In our view, such mechanisms have two defining 
characteristics: 1) they are most usefully described on the cognitive level of proximate 
causation and 2) they are adaptations.” (Footnote, p. 304)
Ho w many domains would have been needed by early man? We have seen that infants 
seem to have at least four domains: language, psychology, physics and biology.2 
Some of these can be further broken down into precursors, as is shown in the work of 
Baron-Cohen above. Tooby and Cosmides (1987, p. 285-286) suggest that there could 
be a large number of modules each dealing with a specific activity, what Mithen calls 
a Swiss army knife type of mind, because specific types o f problems need specific 
ways to solve them. But according to Mithen, three domains would have been the 
minimum: A natural history intelligence, a social intelligence and a technical 
intelligence.
Mithen uses social intelligence/modular theory to solve some archaeological puzzles. 
For instance, there is the problematic fact that early human species —  such as the 
Neanderthals — of the Pleistocene epoch made tools out of stone chipped to form an 
edge. However they did not use bone or antlers as material, only stone was ever used. 
Why not? Bone and antler are easy to work and would have been easily available, 
since Neanderthals did hunt.
11 am ignoring the Fodorean treatment of modules here. Fodor seems to be among the most referenced 
of authors on this topic, but his demand that modularity is restricted to input systems is very limiting. 
The picture I am drawing here would indeed be modularity gone mad.
2 The volume by Sperber, Premack and Premack, (1995) mentioned above gives evidence for these and 
other modules.
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Mithen's answer is that if  there were indeed domains or specialised intelligences, this 
is exactly what we should expect to see in prehistory. Intelligences from the different 
domains could not be used across domains, since by definition there would be some 
kind of cognitive barrier that could not be crossed in the brains of these early humans. 
In the above example, the natural history domain and the technical intelligence 
domain of the Neanderthals could not work together to respond to bone as similar to 
stone.
There are many such problems in archaeology and Mithen finds solutions based on 
the social intellect theory. This not only suggests that modular theory is correct but his 
further conclusion is that only in modem man are these different domains accessible 
to each other, resulting in a general intelligence. (Working across domains is similar 
to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) “representational rediscription”. “Representational 
rediscription is a process of ‘appropriating’ stable states to extract the information 
they contain which can then be used more flexibly for other purposes.” (p. 25) Her 
idea is that mapping mles change during representational rediscription.) That is, 
cross-modular applications of knowledge happens at a later stage o f evolution and 
may be the point where we became modem humans. Along the way, there were stages 
where there would be some crossing over without total access. For instance, the 
development of agriculture was possible only when the natural history domain was 
integrated with technical intelligence, and social intelligence with natural history 
intelligence, since —  as can be seen by studying burial sites —  plants and animals 
became symbols of power for the individual.
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But one domain can be much more developed than another. For example, a high level 
o f social intelligence does not need to extend to other domains. Some monkeys seem 
to be particularly adept at solving social problems, while they do not seem to be as 
good at other types. (However, as pointed out earlier, generally speaking, social 
intelligence seems to have developed in species which already have a high level of 
intelligence.) O f course, applying folk psychology to domains in which it is not 
applicable would have been useful to early man: it works well in other domains. 
Primitive communities still classify and interpret the world in teleological or 
intentional terms. And so do we in our attributions of intentionality to physical objects 
we do not understand. (Jolly (1988) makes a similar point in The Evolution o f  
Purpose.) This could have fuelled the proliferation of this module in humans. Perhaps 
this is how religion originated too. It must be kept in mind that the social intelligence 
module also deals with intentional communications giving rise to modem language. 
This is probably why all the problems in the philosophy of mind are connected with 
the philosophy of language....
8.11) Evolutionary Reappropriation
A slight digression should be made here which will provide some circumstantial 
evidence for the social intelligence hypothesis. As a possible explanation of the way 
in which this module could have evolved, Mithen uses the work of Robin Dunbar. 
Dunbar (1996) suggests that language evolved as a replacement for grooming. In this 
context, Byme (1995, p. 233- 234) points out that in any debate on the origins of 
language the search for language precursors in the communication behaviour of other 
species has been fruitless, because the wrong area was being searched. What should
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have been looked for is the precursor of language in the cognition of other species. In 
this case there are several possible precursors. For example, we have seen that some 
species of primates have the ability to attribute beliefs and intentions to others. This 
understanding of the difference in mental perspective between me and them, coupled 
with the understanding of cause and effect, added to a comprehension of hierarchical 
structures, especially in behaviour, are obvious examples of precursors that could 
have given rise to language. The idea that language could have arisen by a process of 
“evolutionary reappropriation”, i.e. the use of brain structures originally developed for 
something else for a new function, that of language is not especially controversial. 
See, for example, Wilkens and Wakefield, (1995) who coined the phrase 
“evolutionary reappropriation”, a term more apposite than “exaptations.”
The purpose of grooming amongst the primates was initially thought to be basic 
hygiene, the removal of fleas and scabs, as well as providing salt, which was eaten 
when picked off the skin. Some species of monkeys and apes groom for far too long 
for this to be the sole purpose. In present day primates, grooming is an important 
social activity and serves as a way of keeping the group together, exchanging 
information and teaching the younger members of the group about social 
relationships. A major part of grooming activity is based on interpersonal 
relationships and the recognition of hierarchical status. It serves the purpose of 
communicating and maintaining social hierarchies and group cohesiveness. This is 
because there is a strict protocol o f who can groom whom and for how long, 
dependent on social relationships. As in all behavioural activity, including those 
important to social situations, grooming is biologically maintained by the release of 
endogenous opiates.
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Grooming lets members know, for example, who could be trusted to look after babies, 
who food should shared with, all based on the idea of “would they do the same for 
me?” The question at the most fundamental level is, to whom should one devote an 
extremely valuable resource: time? Grooming takes up time that could be spent 
hunting, foraging, mating, or territorial fighting, all o f which are obviously important 
activities too. Relatives groom each other and also help each other out when 
necessary. Unrelated monkeys also groom each other and these are always connected 
with friendships or alliance formations. Close friends are groomed more intensively 
than are others and food is shared more willingly among those who groom each other. 
Also, trust is developed through grooming. For example, Seyfarth and Cheneys’ 
(1988, 1991) experiments with vervet monkey’s warning signals showed members of 
a troupe to be more likely to respond strongly to warnings if given by someone who 
was a grooming partner in the near past.
There is a strong correlation between time spent grooming and the size of the group to 
which the species belongs, or the social complexity (Dunbar (1988) p. 251). At some 
point in evolutionary history, as social groups became larger the time taken to groom 
grew to be counterproductive: beyond a certain number of individuals grooming takes 
up far too much time. Furthermore, the information dealt with became too 
complicated to handle with just grooming. If grooming became less cost effective as a 
way to show who you trust, who you're willing to mate with, whose children you are 
willing to look after, and on whose behalf you are willing to fight, all o f which were 
indicated by grooming, what could substitute for it? Language, says Dunbar.
The actual number o f members of a group depends on what Dunbar calls a cognitive 
group, the number of individuals with whom one has some kind o f social interaction. 
The numbers increase steadily through the primate phylogenetic line until suddenly 
they drop. During grooming only one-on-one communication is possible while during 
talking at least three people can take part. As Dunbar predicts human conversation 
groups are proportionally larger than primate grooming groups: human groups (Group 
size: 150) are three times larger than the largest primate groups (55) (p. 121). It was 
also found that during general conversation amongst humans, if  there are more than 
four people involved, the group splits off into smaller groups.
Dunbar examines human language to prove his hypothesis, since if  it is true, language 
should have some “design features” to make it suitable for its primary purpose. These 
he does find and it seems to confirm his theory. To give one example, if as believed 
earlier, the reason for the evolution of language was to exchange factual information 
about the world, most conversations arbitrarily recorded should be about just that. If, 
on the other hand, Dunbar’s view is correct, language should be mostly devoted to 
social relationships or gossip, which is about (as he puts it) “reputation management”. 
By recording conversations he found this to be true: two-thirds of conversation in 
non-academic situations was about social topics and gossip. The same test can be 
made with newspapers. Generally newspapers devote more space to what is called 
“human interest” stories rather than hard news.1 Incidentally, he does not think gossip 
is a negative thing, but as reputation management, an important human activity.
1 This is true of broadsheets as well as tabloids.
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The point is that amongst apes who already have some kind of intentional behaviour, 
language evolved to take-over the function — the sharing the information and 
affirming ties —  that grooming provided at an earlier stage of evolution.1
So to recap the chapter so far, we saw that social intelligence stems from an attempt to 
order the world and make use of it. This ordering gave us (or our pre-human 
ancestors) the ability to calculate over and predict the behaviour o f others. In this 
ordering system, three levels of intentionality were needed: useable information, 
beliefs and then beliefs about beliefs. At some early stage of primate evolution this 
ordering was internalised and became module dependent. In humans this ordering was 
so successful in the social world that it was carried over or extended into ordering the 
non-social world. These modules are what eventually gave rise to language. Hence, 
our social way of thinking about the world gave rise to what we have been calling folk 
psychology.
So what has happened is that the actual domain may have changed but not the proper 
function of the domain. Gigerenzer (1998, p. 274 275) gives an example of this using 
money. Suppose there was a domain which deals in social interactions concerning 
food in a hunter-gatherer society. This domain processed information concerning 
ways to avoid being cheated, to make sure you have enough, when to reciprocate, etc.. 
In each module, cognitive, emotional, behavioural and motivational process were 
“wired” together, since success and failures of past efforts, likes and dislikes, etc. will 
also have to be calculated over by the module. (We will come to this point again in 
the conclusion when we talk about Damasio’s work.) So the proper domain may have
1 A study of why primates evolved group living in the first place can be found in Dunbar, 1988.
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been the exchange of food for survival and mutual benefit. Generations later, currency 
has been developed and the modules and cost-benefit analysis will be expanded to 
cover tokens that can be used to procure food and finally to the tokens themselves. 
Food sharing is the proper domain, while, financial calculations will be the actual 
domain.
8.12) Consciousness and Communication
However, this is a digression and the details of Dunbar’s theory are not of concern to 
the present discussion. The work is used only to show that social intelligence theories 
do make predictions which can be and have been tested. So the social intelligence 
theory seems to be here to stay. But there is also another area in which the social 
environment could be important. Barlow (1987) in The Social Function o f  
Consciousness, suggest a scenario similar to Humphrey’s but with an important 
variation. As we have seen, Humphrey gives introspection a high evolutionary value. 
His idea is that the survival benefits would be immense if a former behaviouristic 
species had developed an “inner eye” to see what its brain was doing and became 
capable projecting that introspection on to other members of the same species or other 
animals. Barlow points out that first, introspection is often wrong, and second, that 
raw qualia are actually not that raw but need layers of processing before input can be 
registered as qualia. Finally, he claims that for an individual, introspection in itself 
confers no survival value above and beyond standard behaviourism. He examines 
introspective experiences such as pain, love and “redness” to show that a direct 
experience of these has a greater survival value as compared to the introspective 
messages they deliver.
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Barlow goes on to point out that most senses of the word consciousness are dependent 
on communication of some form or the other. What is being communicated is usually 
the model of the individual’s environment, including the part of the environment that 
is made up of other individuals. So consciousness is a direct consequence o f social 
interaction. Conscious introspection is not an aid to social behaviour but is itself 
moulded by social experience. His suggestion goes back to the ideas we examined in 
the section on a child's development, for as he says,
For me at least it makes sense to suppose that the dawn of an infant’s 
consciousness comes with its early communication with it’s parents, and 
that ever afterwards the image or model o f the communicatee is a partner 
in conscious experience, (p. 367)
Barlow suggests that as such, consciousness is not a property of a single brain, but 
also involves the representation of other brains. The survival value of consciousness 
results from the particular patterns o f social behaviour it causes us to follow. (He 
points out that quite a few colour blind people do not actually know that they are 
colour blind. When talking about colour or the experience of colour, they carry on a 
conversation as normal. Many of them discover quite late in life, and with some 
surprise, that they are colour blind. Where is their knowledge of colour derived 
from?)
The infant brain builds a model of what it is interacting with, the caregiver’s brain. 
This modelling is initially for predictive purposes, the prediction being used for 
interacting and manipulating. The earlier discussion on intersubjectivity in infants
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supports this theory, we have seen that this is what children do indeed seem to do. So 
Barlow’s account sounds plausible, but I am not too sure why it needs to exclude or 
be in opposition to Humphrey’s idea of introspection. They could go hand in hand; a 
story could be developed along the lines that introspection plus social interaction has 
a greater survival value than just experience and social interaction. (Before going on, I 
would like to flag the discussion in the last two paragraphs. It will become pertinent 
again when we discuss imitation and empathy later.)
Let us go back to the point that there are certain mental states with which we can 
immediately identify. The question was asked whether knowledge of all these states 
and their connections (to, for instance, emotions) necessarily have to be built in? We 
have seen from the studies on children that some are in fact innate and need triggers 
— generally social triggers such as interaction with other human beings — to be 
activated. What about the rest, do we have to suppose that every propositional attitude 
has to be innate? How does empathy develop further in humans?
8.13) Empathy
We need to take a deeper look at empathy. We will see that empathy is connected to 
another biological phenomenon, imitation. I had briefly mentioned animal imitation 
earlier and brought up the question of how imitation can occur, pointing out that it is 
not as simple as is generally thought. Forms of animal behaviour where one animal is 
copying another, o f the same species or otherwise, cannot be dismissed as being 
merely imitation, since there is nothing “mere” about it.
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In human beings this modelling of the others behaviour — Humphrey calls it 
sympathy, but as I have mentioned earlier, empathy is a better word —  is what is 
lacking in autistic children. This is the tendency on the part of one social partner to 
identify itself with the other and to some extent make the other’s goal their own. In 
any' species, the experiences which trigger off empathy would have to be common to 
the species and the experiences would have to be usual or normal, since anything 
unusual would not have any phylogenetic importance. Yet they would have to know 
how to identify and identify with every possible feeling, emotion, belief and desire. 
(This is the feelings, not the objects of these feelings.) Would it be necessary to have 
all possible feelings or emotions to be in-built? This can be compared to the remarks 
made in connection with Millikan about standardisation of proper functions.
Paul Churchland (in Bogdan, 1991 and elsewhere) arguing against simulation theory, 
suggests that even people who have not felt a particular emotion postulated by folk 
psychology can empathise with people who have them.
People who have never felt profound grief, say, or love, or rejection, can 
nonetheless provide appropriate predictions and explanations of the 
behaviour of people so afflicted, and so on. In general, one's immediately 
available understanding of human psychology and behaviour goes 
substantially beyond what one has experienced in one's own case, either 
in real life or pointed simulations, (p. 45)
This is patently untrue, especially if we recognise the earlier mentioned difference 
between empathy and sympathy, it seems obvious that folk psychology is actually 
very bad at understanding abnormal, aberrant or irrational behaviour. For example, we 
can have sympathy for someone who has had an experience which we can
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understand, but to actually empathise with some one who has had a great loss is 
extremely difficult unless one has experienced a similar loss in their life. This is of 
course even more true in the case of mental illnesses and irrationality. Since 
commonsense is rationally intelligible anything that is not rational has historically 
needed the invention o f witches or gods as rational agencies or the attempt to find 
other causal explanations.1
When people try to relate to sick or grieving people, unless they themselves have been 
sick with the same illness or have gone through a period of grief, they do it 
behaviouristically, but they cannot empathise. This can be seen with reference to a 
point Krebs and Dawkins in the article mentioned earlier make. They use Shannon 
and Weaver’s ideas of information: Information has to stand out from the background. 
It has to be useful to be even considered information. Useful for what? In evolutionary 
terms, this means survival and reproduction. Anything that is not useful in that sense 
will not be considered information, so there would be no empathy about the feelings 
of being extremely sick or dying. There could be useful behavouristic calculations, 
since it would be useful to know if a prey was weak, but no need to feel how it feels. 
Empathising with prey would probably be counterproductive. (Humphrey makes a 
similar point.)
In (what I see as) an early study of empathy in human beings, Hoffman (1977) gives 
some biological reasons why empathy should exist, based on theories of reciprocal 
altruism and kin selection. What is interesting is that he sees empathy as providing a 
motive base for what he calls “prosocial” behaviour. Since reciprocal altruism and kin
1 Wilkes makes a similar point in Wilkes 1991, p 148.
selection are related to social intelligence at a fundamental level, Hoffman’s views are 
parallel to the present discussion. However, the article is more concerned with the 
measurement of empathy but it is interesting to note — in the context o f Churchland’s 
views —  that Hoffman mentions experimental evidence that shows that empathy in 
children is stronger if there is some kind of similarity between observer and model, (p. 
203-204.) Also interesting is that Hoffman (p. 177) quotes a definition o f empathy (by 
H.S. Sullivan), “as a form of ‘nonverbal contagion and communion’ between mother 
and infant...” which fits quite well into the above scheme.
While discussing autistic children I found it necessary to distinguish between 
sympathy and empathy and stipulated the definitions and difference. I said that 
empathy is the ability or act of mentally identifying oneself with another. On the other 
hand, sympathy was defined as understanding what the other is going through, 
especially distress. The distinction between the two is difficult to make, but this is a 
difficulty noted by most researchers in the field. For example, the volume Empathy 
and its Development (Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987) has a discussion on the problems 
inherent in defining empathy and differentiating it from sympathy, with no real 
consensus emerging. Most of the contributors to the volume define it to suit their 
research purposes. However, the editors’ definition of sympathy and empathy (p. 3-8) 
is similar to mine, where empathy is dependent on “sharing the perceived emotion of 
the other” and is a “vicarious affective reaction.” Sympathy is a consequence of 
empathy and the assumed similarity between one’s own and the other’s feeling. Other 
authors also use phrases like “affective contagion” or “resonant emotion” while 
describing empathy, which gets the sense of empathy across quite well.
A point that most of the contributors to the volume make is that there is an element o f 
“as i f ’ in empathy. That is, there is an acknowledgement of separation, however 
small, between the “I” and the other. We have already seen in child development 
studies that from birth the infant is aware that there is a world out there, and some of 
the constituents of that world are living. The next stage for it is to figure out how 
similar to it those living parts of the world are. This can be better understood by 
noting that there is a cognitive and affective component to empathy. Before the advent 
of modem child development studies, the earlier view of empathy —  which fitted in 
with Piagetian theories — saw the cognitive component as being primary. It was 
thought that empathy needed the development of certain cognitive capacities, such as 
person permanence and the ability to recognise the other as separate from oneself 
before it could be manifested in children. This cognitive-developmental view does not 
seem to be accepted any more and the shift from the traditional view was caused by 
these development studies. To reiterate, these studies showed the child as 
knowledgeable about itself and its place in the world: infants are bom with an 
understanding of the other, living and non living entities, and agency, among other 
things. We also know that infants are active participants in interactions with other 
humans; they are highly motivated and responsive social partners from an early age 
and are not indifferent to the emotions of others. These studies showed that empathy 
was possible before more advanced cognitive faculties were in place.1
1 See Thompson (1987) for a discussion of this and an explanation o f the move away from the seeing 
the infant as altricial.
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8.14) Imitation
If the affective element in empathy is so fundamental or basic that very young babies 
already possess it, are there modules or primitive precursors to empathy? This is 
where imitation provides an answer. We have noted that imitation is not as simple as 
it seems. One way to look at imitation is to see it in terms of motor mimicry, 
especially in the case o f same-species imitation. As the title o f their article suggests, 
Bavelas, Black, Lemery and Mullett (1987) in Motor Mimicry as Primitive Empathy 
claim that the sort o f postural imitation that humans do is a very basic form of 
empathy. Motor mimicry is a very common and easily observed phenomenon: infants 
and their caregivers mimic each other and as adults we all continue to mimic; ranging 
from cases where a mother opens her mouth while bringing a spoon to her child’s lips 
or a person wincing when someone else feels pain. Generally, the acts that induce 
motor mimicry in humans are those that involve strong emotions or feelings like pain 
or those involving a great effort.
fhe writers define motor mimicry (p. 324) as a reaction by an observer that has four 
facets: It is similar to one made by the other person, it is one that the other person 
might make in his or her situation, but not what the observer would do as an observer. 
And, of course, it is relevant to the situation and voluntary. (Voluntary does not 
necessarily mean consciously, but more that voluntary muscles and control are 
involved and also that it can be stifled if necessary.) As the writers point out, the 
traditional theories o f such behaviour suggest that motor mimicry is an indication of 
the internal state of the observer. But their research shows that this may not, in fact, 
be true. Motor mimicry is not expressive of any internal state but is expressive to the
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other person in the situation: it is fundamentally communicative in nature. As they put 
it, “ ...it is nonverbal communication intended to convey ‘fellow feeling’ to the other 
person.” (p. 325) (When motor mimicry takes place, there is always another person. 
Or at least, the other, as when we show this kind of response to the TV or internal 
dialogues.)
At an early stage it could be just showing similarity, and the recognition that “I am 
like you” and “I know when you are acting like me”: Brunner and Feldman (1993, p. 
268-269) show that infants react more positively to someone who is imitating them 
compared to some one who is acting randomly. This is true even if the random action 
is coherent, for example, an imitation o f another child. How do the children know 
they are being imitated? Infants can recognise a correspondence between their actions 
and expression and someone else’s.
The Bavelas, et al, article is a description of experiments done to confirm this 
communicative act view. It is interesting to note — in the light of our earlier 
examination of the role of the eyes in developing a theory of mind —  that they find 
eye contact to be important in motor mimicry, inasmuch as motor mimicry is stronger 
if  there is eye contact. An important element of motor mimicry that showed up in their 
experiments is that, as in empathy, in this putting of oneself in the other’s shoes, there 
is still the differentiation between the observer and the observed. For example, in the 
case of motor mimicry which would result in observed person leaning to the left, the 
observer facing him or her should lean to his or her left. Instead the person leans in 
the same side as the sufferer. This means that the element o f separation is present; it is 
not as if  the person who reacts is saying, “I am you,” but more a case o f showing
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similarity to the other person. As Bavelas, Black, Lemery and Mullett put it, (p. 332) 
“We propose that this happens because motor mimicry conveys a message of vital 
importance to our relationship with others: I can feel as you do; I am like you.”
Their findings lead them to say: “Thus these results cannot support the theory that 
intrapersonal processes lead to motor mimicry which then has a secondary or 
incidental function. The form of the behaviour suggests that communication is its 
primary or original function.” (p. 330) (Which is why they call it “analogically coded 
nonverbal communication”.) They also add that, “It is important not to confuse our 
theory with a ‘behaviourism’ that denies the existence o f processes that cannot be 
observed. We simply propose that the overt reaction occurs in parallel to any 
interpersonal reaction rather than serially, which is the usual model.” (p. 331)
This means that motor mimicry is social act that requires understanding of the 
separation as well as an understanding that “I am like the other”. (I am not speaking 
of understanding as in a reasoned or cognitive understanding, so perhaps a better 
expression would be implicit knowledge.) These researchers say that humans are 
primed for this immediate non-cognitive communication, there is no wait for the full 
comprehension of the other’s situation. There may be a more cognitive 
comprehension of the other’s feelings and situation later, but at its earliest stage it is 
an innate response. This immediate identification is what I have been calling empathy.
But of what use is it? Thompson (1987) (foot note, page 142) makes the point that if 
empathy is the outcome of natural selection, its function has to be studied from three 
different standpoints; 1) the multiple possible functions of empathy, for example, as a
motivator of altruism, in parental and care-giving behaviour, in mate selection. 2) the 
targets o f empathy; is it aimed at biologically related kin, the species and even 
familiar members of the same species, all members of the same species, all similar 
species, etc.. 3) the situation in which empathy can be aroused and the environmental 
demands satisfied by arousing empathy. One function which would satisfy demands 
from all three standpoints is that motor mimicry and empathy is a communication to 
set up channels of communications, to instantiate the similarity assumption. For 
example, Bavelas, Black, Lemery and Mullett use the work of Trevarthan who 
suggests that the earliest lines of mother-infant communication at its preverbal 
earliest stages is there to establish the process of communication. In itself, it is content 
free. This can be seen in research that shows that infants smile at eyes, no matter what 
their actual feelings or moods are at that moment, (p. 336)
Bavelas, et al, also question the traditional view that non-verbal behaviour is an 
unimportant part o f the mind, something that becomes redundant once true language 
based communication takes place. Motor mimicry is a form of interactional 
communication and expresses precise information to others. What is most pertinent 
for the present discussion is that earlier theories would say that intrapersonal 
processes are primary and that social behaviour is secondary, that there are two stages 
to this postulated process, first you feel and then you show how you feel. However 
these researchers show that this theory is not supported by empirical evidence. They 
do this by the simple experiment o f timing how long the motor mimicry reactions 
took. A two-stage reaction would take longer than a single stage one and the times 
they obtained were what would be expected if there was a single step process.
There is strong neurophysiological evidence for this link between motor mimicry and 
empathy. An earlier study by Brothers (1989), claims that empathy (Or as he calls it, 
“social emotional communication”.) is based on face-selective neurons and the 
amygdala with the suggestion that there may be neurons which code for a higher level 
feature than just the static face, that of facial expression. There seem to be neurons 
already able to respond to yawns and only yawns, so it does seem to be a possibility, 
(p. 15) Also, he claims that the amygdala, a cluster of neurons lying deep in the medial 
temporal lobes — which is a component of the limbic system important in 
organism/environment interaction — as one of the neural substrates for empathy.
But there is more recent evidence: In an article entitled Mind-reading in the Wave o f  a 
Hand  in the Sunday Telegraph of June 14, 1998, (p.21) Jerome Bume reports on a 
neurology conference. One of the papers delivered showed that there are cells in the 
brain of monkeys that control physical activities and these cells fire when the animal 
performs some physical movement. However in the same neural area there is a sub­
unit that fires when someone else does something. These neurons, which they have 
dubbed “mirror neurons”, help the monkey feel what it feels like for someone else to 
do something. One researcher, Vittorio Gallese of the University o f Parma said: 
“Mirror neurons let me feel what you could be feeling when you do the same thing 
first.”. It can be seen that this is also an explanation of the earlier mentioned problem 
of animal imitation. (It is interesting to note that these researchers felt that these 
mirror neurons are not functioning properly in autistic children.1)
1 But the connection between inability to imitate and autism has long been suspected: See Meltzoff and 
Gopnik (1993).
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Gallese and his colleagues explain that mirror neurons, in order to be visually 
triggered, require an interaction between the agent of the action and the object of it. 
The sight of the agent alone or of the object alone are ineffective. Their conclusion is 
that mirror neurons form a system for matching observation and execution o f motor 
actions. They also suggest that such an observation/execution matching system 
provides a necessary bridge from doing to communicating, as the link between actor 
and observer becomes a link between the sender and the receiver o f each message. 
Since the region in which the neurons were found in monkeys is homologous to 
Broca's region in the human brain they say that a similar system could be found in 
humans and is a possible precursor to language development.1
Is empathy unique to humans and primates? Plutchick (1987) in The Evolutionary 
Basis o f  Empathy suggests that empathy is a widespread phenomenon and many 
behavioural patterns show this, such as schooling in fish or herding in mammals, and 
the mobbing behaviour o f birds. From looking at other species and trying to 
understand how and why empathy arose during evolution, his suggestion is that it is 
an efficient form of affective communication. One primary reason he gives for 
empathy being common among animal species is that it ensures other forms of 
communications work the first time they are used.
Another reason that empathy is common among other species is that it could 
immediately give rise to altruism. Zahn-Waxier, Hollenbeck and Radke-Yarrow
1 Gallese’s conference abstract can be found in Gallese (1998) Also see: Rizzolatti, (1998) What 
Happened to Homo habilis? for a description o f the activity of these neurons and the suggestion that 
mirror neurons were in some way precursors of language in early man. Further details can be found in 
Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) and Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi and Rizzolatti (1996) who describe the 
properties o f these newly discovered mirror neurons.
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(1984) in The Origins o f  Empathy and Altruism, show the connection between 
altruism and empathy and go on to add “[AJltruism is a biological given, ‘wired’ and 
ready for expression given sufficient, physical cognitive and emotional growth.” (p. 
29)
There is one final point I need to make here. This point can perhaps best be made by a 
quote from one of the contributors to the Eisenberg and Strayer volume on empathy 
mentioned above, Lauren Wispe (1987). Though the article, A History o f  the Concept 
o f Empathy, is an historical look, Wispe has this to say about empathy:
This innate capacity enables one person to perceive the existence of 
another person. This is the capacity by which one person obtains 
knowledge of the subjective side of another person. Just as my sense tells 
me who I  am, this capacity allows me to learn about the difference in the 
“foreign” other. I know that I am not he, because my experience of him is 
different from my experience of me. (p. 34)
8.15) The Function of the Mind
This discussion on imitation and empathy may have seemed tangential to our 
discussion of the function of the mind. However, this is not so. Let us, in a few 
sentences, sum up what this last section has shown. There are very simple biological 
mechanisms in animals which insure that an organism is capable of understanding the 
difference between itself and others. More important this mechanism also insures that 
the organism sees the similarities between itself and other members o f the species. 
These mechanisms work on postural signals but do not stop there, they go on to
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emotional signals too. This allows the organism to relate to others in terms of “I am 
like them, I can feel what they feel.” In human beings this recognition o f similarities 
and differences is the foundation on which all interpersonal interaction takes place. 
We have seen that this interaction leads to us having a folk psychology.
Notice that this fits in quite well with the theories o f consciousness developed by 
Barlow and Humphrey mentioned earlier. Humphrey felt that the need to differentiate 
between the experience o f “me” and the experience of “the other” could be important 
in the development, in evolutionary terms, of awareness or consciousness. Barlow 
claimed that consciousness is generally dependent on communication o f some form or 
other, and that an infant’s consciousness comes from its early communication with its 
caregivers. The model o f the “other” is a partner in conscious experience, and 
consciousness needs the representations of other brains. The survival value of 
empathy — as with consciousness, according to Barlow —  results from the social 
behaviour it gives rise to. We have seen that empathy is the simplest form of 
communication and a way to bridge the gap between one organism and another. This 
is o f course a very “basic form” of empathy. What we need to see is if  there are ways 
in which it could develop further and become more “cognitive”.
Humphrey, in his original article in Consciousness Regained, suggested three factors 
by which an individual could grow into a natural psychologist: the first is play, as in 
pretence play. Quite often the point o f children’s play seems to be in fact to 
experience the feelings without putting the child in situations which could be 
dangerous to the child. There is also another form of pretence play which is universal. 
In all cultures children seem to play with dolls or figures, attributing human emotions
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to them and putting them into situations which would result in the appropriate 
emotions being felt in the doll and hence by the child playing with them. Adults do 
something similar: When describing emotions which the other person has possibly not 
felt, we try to put them in the same situation by describing it graphically. If  that 
doesn’t work, because we feel that the feelings were too strong, or we want to 
emphasise the uniqueness of what we went through, we know that the best way to get 
someone else to feel what we feel is to describe a situation where they are forced to 
experience what we felt. It does not have to be the same situation, but something they 
may find easier to identify with: “It was as i f ....”
Then there is parental manipulation. Apart from the manipulation which takes place 
as shown earlier, Humphrey also suggests that initiation rites, which are found in most 
cultures also allow the child to experience things like extreme pain, and learn about 
things like bravery and courage, dependence on others, friendship, all under adult 
supervision so the child doesn’t actually hurt itself seriously. All social animals have a 
period of immaturity in which they are looked after by older members of the group, a 
childhood in which they interact with others their own age as well as adults. They are 
given a certain leeway and do not have the same constraints adults do; they are 
tolerated for breaking rules and perhaps gently chided. They play and pretend, that is, 
they indulge in adult behaviour without any of the consequences. They can fight with 
each other and use bits o f food caught earlier by adults as toy prey. They can 
experience the full gamut of adult feelings so that they can identify these feelings and 
identify with them. During the same period they are being manipulated by adults, 
from simple things like being pushed out o f the home to explore their environment, to 
more complex situations where they are dragged along for a hunt but kept out o f the
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real fray. They are put in situations where they have to cross boundaries and are 
punished when they do. This way they come to accumulate knowledge o f the feelings 
or emotions associated with each activity and can claim it as their own and attribute it 
to o thers.1
I think we have achieved what this thesis set out to do; we have seen that folk 
psychology has a function and that its function is the reason for its existence in us. In 
Chapter Five we saw that all human beings have some knowledge o f folk 
psychological concepts and their use. To review the last two chapters, the way we 
arrived at the function o f folk psychology was in the following way. From studies o f 
very young infants, we saw that some folk psychological concepts, such as agency, 
are innate. Others develop sequentially from childhood according to a developmental 
plan that is nearly uniform. Though the initial module is “built-in” the later stages 
need triggers during critical periods to allow them to start working. These triggers are 
human interactions, like eye contact and other two way manipulations, between the 
caregiver (and others) and the infant which results in an escalation o f communicative 
manipulation. The child under four years of age is using a basic version of folk 
psychology, where only the beliefs of the attributer exist and are attributed to the 
other.
Further, we have seen the reasons why we should have this skill by looking at other 
species. We have seen the evolutionary reasons, or the adaptive problems, the solving 
o f which resulted in us having this system. We have seen that the precursor to 
empathy was developed during evolution as a way to make relatively fast calculations
1 The third factor Humphrey suggests is dreaming, but this is outside the scope of this discussion.
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about another animal’s behaviour. Because of the evolutionary advantage it gave to 
the species it become “internalised” or innate and there is evidence that animals closer 
to us in evolutionary terms also have simple versions of this system. The causal 
effectiveness of this folk psychology is intersubjective and designed to be used in the 
case o f the animals’ relations to the world and external relationships such as goals, 
objects o f attention o f the other person or gaze, behaviour, etc. The reason these 
animals have this ability to empathise with others is to maintain social systems at a 
level of complexity not seen elsewhere among animals.
As further evidence we have seen that those human beings who, for whatever reasons, 
lack this system as children, do not generally grow up to be empathic human beings, 
but into more “behaviouristic” beings. These children seem to be incapable of 
interacting with their parents or others of their own age in the normal way nor engage 
in any sort of play, and especially pretend play. Pretend play and other children’s 
games seem to help us to develop the full range of human feelings and emotions apart 
from the basic beliefs and desires. These beliefs, desires, feelings and emotions are 
what we identified earlier as being the mind, or at least, one part o f the mind. So the 
function of this part o f the mind is to allow us to empathise and interact with others, 
order and categorise the world in order that this interaction can take place. Briefly, the 
function of the mind is what I would call socialisation.
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Chapter 9 
Implications
Having seen how and why we have folk psychology, we have completed what we set 
out to do. Let me reiterate what has been achieved. First, I will briefly sum up the 
research programme of this thesis.
We set out to see if  there was a way to examine psychotherapeutic practices to see if 
they were valid. One possible way to do this would have been to study each modality 
or practice and examine it to see if it meets present day scientific criteria, whatever 
they may be. However, we took another route, one which serves the same purpose. 
The aim of this thesis was to attempt to search for a model or framework against 
which psychotherapeutic theories and practices could be measured. To insure that this 
model was compatible with current scientific thought, it was stipulated that we were 
going to use a biological framework for the discussion, and therefore base the whole 
exercise on evolutionary theory.
In the search for this framework we first looked at the practice of psychotherapy to 
see what kind of framework would be of the most use. The best framework would be 
to try and fit psychotherapy into the medical model, the standard model used in 
medicine today. But we saw that there were problems inherent in applying this model 
to discussions of mental health problems, and these were not just problems of its 
application to mental health, but problems for physical medicine too. Yet we have to 
acknowledge that the medical model is successful, in as much as it is the best we have
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to date. To keep it we had to see what the peculiarities o f its application to mental 
health were and these we examined this by use of the computer analogy.
This discussion led us to the conclusion that knowing the function o f something is the 
only criterion we have for saying that it is functioning properly or not. We had earlier 
come to a similar conclusion; that the problems of defining mental illness could be 
reduced by knowing the function of the mind, so the computer analogy reinforced this 
conclusion.
The next step we took was to develop an understanding of what the mind was so that 
we could proceed to examine its function. This was done by following a standard 
philosophical route, a route which also led us to see if there was a notion of function 
that could be applied to biological entities in general and the mind in particular. The 
word mind is generally used for a whole raft o f capacities so we were very particular 
in specifying what we meant by mind. This was not the senses, thinking or logic or 
just generally intelligence or vague notions of thought. We used the idea of 
intentionality, which has generally been seen as identifying the problematic “part” of 
the mind, the part that cannot be reduced to neurons, biochemistry or physiology.
The philosophical understanding of intentionality focused on representations, content, 
and the relationship between them and mental states. While looking at what we mean 
by the mind, we saw that the ability to have beliefs and desires —  among other 
propositional attitudes — is what gives rise to folk psychology with its second-order 
intentionality. This is the commonly or generally understood idea of the mind, usually 
used in the practice o f attributing minds to others. Folk psychology is then a system
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which has both an ontological as well as a causal aspect. The ontological aspect gives 
us a list of entities, mental content, states as well as processes which we accept as 
mental and differentiate from the non-mental, allowing us to draw a line between 
thoughts, inner experiences and objects, and behaviour. The causal aspect relates 
these entities to action and gives us reasons for behaviour.
Following this route further we saw that there was indeed a functional way to 
understand the mind, which made clearer the connection between our beliefs, desires 
and the environment, especially the historical or evolutionary interaction between the 
two. What we used was a naturalistic idea of function. Using this we saw that the 
function of beliefs was to be present (and represent) when the environment was in a 
certain way, the relation between the beliefs and the environment being historical, that 
is, what worked in enough cases to cause the possessor of those beliefs to survive and 
proliferate.
This was not enough to give us an idea o f the mind and its function. What was further 
needed was understanding o f how we make use of those beliefs to form beliefs about 
beliefs, or how and why we have second order intentionality. This is what makes our 
minds uniquely the minds of human beings.
So the next step was to search for the function of the human mind, by seeing what it 
was historically supposed to do. The empirical evidence came from two sources, the 
first was child development studies. The second source was ethological studies of 
animals related to us, as well as some research done on the evolution of man. These
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two roads were convergent and together, they allowed us to study the mind 
ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically.
From child development studies we saw that the ability to have beliefs and know 
about them, develops over time from birth. Precursors of this ability, such as shared 
attention mechanisms, are module based. What allows the development of folk 
psychology are these modules and the interactions of the child with other people and 
the environment. Without these modules the child does not develop a full mental 
state. Without this fully “minded” state, we would be behaviourists instead of 
mentalists; perhaps using conditioning, manipulating and arranging stimuli and 
responses rather than manipulating and using beliefs and desires as we normally do.
The ethological and evolutionary studies showed why having a folk psychology could 
be important, that is, why certain animals seem to have it, or at least basic forms of it. 
This ability arose because of the social complexity of life among primates. In primate 
society the development of ever-increasing subtlety and sensitivity in detecting social 
signals, Ld to the internalisation of ever increasing skills of prediction. The ability to 
have beliefs about beliefs developed because of the need to understand what was 
going on in the mind of other members of the group, so that this knowledge could be 
used in planning action. In humans, the suggestion was that because this form of 
predicting the behaviour of others and making use of these predictions was so useful, 
it could have led to using this skill to organise the rest o f the world. So folk 
psychology is a way to organise the world, by forming beliefs about the input from 
perceptual processes and process in the mind. It may be that the autistic child's
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obsessive interest in odd facts and repetitive movements may be a failed attempt to 
organise the world in this fashion.
We also saw that the whole edifice of social intelligence, which gives rise to folk 
psychology, is built upon empathy. Basic forms of empathy, or perhaps precursors to 
empathy, can be seen in the ability to imitate. This was also seen in the child 
development studies where, the first form of infant-adult interactions were shown to 
be imitative in nature. Imitation is not only postural but also emotional, possibly 
because most basic emotions are postural in nature. We can say that there are forms of 
perception in which perceiving a body is to perceive aspects of mind, knowing what 
kind of a thing the other is, and the relationship of that thing to us. These interpersonal 
relationships are empathetic and affective. Infants have biological innate capacities 
for direct perceptions of the bodily-expressed attitudes of others and this is needed for 
intersubjective understanding and relationships. This is what empathy is. Empathy 
determines the nature of the transactions that occur between people, leading to 
intersubjecitvity, which then leads to the development of the mind. Along the way I 
have also suggested that consciousness itself is transactional, at least initially.
So following these two lines of evidence we can say that the function of the mind is to 
allow us to categorise the environment in biologically useful ways and use that 
categorisation to aid survival. The most prominent part of environment to which this 
categorisation applies is the social environment, consisting of comembers o f the 
species. So this evolutionary theory suggests a function for the mind consistent with 
present day research.
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The emphasis throughout has been to show that the mind and its precursors are 
biological in nature, either by showing that the building blocks of various mental 
structures are simple “stupid” entities or by showing that there are plausible 
evolutionary reasons for the existence o f a particular trait. For example, a seemingly 
intellectual human act, empathy, can be seen to be based on neurons that specialise in 
imitation.
9.1) The Use of This Model
Having this precis before us, we can now ask if this theory —  of what the mind is and 
how it comes to be that way — is useful to the examination of psychotherapy. Let us 
go back to our original problem, that o f validating psychotherapy. As pointed out 
earlier, we could have gone backwards, so to speak, in that we could have taken a 
particular modality and seen whether or not it fits into evolutionary theory. Instead we 
decided to go forwards and see if evolutionary theory and its implications could in 
itself develop some sort of theory of mind that could be used to base a psychotherapy 
on. The answer is yes, we do now have a function for the mind, we know what the 
mind is supposed to do and how it does it.
However, a note of warning should perhaps be inserted here. This concerns the very 
real fear o f the use, or more correctly, the misuse, of the notion of the function of the 
mind.
Our aim was to validate the medicalisation of mental illness (section 1.3, Page. 20) so 
the objective was to show that there can be a continuity with the rest of medicine.
There will be problems with the use (or misuse) o f any understanding of mental 
functions, just as there are with any other field of medicine. Though this thesis rests 
on the medical model, no claim is being made here that biological or medical 
knowledge is always used in some positive way. The classic example is the use of 
genetics in eugenics. An understanding of how genes work and what they do does not 
necessarily imply that eugenics is “right”.
Addressing such use or misuse is not within the scope o f the present thesis since 
judgments of that nature are made in relation to the political and moral mores of the 
time. The general point can be made by using the examples of eating and 
reproduction. Eating has the function of ingesting food for the purpose o f providing 
material for fuel as well as building and repairing the body. There are certain 
substances which we need to keep the body operating properly The way evolution 
seems to have worked is that in this respect it made some substances pleasurable 
while others were not. However, our present day eating habits are not constrained by 
these biological necessities. We regularly eat food that tastes bad, (“ .. .it’s an acquired 
taste!”) food that could be considered poisonous (alcohol for instance) and we eat 
quantities that are larger than are strictly required for our wellbeing. The normative 
force that comes from understanding human dietary requirements is rarely used. Only 
in extreme cases, let’s say if there is a war or a famine and food has to be rationed, 
will decisions be taken about what food stuffs are needed and in what quantities. 
Another case would be if a person is sick or perhaps incapable of feeding themselves. 
This knowledge of dietary requirements could be misused, for example in the 
situation where people need to be just kept alive (prison camps, for example); they 
can be fed the bare minimum. There are also examples which are not so extreme;
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athletes over-eating a particular food group to levels which may be dangerous to 
ordinary people, but still based on dietary rules.
A similar scenario can be built around the biological function o f sexual intercourse. It 
is primarily for reproduction but this does not mean that on every occasion sex should 
result in pregnancy. We can decide to go completely against a biological function; 
contraceptive methods are developed thanks to an understanding of reproduction and 
reproductive systems. However, when problematic situations arise, such as cases of 
infertility, it is knowledge of the reproductive function that is going to be o f use. 
Again the information we have of reproduction is not going to be the foundation on 
which we decide questions of (for example) what kind of people are allowed to have 
children, whether one should be allowed to chose the sex of one’s child, or further 
afield, whether abortion of disabled fetuses should be allowed, etc.
Note that in both cases, the biological function has not changed: Sex is still for 
reproduction and eating food is still for nutrition. There is a normativeness in these 
cases that comes from biology but, unless one subscribes to some version of the 
“naturalistic fallacy”, it cannot be a guiding “force” in these cases. However, this does 
not mean that we swing the other way. Because, as is seen in both the above cases, 
biological understanding gives us a place to stand while we take decisions, decisions 
which will probably be based on the moral, social or political climate in which we 
live.
The point was to validate the working methods of psychotherapy by providing a 
framework, not prescribe moral codes for psychotherapists, which we saw in Chapters
3 and 4 were outside the discussion of mental health. As applied to the mind and 
behavior, a point to note in this respect is that the understanding of the function of the 
mental, rule out that there are going to be hard and fast rules about what constitutes 
normal behavior. Normal behavior is to be understood in relation to the environment 
which will be, among other things, the social environment. What we have is the 
knowledge that we have beliefs and belief formation mechanisms for a particular 
reason. If  these mechanisms go wrong, we can call it malfunction and then go on to 
call it (if social practices deem it necessary) a disease. But as to whether or not it 
should be treated is another question. The question of what the overall aim of 
medicine is, remains to be answered.
That being said, can the model o f the mind developed here be used by 
psychotherapists to evaluate their methodology? Of course, but this is trivially true in 
two ways: first, mental illness involves memory, perception, beliefs, desires, emotions 
and reasoning and anything that tells us more about these processes is obviously 
going to be useful to the study of mental illnesses; and second, because we have 
identified the function of the mind, loss of this function can immediately be said to be 
dysfunction and identified or recognised as a mental illness.
But before I can claim that our task is finished I must make that statement found in 
most research papers, “More research needs to be done.” This is not just an attempt at 
humility but a way to show exactly what the value of the model we have built is. 
There are two primary methodological reasons why it cannot be claimed that this is 
the final word. These two reasons are typical o f any rapidly progressing science.
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1) Further empirical evidence may give rise to other theories, proving some theories 
wrong, and this will have positive or negative implications for the present model.
2) The philosophical framework could change, calling into question the meaning or 
interpretation of the data.
Obviously, 1) and 2) are intertwined. An example o f this is the effect that changing 
theories could have on some of the initial assumptions that underpin this thesis. One 
of these was rigorous adherence to adaptationism and individual units of selection. 
The group selection view, long out o f favour, could be found to be more pertinent to 
human evolution.1 In this case we can see that social structures would be directly 
influenced by group selection and this would probably have serious implications for 
the evolutionary story told in this thesis. At a slightly later stage, our use of Millikan’s 
theory o f function was itself dependent on adaptationism, but Millikan’s theory itself 
could be found to be wanting.2 Then again, the philosophical understanding of the 
mind we adopted in Chapter Five —  based as it was on the relationship between mind 
and representation —  is one such understanding; there are others. Obviously, using 
another version would result in having to develop another account.
The second section of this discussion has been based on the social or Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis. This is still a hypothesis and there are important criticisms of 
this view. See for example, Heyes, (1998) where she questions the methodology as 
well as the validity of attributing a theory of mind to primates from the data already
1 See Wilson and Sober, (1994) Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioural Sciences.
2 Allen, Bekoff, and Lauder (1998) present recent critical discussions on theories of function.
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collected. She claims that it is the wrong use of the “parsimony” argument that results 
in the attribution, especially since most o f it is from evidence that is far too anecdotal. 
The peer commentary following her article seems to be quite angry about her claims, 
though, o f course, this says nothing about the validity of the theory. A recent appraisal 
of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis and work done since it was first put 
forward can be found in Whiten and Byrne (1997). It is especially interesting since 
these are the writers who originated the phrase.
More empirical findings could show that the tool use theory which we examined and 
dismissed could perhaps be right. Tool use also depends on cognitive hierarchical 
structures and there is some connection in the localisation of this process with Broca’s 
area, which itself is concerned with language.1 Further, some of the research on mirror 
neurons shows that there does seem to be some neurological connection between 
grasping, mouth movements, phonetic structure and language. As far as developing a 
mind is concerned, the implications of this could have ramifications for the theory 
discussed in the present work.
However, there is something more than just the fact that the theories on which this 
model is based can be refuted. Why is the model presented here different from other 
theories o f psychotherapy which may or may not claim to be based on evolutionary 
theory? This is another reason why further work needs to be done. Looking at this will 
show us what we have accomplished.
1 See Greenfield (1991) Language, Tools and the Brain
281
The model presented here works at a more “fundamental” level. It provides an answer 
to why we have beliefs in the first place, rather than postulating reasons why belief 
systems can go wrong. It further goes on to show how these belief-forming 
mechanisms develop. We have seen the beginnings o f how a person is constructed by 
biological programs. But beyond this we need to see how exactly a person develops, 
for example, a personality, what makes Jill, Jill, and not Joan.
Psychotherapists need to understand individual behaviour and know the extent of 
individual flexibility, they need to know about the biological and environmental 
forces that influence stability and change. We know that the modular structures we 
have discussed, the neural connections that evolve in the brain from birth, are made in 
complex causal chains dependent on genetic material, biochemical processes in the 
brain as well as the body, and interactions and micro-interactions between the 
organism and the environment, unique for each individual. It is not likely that we can 
know these for each individual from birth to adulthood. Since so much more goes into 
the making of a person than just those processes discussed in the present thesis, do we 
need to say that our attempt has failed?
Not at all. In terms of psychotherapy, if  nothing else, we could use this model to 
devise a procedure for distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information. 
Our evolutionary theory has given us a method for weighing data. This indicates the 
direction further research should take, it provides a research strategy. We can now ask 
what kind of investigations can be done, in the light o f this framework. We can 
question the appropriateness or suitability of investigative strategies. And I feel this is 
the most important accomplishment of a work such as the present thesis. There is no
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denying that there is still a need to bridge the gap, the discontinuity pointed out above, 
but the bridging methodology itself can be based on a model such as this.
9.2) The Shape of Further Research
I will explain this by using a grossly generalised and negative caricature of 
psychotherapeutic practice. Most psychotherapeutic theorie: and practices seem to be 
based on what could be called “superstructures”. What is studied is the psychological 
problems caused by the “wrong” environment: for example, the problems caused by 
growing up in a dysfunctional family. Further, there is usually a need to constantly 
postulate “drives” and psychological “needs”. And these are difficult to accept or 
refute since there is usually very little empirical evidence from outside that particular 
therapeutic field. The method all psychotherapeutic theories use is extrapolation from 
present symptoms to normal development during infancy. That is, they are 
retrospective in nature.
The difference with our work is that while such theories start with a mental health 
problem and make hypotheses about events and processes which are thought to have 
contributed to its development, the research strategy suggested by the model 
presented here starts with environment/infant interaction, the environment consisting 
of, among other things, other humans, and then goes on from there. This means that 
the research strategy from now on can be “horizontal” rather than “vertical”. (I have 
taken the words from Flannagan (1984), the chapter criticising early sociobiology, 
since they seem an apt description of the situation.) We have no need to isolate social 
practices from their context, since the social context itself can be seen in an
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evolutionary light. Human behaviour is embedded horizontally in complex social 
systems and these social practices can be seen to arise from the basic belief 
mechanisms in which they are embedded, taking into account all the relevant 
pressures, noting which are adaptive or functional in the first place in the light or our 
knowledge of their naturally occurring contexts.
There have been some attempts to develop psychotherapeutic theories from a 
biological framework. The most noticeable is the work of Bowlby. We have seen that 
his work was based on attachment behaviour, studied using ethological techniques 
and using these theories to build up a psychological theory of dysfunction. (Section 
2.0) For example, Bowlby showed that psychologists — especially psychoanalysts — 
had got it the wrong way around when they claimed that the child first had a symbolic 
conception of reality which only later, during the journey to adulthood, was slowly 
and carefully dismantled so that reality could take over. Neurosis resulted if the 
dismantling and replacement was not thorough. We have seen that infants are bom 
with some knowledge of the world as it is, and are able to relate and interact with the 
environment practically from birth. However, it seems that Bowlby was caught in the 
paradigm of his time and felt the need to subsume his theories into a psychoanalytic 
framework, the prevailing psychotherapeutic theory of that period.1
This often is the case: workers in a particular modality use whatever they can find in 
biology to support their own theories. For example, Sutherland (1993) tries to squeeze 
evolutionary theory into the service of psychoanalytic theory by showing how the
1 See the work of Garelli (1999) which presents a unique insight how Bowlby’s ethological theory —  
based on empirical studies of human infant development as well as animals —  was later modified to 
conform to object-relations theory, possibly making it worthless as a therapeutic tool.
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work o f influential early researchers in the field can find some sort of evidence in 
evolution. Unfortunately, this is paradigmatic of the working backwards method, and 
his paper seems to fit the above caricature quite well. The attempt to carefully pick 
and choose what is supportive and ignore what does not is painfully obvious.
Another example is this quote from Jeremy Holmes (1994): “The story o f evolution is 
a paradigm which underlies the entire science of biology. Psychodynamic ideas are, or 
should be, no less “biological" then biochemical theories. Neo-Darwinism can be 
applied to psychotherapy in interesting and illuminating ways.” One example he 
gives: “The ‘Oedipal’ child is entering the world familiar to biologists — of deceit 
and camouflage in which the ability to ‘read’ other’s intentions and to experience 
guilt and pain when one is thwarted, are essential to survival.” (p. 49). But here is a 
case of someone trying to fit a superstructure on to a foundation. In the context of 
what we have seen; do we really learn anything more by using terms such as 
“Oedipal”?
It seems as if most forms of psychotherapy, which work from the viewpoint that they 
are primarily a therapy with their own theory of the mind, demand that research has to 
come from within that theory. However, in our case we took a biological approach 
and observation of the natural world gave rise to the model. Integrating ethology and 
evolutionary psychology, has given us a general theory of mind, behaviour, and 
beliefs. During the Pleistocene, the human environment of evolutionary adaptiveness, 
we evolved some behavioural patterns that helped us survive. These are still with us, 
relatively unchanged.
Perhaps the simplest way to proceed would be to see how folk psychology and 
empathy are treated in each modality. It may be that some can be dismissed 
immediately if they do not treat these as an integral part of the mind. But this would 
again take us down the path we rejected at an early stage, that o f examining each 
modality. It again places us in a position o f examining the superstructures to see if the 
foundations are firm. If  this is indeed the direction to be taken, perhaps a way forward 
could be to use something like the work of Irving Goffinan, (1959, 1963) and show 
how empathetically, we recognise the mentally ill through their lack of conformation 
to social standards. We might then be able to see what the biological basis for these 
standards are.
On the other hand, in rejecting this approach, we do not have to go to the other 
extreme either, like for example, Neubauer and Neubauer (1990) who, in Nature’s 
Thumbprint, continually emphasise that there is a genetic element in personality that 
is as, if  not more, important than the environmental factors. However, it must be said 
that they do make a valid point when they argue that, as far a psychotherapy is 
concerned, it looks as if the environment has taken all the blame and occasionally aii 
the credit, for anything that can be said about a person’s mental make-up. Others have 
seen psychopathology in terms of evolutionary game theoretical strategies.1 This is an 
example of an attempt to think in evolutionary terms but it does not form a complete 
picture. It may be a valid hypothesis statistically, but individual behaviour, and hence 
psychotherapeutic practice, is still beyond its reach.
'For example, Mealy, (1995) The Sociobiology o f  Sociopathy: An Integrated Evolutionary Model.
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It is somewhat paradoxical that our acknowledgement o f domains has resulted in us 
moving away from such atomisation into a more interactionist view. We can now 
ignore the search for the link between behavioural “units” such as aggression, 
depression, intelligence, etc., with biological “units” like genes, hormones, 
neurotransmitters, modules, etc. The study o f organism-environment interaction is 
what is usually called ecology: we now have a starting point for the ecology o f belief 
systems, the starting point being the knowledge of how and where they fit into the 
biological world.
Psychology has occupied a position between biology on one side and the social 
sciences on the other, and in some ways, it is not the mind/body debate but the 
nature/nurture debate that is at the heart of the historical differences between 
psychotherapy and other forms of medicine. We can now see that biology is as 
important as experience when it comes to the mind. The theory presented here has 
been a start to the entwining of the three traditional paths towards mental health: the 
psycho-dynamic, the evolutionary and the neurological. Continuing that entwining is 
the next step and, I will briefly attempt to move in that direction, while warning that 
this is only conjecture on my part. One immediate possibility which goes some way 
towards bridging the gap between the basic model of the human mind presented here, 
and the complex mental life that we know we have, involves studying the creation of 
the self.1
1 Perhaps another possibility is moving on directly to culture: Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner, (1993) in 
Cultural Learning, try to provide an evolutionary-psychological basis for cultural evolution with the 
focus being on what part the individual contributes to the process o f enculturation. They say that 
enculturation is dependent on social cognition, which we have seen is biological. It is interesting to
9.3) Narrative
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We have seen that the self —  in terms of the “I” and the “other” separation — is 
present from birth, contrary to what some psychotherapeutic theories claim. There is 
nothing remarkable about this: most organisms would need this differentiation 
between the organism and the environment to survive. But in higher organisms there 
is something more, there is a knowledge of this separation. Humphrey's (and other) 
theories of consciousness and qualia depend on this separation: the difference 
between what is happening out there and what is happening to me. There is, however, 
another facet to the idea of self, and this may be more directly applicable to 
psychotherapy.
This is the notion of the continuous self, continuous from moment to moment. Further 
research might be able to show how it is created. I feel that the central idea here is of 
narrative, the narrative that creates the self by adding a temporal dimension to beliefs, 
desires and action. This is probably more than just planning long term projects: by 
narrative, I mean something that gives cohesion to the separate facts we experience 
and the beliefs that pick them out, and goes a step further in joining mental events 
with actions over time. So narrative is an account of causality in time, together with 
reasons for that causality. It is an “argument” o f action; a causally related sequence of 
events.
But a narrative is also a communicative action. Communicating to what or whom? I 
suspect it is to ourselves first. (This is reminiscent o f Barlow's idea o f consciousness
note that in the peer commentary following the article, some o f the contributors take issue with the
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as the mentally omnipresent other, the other built up out o f the earliest interactions of 
the infant and the caregiver.) But whether it is to oneself or to others, the narrator has 
to know what is appropriate and important to the narrative, and need some 
understanding of the listener’s knowledge base. So a narrative is transactional or 
socially organised. Notice that there is a difference between “A knows that b is the 
case” and that “A thinks that b might be the case”. This is the way narratives or stories 
are organised and this is the difference between precursors to, and a full blown folk 
psychology.1
We have seen that social organisation is dependent on the ability to have beliefs and 
desires, which itself is built on social interaction. How then does our everyday 
narrative result from the social organisation built into our brains? This might be a 
worthwhile area of research. Carrithers (1991) suggests that it is a distinct cognitive 
power in itself. This is a possibility, but I do not agree with his statement that it is a 
power that is unique to humans. Perhaps it is only the length or time frame of the 
human narrative that is significantly different from those of the higher primates. 
Carrithers also points out that this ability to form narratives does not necessarily have 
to be a linguistic skill (p. 313); but examining how language is connected to narrative 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, even at the stage of pure conjecture.
With this suggestion for further research I will close. We made a distinction between 
models and theories in Section 2.1: what these research suggestions should make clear 
is that we do now have a model. This model can be used to check other theories and
claim that only humans have cultural learning, citing examples o f chimpanzees doing the same.
1 There is a distinctive lack of narrative ability in autism (See Loveland and Tunali, 1993.).
show that evolutionary theory itself can provide a foundation for an integrated 
approach to psychotherapy, integrated with biology and evolutionary theory on which 
biology is grounded. There are, o f course, illnesses that result from the effects of 
genetic or physiological disorders which affect the mind, but now we can state with 
greater conviction that the very belief-forming mechanisms which allow us to 
examine the world are a part o f our biology.
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Appendix
I would like to make a note of an early precursor to this thesis. One of the 
philosophers I mention is Karen Neander, a major worker on etiological theories of 
function. Her ideas were originally developed in her 1984 Ph.D. thesis, Abnormal 
Psychobiology, and that work is similar in content to some sections of the present 
work, in that her work prefigures it, especially chapters three and six which seem very 
close to her thesis.1
Unfortunately, the difficulty of acquiring her thesis meant that I could not consult it 
until after I had finished my own thesis and hence could not mention it in the body of 
the present work.
In her thesis, the problem she attempts to resolve is the applicability o f the biomedical 
model to psychiatry, centering around the question I asked at the start of chapter 
three: If a patient has no organic disease, trauma, or lesion, and no anatomical, 
physiological or neurochemical abnormality, can he or she still be considered ill if 
they show mental disorders? She focuses on the “antipsychiatry movement” which 
was concerned with condemning the medicalization of mental illness; claiming that 
medical methods should not be used to treat disorders which were purely mental.
Her defense of medicalisation starts from showing that the concepts of illness, disease 
and health were not natural kinds in themselves but rest on the notion of function and 
dysfunction. She then develops an evolutionary theory of function, based on a 
reworking of Wright’s theory. She shows how central it is to biology, or, as she says, 
“ ...[T]he concept o f function is the corner-stone of biological theory” (Neander, 
1983, p.53) Further, she uses this theory to emphasize the continuity of psychology 
with biology. She then goes on to show that functionalism as a theory of mind can be 
incorporated into such an etiological theory. From which her conclusion — that 
psychiatry is a valid method of treating mental disorders —  follows.
1 Neander, K. (1983) Abnormal Psychobiology, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, La Trobe University.
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It can be seen that our topics are similar in quite a few areas. However, there are 
major differences. Her problem is slightly different from mine: she wants to show that 
medical systems (psychiatry) can be used to treat mental disorders because all 
dysfunction, mental or otherwise, rests on function. In my case, I have already 
assumed a difference between psychiatry and psychotherapy but question the 
usefulness of the later since there does not seem to be a way o f validating its 
methodology. So, my primary aim was to develop a framework which can actually be 
used by psychotherapy, rather than take part in the antipsychiatry debate. But it must 
be noted that these two problems are quite similar in intent.
Then I use a discussion of the medical model as well as the computer analogy to show 
the importance of function and malfunction in providing criteria for health and ill 
health. My notion of what the mind is was developed from the standpoint of folk 
psychology. I use this to explore the philosophically problematic areas of the mind 
such as intentionality, representation and the further problem of metarepresentation. 
Instead, Neander, starts from a functionalist position and then goes on to argue that 
functionalism is based on biological function. Therefore she needs to defend 
functionalism against its detractors, which was not necessary for my thesis, since 
rather than take a stand on any philosophical position, I just allowed one to develop.
A major difference between the two theses is that while Neander does show that the 
mind can be seen as a function*! adaptation just like any other biological entity, she 
does not go on to ask what this function actually is. This is of course a major theme of 
the present work.
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